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Following the 1991 Criminal Justice Act a 'dangerous' offender is liable to a longer than
normal sentence of imprisonment in order to prevent the commission of future serious
violent and sexual crimes. The thesis argues that this new power is similar to, but
significantly different from earlier legislative and medical attempts to control dangerous
offenders. The new power establishes a system of social defence which proactively
punishes offenders and generates a societal reliance on incapacitation through
imprisonment. Such a policy arises out of a general failure of belief in modem
criminological theories to provide a methodology for reducing all criminality including
serious violent and sexual crimes.
The liberal state must justify the longer than normal detention of 'dangerous' offenders if
it is to use this coercive power in a legitimate way. The thesis argues that the state is
limited in its power to punish 'dangerous' offenders for what they might do. The state
cannot discriminate against offenders by redistributing benefits which privilege some
citizen's liberty over others without putting at risk the state's claim to treat all citizens
equally. Neither can the state presume to predict and to judge in advance a rational
citizen's future behaviour without seriously violating important moral principles. The
situation is different for non-rational 'dangerous' offenders, for whom the use of
incapacitation may be permissible, but civil detention must still be imposed in offenders'
best interests not in the best interests of others.
That the state does violate fundamental liberal principles is made possible by social and
cultural changes in which crime avoidance becomes a conscious part of everyday life. A
heightened sense of the risk of crime reduces opposition to the incapacitative and
disproportionate use of imprisonment and encourages a policy of social defence by
governments frustrated at their inability to control crime. Nevertheless, the use of longer




PUNISHMENT OF 'THE INNOCENT'
1.1 Introduction
For many Western countries, the decade of the 1990s saw the accelerated development of
a political culture that placed the incapacitation of 'the dangerous' at the centre of penal
and health care policy. In countries such as the UK, the USA, Australia and Canada,
people who were found to be dangerous, either through criminal activity or through
mental illness were subjected to policies designed to 'protect the public' from them1.
These policies were intended to encompass, perhaps especially, those people who were
merely predicted to be dangerous since there are obvious utilitarian advantages in
preventing harmful behaviour before it occurs.
The question at the heart of this thesis is whether it is justifiable for the modern liberal
state to take such action, that is, to incapacitate adult offenders who are assumed to be
dangerous. In England and Wales s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act2 (the 1991
Act) permits sentencers to imprison offenders convicted of a violent or sexual offence for
a longer period than is commensurate with the offence if it is considered that they will go
on to commit a serious violent or sexual offence. Provisions such as this are prima facie
illiberal since they authorise the imprisonment (or the imprisonment for a longer period)
of offenders on the basis of something they might do rather than on the basis of
something they have done. Yet the modern state is founded upon liberal principles, in
particular the political and legal principles concerning the state's power to control and
punish citizens. The thesis considers whether a provision such as s.2(2)(b) of the 1991
Act can ever be compatible with liberal political theory. In addition, taking the political
climate in which the 1991 Act was introduced into account, this thesis addresses the
question of why such an apparently illiberal provision failed to excite public protest.
1
Pratt, J (1997) Chapter 2
2 The provisions of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act and other sentencing legislation have
been consolidated in the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (the
PCC(S)A 2000). S. 2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act is now S. 80(2)(b) of the
PCC(S)A 2000. References throughout refer to the original legislation in order to situate
the provision more finely in its social and political context.
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In brief, in this thesis I will:
(i) describe the history, context and form of punishment of 'innocent' 'dangerous'
offenders - those who have not committed a serious offence and are imprisoned
on the basis that they require incapacitation to prevent predicted dangerous acts;
(ii) consider the relationship between the concepts of 'incapacitation' and
'punishment'. It will be argued that incapacitation imposed by the state for either
past or future wrong-doing is always a form of punishment. Incapacitation
delivered via the criminal justice system will be distinguished from non-punitive
incapacitation e.g. quarantine and prophylactic interventions;
(iii) argue that the state resorts to incapacitation partly because of a failure of
criminological and other discourses to supply an alternative solution to the
problem of the dangerous offender i.e. these discourses have failed to provide the
methodology to predict or prevent dangerous offences;
(iv) argue that punishment of the innocent fails to fit within a liberal political
framework, and suggest ways in which incapacitation of the 'dangerous' person
might be made to fit within liberal constraints, precisely by exploiting the
distinction between punishment and [non-punitive] incapacitation (alluded to
under (ii)), and taking into account the rationality (or otherwise) of offending
behaviour;
(v) argue that the use of expert discourses and the public's attitude to risk have made
it possible for the state to introduce an apparently illiberal measure, and argue
that we can expect this form of punishment of the 'innocent' to remain
government policy.
The title of this thesis contains quotation marks around the word 'dangerous' for a
reason3. The marks are intended to distinguish the dangerous offender who has been
convicted of a serious violent or sexual offence from the 'dangerous' offender who has
not. The latter is deemed to be dangerous before he or she has committed or been
convicted of a serious violent or sexual offence. This thesis will be concerned primarily
with the longer than commensurate sentences imposed on offenders who are assumed to
be dangerous but who have not yet committed a dangerous act. This is made clear, it is
hoped, by the use of the quotation marks around the word 'dangerous' where relevant
3 A similar stylistic device is used in Floud and Young (1981) Preface, p ix
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and by the use of provocative words such as 'innocent' to describe those who are
subjected to punishment on this basis.
The thesis is centred around s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act because of the
explicit element of incapacitation of the 'innocent' enabled in this provision. The
provision allows for the incapacitation through extended imprisonment of those who
have committed serious violent or sexual offences4, and it further permits the
incapacitation of those who have not yet committed such serious offences. The historical
background to the 1991 Act, outlined below, shows that legislators and policy makers
have sought for many years to incapacitate offenders who commit specified criminal acts
and as a result were found to be dangerous. Yet the 1991 Act is special in that it permits
the incapacitation of those who are felt likely to be dangerous, before they have
committed a dangerous act. The historical analysis outlined below is brief, and does not
fully explore the connections between mental health and criminal justice policy and
legislation. It is intended merely to give an impression of the number and variety of
attempts in England and Wales to control the behaviour of those citizens felt to pose a
particular danger to other citizens. The fact that so many mental health and criminal
justice initiatives have been employed to this end throughout the 20th century shows the
importance of the issue to policy makers. However, the fact that new policies continue
beyond the 1991 Act into proposed criminal justice and mental health legislation of the
21st century must surely suggest that the state has not come to a permanent solution.
Indeed, it will be argued in chapter two that it is precisely because punishment of the
proven dangerous did not solve the problem of the dangerous offender, that the 1991 Act
advocated the punishment of the 'innocent', a practice which looks likely to continue.
In the rest of this chapter I shall set out the background to this thesis, both the conceptual
background in terms of assumptions and usage and the historical background to the 1991
Act. Critical political, sociological and philosophical evaluation of the policy is reserved
for later in this thesis.
4 This power has existed for some time, see e.g. Moore (1986) Cr App R (S) 376,
Zacharko [1988] CLR 546
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1.2 Punishment and desert
I have acknowledged that the word 'innocent' is controversial in the context of a
provision that applies to persons who have been convicted of an offence5. Such offenders
are, of course, guilty of the violent or sexual offence of which they are convicted.
However, the problem which underlies this discussion of s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal
Justice Act is that the pain of confinement inflicted in the name of incapacitation is
imposed to prevent crime that has not been committed rather than to punish crimes that
have been committed. The problem this raises is, 'To what extent is such incapacitation
deserved?' There is considerable discussion of this question in the penological literature6
and a limited answer to it will form the basis of the discussion in chapter 3. As well as
the question of desert, it is important to look at the foundations of the state's power to
impose undeserved punishment on citizens as this is obviously an immensely powerful
mechanism of control and has the potential for significant abuse.
Firstly we need to consider what it means for something to be deserved. Philosophers
such as Feinberg argue that any benefit or suffering which is deserved necessarily arises
due to some characteristic or action on the part of the person who benefits or suffers7.
The difference between a reward and a gift is that the reward reflects some action of the
recipient. The giving of a gift may have nothing to do with the recipient but may reflect
the kindness, altruism or beneficence of the giver. The word 'reward' relies for its
semantic force on the recognition that it is being given as a result of an act or
characteristic of the receiver. Likewise, the difference between punishment and
mistreatment is that the punishment reflects some action of the punished8. The
mistreatment reflects the character of the abuser rather than any characteristic of the
5 Duff (1986b) argues that deliberately punishing an innocent person is a perversion of
punishment, and this is why it must be accompanied by dishonesty and deceit on the part
of the punishing authorities.
6
E.g. von Hirsch (1986)
7
Feinberg J (1970) Chapter 4, see also similar discussions in Primoratz (1989), Flew
(1969), Hart (1973), Honderich (1976)
8 This may not always be true of some more metaphorical uses of punishment: e.g. 'a
punishing schedule', 'the team took a lot of punishment defending a narrow lead'. Here
punishment is equated with inflicted pain without thought to desert. We see that these are
metaphorical when, if we ask what they are punishments for, there is no answer.
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abused person. Punishment however, requires that the person punished is, or is perceived
to be, responsible for, or deserving of, the punishment imposed.
Feinberg confirms this distinction when he states that: '...judgements of desert carry with
them a commitment to the giving of reasons'9. Although Feinberg does not say this
explicitly, the reasons for the judgement must not only be articulated, they must be sound
in some sense. We cannot just adduce any (supposed) fact in justification of a judgement
of desert, the reason or reasons given must be appropriate i.e. morally relevant to the
action. E.g. it is not usual to say something like:
Ario deserves to win the lottery because he has green eyes.
The claim to desert here seems rather weak, even though it is articulated and a reason has
been given. It strikes us as more appropriate to say:
Ario deserves to win promotion because he works hard and is good at his job.
What is crucial, in this elaboration of Feinberg's argument, is that the desert attaches to
some relevant quality or action of the individual. It would similarly strike us as
inappropriate for someone to say:
Ario deserves to be beaten up because he has green eyes.
Being green-eyed is a quality which, for the sake of the example, we may agree Ario has.
However it is hard to see how this quality is relevant to his deserving to be beaten up.
Without any further information, the reason is not sufficiently compelling for the
suffering to be seen to be truly 'deserved'.
Any particular claim to desert may be flawed, but if it is articulated and relevant the
invocation of desert is still appropriate and natural. Consider the following:
Ario deserves to be beaten up because he is a liar.
9
Feinberg (1970) p 58
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This justification may be morally problematic (why should liars be beaten up?) or
inaccurate (Ario is not a liar) but since the use of desert is potentially apposite, we have a
sentence which makes moral as well as semantic sense to most English speakers.
It seems that 'winning the lottery' or 'being beaten up' are examples of gains and pains
which may be undeserved or deserved. The situation with respect to the deservedness of
state inflicted punishment is more complex. The word 'punishment' conveys with it a
sense that it must be deserved. Implicit in the notion of punishment is the concept of
social censure10 and censure cannot lack articulation or justification. Punishment is more
than just the imposition of pain or the deprivation of goods such as money. If it was not,
then high taxes and dental treatment would be punishment, and they are not, except
metaphorically". Punishment carries with it disapproval and condemnation, and it is
impossible to see how disapproval or condemnation can be thought of as undeserved by
those voicing the disapproval or condemnation (assuming they act in good faith). The
pain imposed may be morally questionable or the circumstances may be factually wrong,
but for the pain to be punishment, there must be a justification for its imposition. That is
to say, it must be seen to be deserved.
Yet the term 'undeserved punishment' is not a moral oxymoron. Rather, what it indicates
is a difference between two perspectives. Pain may be inflicted as punishment by one
party which judges it 'deserved'; a second party either knows of no adequate justification
having been given or being available, or judges any justification of the infliction of pain
to be inadequate. There may be no disagreement as to the facts of the case. The
interpretation of the facts however, will involve judgements influenced by political
considerations and it is these that bring about the difference in perspectives.
Nevertheless, the philosophical foundation of punishment is that it be deserved. But a
judgement of desert is context dependent. It was hinted above that the sentence:
Ario deserves to be beaten up because he has green eyes.
10 Duff (1986), von Hirsch (1993)
n I.e. dental treatment may be seen as 'punishment' for poor oral hygiene, and high taxes
may be seen as 'punishment' for poor fiscal management.
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does not make moral sense (rather than semantic sense) without further information. To
be more exact, it does not make sense to us. However, in a society which has different
values and beliefs, the position may be different. For example, consider the additional
context provided by:
Witches cause harm.
Only witches have green eyes.
Ario has green eyes.
Therefore, Ario is a witch and causes harm.
Hence,
Ario deserves to be beaten up because he has green eyes.
Having supplied the detail, it is apparent that, if all of the steps in the argument are
believed by those participating, Ario's beating may well be held to be deserved by those
participating. This is so even though we, today, find the justification spurious and, in all
likelihood, consider the judgement itself morally untenable because we think it most
unlikely that being green-eyed could be an appropriately relevant feature in any similar
circumstance. It is essential to examine the context in which justifications of any
punishment are offered, including both moral and factual beliefs, before it can be
established whether participants in that context regard the punishment as being deserved.
Thus, in the context of a late modern society with high levels of recorded crime, rising
levels of violent crime and an increased awareness of sexual crime, the punishment of the
'innocent' may be explicable. Chapter 5 considers the social and political context of such
measures in detail.
The argument above establishes that there is a context-dependent moral requirement for
the articulation of reasons for imposing punishment. This requirement is expressed
through the legal limitations of the right of the modern state to punish. In the modem
liberal state, the punishment of unconvicted people offends longstanding political values
and fundamental legal principles because the punishment has not been shown to have
13
been deserved. For example, textbooks in English criminal law commonly start by
asserting that:
The accused is guilty only if he has acted. He is not liable for being just as he is
(e.g. poor, religious, black). People are not punished for mere thoughts... the
accused is guilty only if he had at least some control over his behaviour. There
must be a willed act, a voluntary act12.
As the quotation above implies, not only is it necessary for the act to have been
committed, it must be determined that it has been committed by that person, i.e. the
reason for the imposition of any punishment on that person must be articulated. As noted
above, 'punishment' cannot be imposed at random, without any justification, since this
removes the element of deservedness which is essential to the sentence being
punishment13.
The principle that punishment should follow only upon conviction is tacitly accepted in
current textbooks but it can be identified in the Declaration of Rights dating from
February 1689 and which arose from the events known as the Glorious Revolution14. The
Declaration states:
And thereupon the said lords spiritual and temporal and Commons... do in the
first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating
and asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare:...
12 Jefferson (1999) p 4-5
13
However, as the analysis of miscarriages of justice has shown the justification for the
imposition of punishment may be factually mistaken, see Walker and Starmer (1999)
(eds.)
14 The principle dates back to the Magna Carta clause 39 'No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed - nor will we go
upon or send upon him - save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land'. But as the events of the Glorious Revolution established the sovereign powers of
parliament, the 1689 declaration is arguably the first record of the limitation of the
state's power to punish.
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... 12. That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons
before conviction are illegal and void.15
In general, the law holds that without the determination that there has been a proscribed
act (conjoined with a particular mental state), there can be no conviction. Without a
conviction, there is no justification for the imposition of punishment. So, we have two
important legal principles arising from the moral foundations of the concept of desert:
1. There should be no punishment without a prior conviction;
2. A conviction requires determination that the accused committed a criminal
act.
These principles (or more strictly, principle 1 which follows from principle 2) limit the
state's ability to exert coercive control, i.e. punishment, over citizens. However, there are
some exceptions to both these general principles. There are exceptions to the requirement
that criminal liability requires an act: an omission may be considered a type of act so e.g.
the failure to feed a dependant person, who dies as a result, may constitute murder16.
Similarly, there is an exception to the principle that punishment cannot be imposed
before conviction: a person who has not been convicted of any offence may be held on
remand in custody awaiting trial. In this way, a court can lawfully decline to release an
accused person on bail under the Bail Act of 1976 if there are grounds to believe that
there is a risk that the accused will fail to return to court when required, will interfere
with witnesses or will commit further offences while on bail. The police also have
powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act 1994 to hold a suspect in custody while awaiting a court appearance or
while collecting evidence against the suspect.
15
Quoted in House of Commons (2001)
'6 R v Gibbons and Proctor 13 Cr App R 134
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The use of remand alerts us to an idealisation in our conception of 'punishment'. It was
established above, that the moral foundations of punishment require justification for its
imposition. This clearly cannot be given before conviction and a remand prisoner will not
have been convicted of the instant offence17. Remand in this sense is not 'punishment'.
But remand is a form of coercive control of the citizens by the state, albeit without the
formal condemnation and expression of disapproval which follows from conviction and
sentencing. The conditions under which a remand prisoner is held are almost identical to
those of a sentenced prisoner. Thus, it can be argued that the remand prisoner is indeed
being 'punished' prior to conviction although the deservedness of such action has not yet
been confirmed. That this is indeed how we see remand some of the time is shown by the
fact that any period of time spent in custody on remand is counted against any sentence
of imprisonment that is subsequently imposed18. That there is idealisation in our
conception of punishment, or perhaps just an unwillingness to face up to its
consequences, is shown by the fact that no restitution is made to the prisoner detained on
remand and later found not guilty: his case is not treated as a case of wrongful
imprisonment for which compensation would be offered. Perhaps this shows that, while
there are moral and legal principles concerning the requirements that must be met for a
person to be found guilty of a crime and imprisoned, these requirements are not absolute.
It also highlights the importance of censure to the understanding of what constitutes
punishment.
We should note, however, that there are other instances in which the state exercises
coercive control over the citizen and in which questions of desert and punishment do not
arise. Taxation has already been mentioned above, enforced quarantine in the event of an
epidemic of disease is another example. Such exercises of power are given utilitarian
justifications. This is also the received view concerning remand, i.e. that the interests of
justice are served by detaining the accused rather than permitting him or her the
opportunity either to re-offend or to abscond before trial (see discussion in section 1.7
below). Questions about the role of utilitarian decision making will be considered in
detail in chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis.
17 The 'instant' offence is the offence for which he or she is accused. Obviously a remand
prisoner may have previous convictions.
18 Wasik (2001) s 4.4.5
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1.3 Principles of sentencing and the 1991 Act
The rules concerning the correct, i.e. legally permissible, imposition of punishment have
developed as the criminal law has evolved and as new forms of punishment have become
available. Principles of sentencing exist to govern the appropriate imposition and length
of a custodial sentence following conviction. The common law and statutory law have
traditionally only set sentence maxima for the period of imprisonment for which an
offender may be sentenced for particular crimes19, apart from murder20. The 1991 Act,
for the first time in English statute law, introduced general guidance concerning the
imposition of custodial sentences and the length of any custodial sentence, where that
period is not mandatory. The principle set out in the 1991 Act states that custody should
only be imposed if the offence committed is so serious that only such a sentence can be
justified21 or if custody is necessary to protect the public from the offender22. Thus, in
effect, the Act states that custody can only be imposed if the state wishes to impart to the
offender and the public the message that this offence is particularly serious, or, where the
offender is a risk to the public, though it is often not clear where these thresholds lie23.
Having established the requirement for custody, the 1991 Act also restricts sentencers as
to the length of prison sentences they may impose. The Act limits the length of sentence
to a term 'commensurate with the seriousness of the offence or the combination of the
offence and one or more offences associated with it'24, although seriousness is a vaguely
defined concept25. The reference in the Act to the commensurate length of the sentence
19 This has recently changed with the introduction of mandatory sentencing legislation
known as 'two-strikes' legislation in the 1997 Crime (Sentences) Act
20 Which results in a mandatory life sentence of imprisonment.
21 S. l(2)(a)7997 Criminal Justice Act now S. 79(2)(a) of the Powers of the Criminal
Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCC(S)A 2000)
22 S. l(2)(b) 1991 Criminal Justice Act, now S. 79(2)(b) of the PCC(S)A 2000
23 Ashworth and von Hirsch (1997)
24 S. 2(2)(a) 1991 Criminal Justice Act, now S. 80(2)(a) of the PCC(S)A 2000. This
principle also dates back to the Magna Carta clause 20 'For a trivial offence, a free man
shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood'.
25 Cochrane et al (1993)
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was intended to prevent the application by sentencers of longer terms of imprisonment in
order to set an example to others26. This 'length of prison sentence' criterion in the 1991
Act illustrates a third general principle:
1. There should be proportionality between the seriousness of the offence and
the punishment imposed for that offence.
Although such a general principle appears prima facie to be incontrovertible, in practice
it elicits a variety of problems given that seriousness is not well defined and it is difficult
to measure the difference in the punitive weight of penal measures27.
As the restrictions on the imposition of custody cited above imply, the 1991 Act and the
policy documents that preceded it, were explicit in advising sentencers that they should
use imprisonment sparingly and only impose it as a punishment of last resort. This
guidance was not new to the 1991 Act, having been expressed 10 years earlier in the case
ofBibi where it was stated:
sentencing courts must be careful to examine each case to ensure, if an
immediate custodial sentence is necessary, that the sentence is as short as
possible, consistent only with the duty to protect the interests of the public and to
punish and deter the criminal28
The principle of parsimony referred to in Bibi, requiring sentencers to impose the
shortest period of imprisonment possible, has been stressed by the higher courts
periodically throughout the past 100 years. Recently, following legislative changes which
have undermined the universal applicability of this principle, the Court of Appeal
26 See the comments of Taylor CJ in Cunningham [1993] 1WLR 183
27
von Hirsch (1993)
28 Bibi [1980] 1 WLR 1193
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restated the principle of parsimony in the case of Ollerenshaw29. Parsimony is seen as
desirable on financial and humanitarian grounds. The expense of custody is
acknowledged to be major financial burden for taxpayers and the interruption and
damage to offender's lives is well documented30. In practice, however, it is often difficult
to know what constitutes the features of a crime that make it so serious that only
imprisonment can be justified as a punishment for it. The Bibi judgement, referred to in
the case of Howells3\ cited the Chief Justice, Lord Bingham as saying that the 'nature
and extent of the defendant's criminal intention and the nature and extent of any injury or
damage caused' are indicators of offence seriousness32. The discussion in Howells echoes
earlier comment in the case of Bradbourn33 concerning the difficulty sentencers have in
articulating reasons why an offence is serious enough to require a custodial sentence to
be imposed34.
The 1991 Act's general criteria for the determination of sentence length35 have not been
altered in the consolidated Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (the
PCC(S)A 2000) and the principle remains that a prison term should be the minimum
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence and other offences associated with it,
and with the offender's previous convictions and response to previous sentences36. The
reference to offences 'associated with' the offence commonly refers to the situation
where an offender is convicted of several offences in one trial. However, relevant
'associated offences' include those which the defendant has requested be 'taken into
consideration'37. The theoretical advantage to the defendant of having other offences
'taken into consideration' is that any addition to the punishment for the extra offences is
less than it would have been if these charges had been tried separately. Yet, as Wasik
29 Ollerenshaw [ 1999] 1 Cr App R (S) 65 The principle of parsimony conflicts somewhat
with the provisions of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 s. 2, which states that, unless there
are exceptional circumstances, the court shall impose a life sentence on an offender
convicted of a second serious offence.
30 Both of these effects are acknowledged in Home Office (2002), discussed below.
31 Howells [1999] 1 WLR 307
32 cited in Wasik (2001) pi 18
33 Bradbourn (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 180
34 Ashworth and von Hirsch (1997), Wesson (1994), Thomas (1992), Nash (1992)
35 As amended in the Criminal Justice Act 1993
36 See Wasik (2001) ss. 2.2.5 and 4.4.2
37 See Wasik (2001) s. 3.8
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notes, having an offence taken into consideration does not amount to a conviction38. The
offence for which the offender has been convicted can be found to be more serious, and
the prison threshold reached, as a result of consideration of these unproven associated
'offences'39. Just as worrying is the fact that an offender convicted of an offence
committed while on bail and awaiting trial for another charge, may have the earlier
unproven charge considered an 'associated offence' for the purposes of gauging the
seriousness of the present conviction40.
The inclusion of the 'associated offences' criteria in a consideration of the seriousness of
the current offence undermines the proportionality requirements originally laid down in
the 1991 Act. This inevitably means that some offenders are being sentenced to prison
rather than a community sentence, or a longer prison sentence, on the basis of acts which
they have not done. This conflicts with the principles 1 and 2 above, as well as the
guidelines concerning proportionality between offence seriousness and sentence, and the
desirability of penal parsimony. Hence the guiding principles for determining sentence
length in the 1991 Act are contaminated through the detail and implementation of the
legislation.
1.4 Exceptions to principles
We have seen that three general principles concerning (i) the requirements for imposing
custody, (ii) the determination of guilt and (iii) the appropriate length of a prison
sentence all encounter exceptions. The seriousness criteria for custody may be based on
assumptions concerning unproven 'associated offences' rather than convictions. Recent
statutory changes have resulted in legislation which creates additional exceptions to the
principle of proportionality between seriousness of offence and severity of sentence.
38 Wasik (2001) p 107
39 The evidential requirements of this process are weak and the danger is that offenders
are being sentenced to custody on the basis of associated 'offences' which they did not
commit. There are temptations for the police to clear-up unsolved crimes by pressuring
suspects into signing lists of offences to be 'taken into consideration' and it is known that
some defendants admit to crimes they did not commit. See Belloni and Hodgson (2000)
Chapter 3
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Non-mandatory sentence minima have been set for certain specified offences, where the
offender satisfies conditions relating to previous offences and in which there are no
'particular circumstances'41. For example, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the
court must impose a minimum prison sentence of 7 years for third Class A drug
trafficking offence42. The argument that this results in a sentence which is manifestly
excessive for the instant offence has been rejected in the case of HarveyAi. Similarly, a
minimum sentence of three years imprisonment for a third domestic burglary44 must be
applied unless there are exceptional circumstances. An automatic life sentence for a
second serious offence45 must be imposed unless there are exceptional circumstances,
even where a sentencer feels that such a sentence is unjust46.
Both forms of life sentence also dissolve the connection between specific offence
seriousness and sentence severity. The discretionary life sentence is available for all
offences where it is provided as the maximum penalty. As it is an indeterminate sentence,
it has been argued by Wasik that this sentence logically cannot be commensurate with the
seriousness of the offence47 and should only be passed under the provisions of s.80(2)(b)
of the PCC(S)A 2000 i.e. as an explicitly incommensurate sentence. If the sentencer
wishes to sentence proportionately there is nothing to prevent him or her imposing a very
long determinate sentence of imprisonment for a very serious offence48. The
discretionary life sentence is been held to be appropriate only where the offence is very
serious and requires a long sentence, the offender suffers from a mental disorder and is a
danger to the public49. The discretionary life sentence is thought to be particularly
appropriate if the offender's mental illness is unbeatable and is unlikely to improve over
a known period50. These criteria are unrelated to the seriousness of the offence which has
40 See Baverstock [1993] 1 WLR 202, and s. 151(2) of the PCCA(S) 2000
41 See Wasik (2001) s. 4.2.1
42 S.l 10 PCC(S)A 2000 see Wasik (2001) s. 4.3.3
43
Harvey [2000] 1 Cr App R (S) 368
44 S. 111PCC(S)A 2000 see Wasik (2001) s. 4.3.4
45 S. 109 PCC(S)A 2000 see Wasik (2001) s. 4.3.6
46
Kelly [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 176
47 Wasik (2001) pi31
48 Wilson (1964) 1 Cr App R (S) 329
49 A-G's Reference (no 22 of 1996), [1977] 1 Cr App R (S) 191
50 In other cases an order under the Mental Health Act 1983 S. 37 may be more
appropriate, see Wasik (2001) 4.3.7
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been committed. The discretionary life sentence has long been justified as providing
protection from those offenders who are felt to be dangerous due to a continuing and
unbeatable mental disturbance. The combination of offence seriousness51 and the
offender's dangerousness is used to justify the imposition of an indeterminate sentence52.
It is not appropriate as a sentence for a serious offence where the offender is not
suffering from a mental illness or if it is felt that the offender's mental condition is likely
to improve during the term of a commensurate sentence. In the latter case, if the
offender's condition is thought likely to improve during the period of a commensurate
sentence, then a commensurate sentence should be imposed53. The inappropriate use of
the indeterminate life sentence may reflect some sentencers' desire to impose a sentence
which sounds particularly severe, arising from its parity with the mandatory life sentence.
Finally, the sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory for murder committed by an
adult. The absence of sentencing discretion for this crime means that it is impossible for
sentencers to reflect the wide variety of situations under which murder can be committed.
The offence of murder can encompass actions as diverse as a terrorist killing or the
facilitation of the death of a terminally ill spouse, but this cannot be reflected in the
sentenced imposed upon those convicted of this crime. The mandatory life sentence
therefore cannot be commensurate with the seriousness of the individual offence54. The
sentence has been criticised on this basis in a Report of the House of Lords Select
Committee55 which recommended that it should be abolished. The Sentencing Advisory
Panel has recently offered guidance to the Court of Appeal on the subject of 'minimum
sentences' for those convicted of murder which it argues should replace the mandatory
sentence.56 The arrangements for release of life sentence prisoners have also been
criticised for depending on the final approval of the Home Secretary, although this
process has been found to be in breach of human rights of the prisoner and is likely to
change. The involvement of the Home secretary was felt by many to result in a sentence
51 See Chapman [2000] 1 Cr App R (S) 377
52
Virgo (1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 427
53 Hercules 1980 2 Cr App R (S) 156
54 In practice the time served in prison following a conviction for murder can vary quite
widely. See Wasik (2001) S. 4.3.5
55 House of Lords (1989)
56 Sentencing Advisory Panel (2002)
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which is commensurate not with the seriousness of the crime but with the degree of
public interest in the case57.
1.5 Principles, Exceptions and Protecting the Public
It has been my intention in the brief survey of sentencing to draw attention to the fact that
sentencers have considerable legal authority to depart from the principles that govern the
imposition and length of sentences of imprisonment. Where the departure from principle
is permitted, the justification frequently given is that the public requires protection from
the offender and only a sentence of imprisonment will provide this protection38. This
justification was made clear in Protecting the Public, the White Paper preceding the
original Crime (Sentencesj Act of 1997 in which the statutory minimum sentence of three
years imprisonment was introduced for a third offence of domestic burglary:
The Government believes these proposals will strongly reinforce the successful
efforts the police are making to target some of the most callous and persistent
professional criminals in this country. Statutory minimum sentences for burglary
will act as a powerful deterrent. Those who persist regardless will be taken out of
circulation for a long time, thus protecting the public from their evil activities.
The public is entitled to expect no less59 (italics added).
The policy of imposing an automatic life sentences for those offenders convicted of two
serious offences originates from the same white paper:
57 See Home Office (1990) para 2.1 and also Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Hindley [1999] 2 WLR 1253
58 An exception being the mandatory sentence for murder, which reflects the seriousness
of the offence and does not consider the dangerousness of the offender. This issue has
recently been considered in the case of the conjoined twins Re: A [2001] 2 WLR 480
where the doctors' liability for the murder of the weaker twin during the separation
procedure was reviewed. The doctors were clearly not considered dangerous but would
have been liable to the mandatory life sentence if convicted of murder.
59 Home Office (1996) Protecting the Public paragraph 12.9
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Too often in the past, those who have shown a propensity to commit serious
violent or sex offences have served their sentences and been released only to
offend again. In such cases, the danger of releasing the offender has been plain
for all to see - but nothing could be done, because once the offender has
completed the sentence imposed, he or she has to be released. Too often, victims
have paid the price when the offender has repeated the same offences. The
government is determined that the public should receive proper protection from
persistent violent or sex offenders. That means requiring courts to impose an
automatic indeterminate sentence, and releasing the offender only if it is safe to
J 60do so .
These provisions show that the state has developed a number of measures which depart
from the principle of proportionality between offence seriousness and punishment, and
these can be employed where it is felt that this is necessary to protect the public from
dangerous offenders. Although they are all deviations from the principle of
commensurability, the mandatory life sentence, discretionary life sentence, automatic life
sentence and minimum sentences are all imposed following conviction for a serious
offence. If we assume the commission of a serious offence is tantamount to a finding of
dangerousness, then the sentences are consistent with the policy of imposing
disproportionately long sentences of imprisonment on dangerous offenders. Such
sentences may breach the principle of proportionality and the principle of parsimony, but
they do require the offender so sentenced to have been convicted of the act for which the
disproportionate sentence is imposed.
In s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act, the principle of commensurability between offence and
sentence has been eroded further to the point where it is effectively the case that a person
can be punished on the basis that an act which they might commit in future will be more
serious than anything they have done to date. S.2(2)(b) empowers sentencers to assume
60 Home Office (1996) Protecting the Public paragraph 10.11. The public protection
justification for the automatic life sentence has been reiterated in the case of Offen and
others [2001] 1WLR 253. On the other hand, an incompetent and non-aggressive attempt
at robbery, although a second serious offence, did not result in the automatic life
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that the offender will continue to offend, and gives them the discretion to assume that the
offending will escalate in degree of seriousness. A sentence imposed under s.2(2)(b)
contravenes principle 3. (above) which states that the punishment should in some way
reflect the seriousness of the crime committed.
S.2(2)(b) also circumvents the principles 1. and 2. even though there is a conviction, as
the punishment relates to another unconnected offence. The offender has been found
guilty of an offence but has not committed the act for which the extra punishment is
being imposed. The fact that the offender has committed a qualifying offence, somewhat
disguises the fact that the ancient principles are being discarded. The merging of two
offences, one which has been committed and another which is presumed will be
committed, hides that fact that the offender is being punished before there is a conviction
(for the future offence) and prior to a determination of guilt.
The discussion in section 1.4 and this section shows that there exist counter-principles,
statutory interventions and practices, some of which predate and others which succeed
the 1991 Act, that undermine general sentencing principles and the foundational
sentencing philosophy of the 1991 Act. So the inclusion of s.2(2)(b) in the Act as a
departure from the general proportionality principle is not exceptional or even
particularly unusual within the English criminal law. However, the following section will
detail the particular way in which s.2(2)(b) is novel, unique and qualitatively different
from the other deviations from the principles and practices outlines as exceptions to the
general requirements which must be satisfied before it is legitimate for punishment to be
imposed upon an 'innocent' offender.
1.6 The 1991 Criminal Justice Act
The 1991 Criminal Justice Act (as amended by the 1993 Criminal Justice Act s. 66(2))
introduces longer than normal penalty provisions as follows:
sentence as it was held that the offender did not pose a danger to the public, see Buckland
[2000] 1 WLR 1262.
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2. - (1) This section applies where a court passes a custodial sentence other
than one fixed by law.
(2) The custodial sentence shall be-
(a) for such term (not exceeding the permitted
maximum) as in the opinion of the court is
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, or the
combination of the offence and one or more offences
associated with it;
(b) where the offence is a violent or sexual offence, for
such longer term (not exceeding the maximum) as in the
opinion of the court is necessary to protect the public
from serious harm from the offender.
Note that under the 1991 Act, all custodial sentences are justified either on the basis of
the seriousness of the offence or on grounds of public protection if the offence is a sexual
or violent offence. A protective custodial sentence can only be imposed if:
where the offence is a violent or sexual offence, ... only such a sentence would
be adequate to protect the public from serious harm from [the offender].61
A custodial sentence passed under either s.l(2)(b) or s.2(2)(b) will be justified on the
grounds that it is necessary to protect the public but only a sentence passed under
s.l(2)(b) is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Both are imposed on the
basis of a 'predictive' rather than 'desert' based rationale62 the difference being that
under s.l(2)(b) the prediction affects the style of punishment (the 'custody threshold')
while under s.2(2)(b), the prediction affects the length of the custodial sentence. Even
though the move from a non-custodial to custodial sentence is, for the offender, a major
consequence of being found likely to commit serious harm in the future, the sentence of
imprisonment under s.l(2)(b) is nonetheless imposed as commensurate with the
61 S. l(2)(a)7997 Criminal Justice Act
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seriousness of the offence of which the offender has been found guilty, and it is not a
longer than normal or disproportionate sentence. A sentence passed under s.l(2)(b)
therefore does not suffer from the same political and philosophical difficulties as a
sentenced imposed under s.2(2)(b).
Section 2(2)(b) has been criticised on (at least) four grounds: (i) the inadequacy of the
definitions of violent and sexual offence; (ii) the limitation of the longer than normal
sentence to the maximum provided for the offence for which the offender is convicted;
(iii) the vagueness of the criteria used for imposition of a longer than normal sentence;
and (iv) the inflexibility of the sentence, i.e. the offender cannot be released earlier if he
or she is held no longer to be dangerous nor detained further if he or she is held still to be
dangerous63. Criticisms (i) and (iii) relate to the problems of determining the qualifying
criteria for the sentence. For the purposes of an examination of the political legitimacy of
imposing a longer than normal sentence it is the second and last of these criticisms that
are important. With respect to the second criticism, Thomas notes that 'the powers given
by the section are limited to the maximum sentence provided for the offence of which the
offender is convicted. This is particularly unsatisfactory in cases of violence, where
maximum sentences are relatively short...'64. However, this point surely applies just as
appropriately as a criticism of the length of the commensurate sentence. Thomas cites,
for example, the maximum sentences for unlawful wounding, maliciously inflicting
grievous bodily harm and assault occasioning actual bodily harm as being 'relatively
short' at five years. Yet as the longer than normal sentence is being imposed for an
offence that has not been committed, it does not seem unreasonable to limit the penalty to
the maximum possible for the offence of which the offender has been convicted. If this
were not the case, and e.g. the offenders could be sentenced to the maximum permitted
for a predicted offence then sentencers would be required to be much more specific
about the nature of the predicted offence. This would impose an extreme evidential
burden and allow considerable scope for appeal. As it is the Court of Appeal has stated
that the maximum sentence for any offence is reserved for the worst possible example of
62 Wasik (1998) 4.2.6
63 Thomas (1996)
64 Thomas (1996) p 5
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the offence6' so there is certainly scope for a longer than normal sentence to be imposed
and still offer some additional period of protection66. As Wasik notes: '...the average
length of prison terms actually imposed for offences is well below half the maximum
term which may lawfully be imposed'67.
Not even the prediction that the offender is likely to commit a serious violent or sexual
offence in the future justifies going beyond the maximum possible sentence for the (non-
serious) offence for which he or she has been convicted. An escalation in offence
seriousness can occur in two ways. The escalation may result from a more serious
incident of the same type - a more violent assault perhaps - or the escalation may result in
a more serious offence, e.g. an attempt to endanger life by poisoning rather than an
attempt to injure by poisoning. When a prediction is being made about a potential
increase in the seriousness of the person's offending, as will be the case under s.2(2)(b),
it is surely less unreasonable to assume that the future more serious offence will be of the
same type as the offence that has been committed, even if it is more serious, than to
assume that the offending will escalate into a different type of crime with a longer
maximum term of imprisonment68. If there were not this limitation, it would be possible
for the least serious violent or sexual offence imaginable to incur a life sentence, this
being the most serious sentence possible for a violent or sexual offence.
That said, there is a problem of how the sentencer regards a prediction of future more
serious offending. This is so particularly where statutory criminal law itself supplies fine
graduations in the seriousness of acts such that an increase in seriousness determines a
65
Byrne (1975) 62 Cr App R 159
66
Tonry (1994 and 1998) and Morris (1976) present versions of the argument that the
sentence for the instant offence should be placed within a range which is determined on a
retributive basis but within which adjustments can be made for mitigating, rehabilitative
and incapacitative purposes. A version of this sentencing philosophy informs the
Halliday report discussed below at s. 1.8.
67 Wasik (1998) p 124
68 A person convicted of the crime of attempted rape who is assumed to be likely to
commit more serious offences might well be considered likely to commit rape in future.
However, this does not alter the sentencer's options as (with a few exceptions) s 4(1) of
the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 permits the maximum punishment imposed for an
attempt to be the maximum that can be imposed for the offence itself. See Wasik (2001)
p 125
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different offence. An example is found in the offences relating to poisoning noted above.
When an increase in seriousness results in the act being defined as another crime, it is
indeed the case that the sentencer's discretion is constrained. To illustrate: in the case of
the crime of Administering Poison with Intent to Injure, the statutory maximum under the
s. 24 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is 5 years while the crime of
Administering Poison with Intent to Endanger Life carries a maximum penalty of 10
years under s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. A sentencer who thought
the 'dangerous' poisoner was likely to move from intending to injure to intending to
endanger life would be unable to incapacitate the offender for longer than 5 years. In
general however, the law provides scope for a substantial increase in the period of
imprisonment within the bounds of the maximum penalty of the offence for which the
offender has been convicted. As s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act has been conceived, the
increasing seriousness of predicted offences is not based on a scale of increasing
seriousness of offence type. Rather the increase in seriousness is based on some more
intuitive notion of a change in the quality of the offence, of which the offence before the
court is an instance.
As to the fourth criticism Thomas lists, that of the inflexibility of the sentence with
respect to the release of the convicted person sentenced under s.2(2)(b), the offender
sentenced to a longer than normal term of imprisonment is treated as if the sentence was
imposed as commensurate with the offence. As such, the offender is released at the latest
time designated by law, or earlier if (having served half of the sentence) the judgement of
the parole board is that the offender poses no danger to others. There is no difference
between the release process of the person serving a commensurate sentence and the
offender serving a longer than normal sentence. In both cases release occurs eventually
regardless of the likelihood of repetition of the offence or the commission of other
offences. The sentencing philosophy of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act was to punish
offenders on commensurate, retributive grounds69, i.e. on the basis of the seriousness of
the crime committed. Normally, altering a sentence on the basis of perceived changes in
the offender's propensity to reoffend would be irrelevant and it would be inappropriate to
alter the sentence that was imposed. However, when the sentencer is permitted to deviate
from a commensurate sentencing policy, as is the case with s.2(2)(b), Thomas argues that
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it is unfair to restrain the offender longer than is necessary where there is no continuing
evidence of dangerousness, or more plausibly, when there is positive evidence that the
offender is no longer dangerous. In effect, Thomas' criticisms amount to a complaint that
s.2(2)b is inflexible in both directions, both with regard to the still dangerous and the no
longer dangerous.
In defence of the policy of treating 'dangerous' offenders in the same way as offenders
sentenced to a commensurate period of imprisonment, it could be argued that a person
convicted under s.2(2)(b) is unlikely to have been so sentenced as a result of an isolated
offence, whereas a person with a commensurate sentence might well have been. The
Court of Appeal has given guidance to the effect that where there is no reason to suspect
future offending, an isolated case should not give rise to a sentence under s.2(2)(b)70. As
a result of the persistence of offending an offender might well be considered to
demonstrate a greater probability of future harm than the person convicted of an out of
character or first offence71. But this assumption only holds if there is an escalation in the
seriousness of offences. Otherwise a series of offences would not be an indication that
the offender will commit a more serious offence in the future, just that it is likely he or
she will commit more offences of the same type and no inference could be drawn with
respect to future offending being more serious.
Thomas' observes that the offender sentenced under s.2(2)(b) will be released at the
expiry of the term of his or her sentence. No extension of the term of custody can be
made on the basis that the offender poses a continuing risk of causing harm to the public.
As noted above, for the purposes of release from prison, the offender serving a s.2(2)(b)
sentence is treated exactly the same as his or her commensurately sentenced counterpart.
The problem with the 'inflexibility' criticism of the 1991 Act as mounted by Thomas, is
that it relies on an assumption that dangerous offenders are those (and only those)
identified by having been subject to a longer than normal sentence under s.2(2)(b). As
69 Ashworth (et al) (1992)
70 Crow (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 409. Clearly if there is no reason to suspect any further
offending the longer sentence cannot be justified, there must be evidence that further
serious offending would occur before the longer than normal sentence is justified.
71 Bestwick (1995) Cr App R (S) 268
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this is very unlikely to be the case, no special measures, such as indeterminate or
extendable sentences, should be set aside just for such offenders. Remedying Thomas's
criticism increases the likelihood of injustice in cases of predicted dangerousness. The
reasoning is unsound unless all and only those offenders who are dangerous are
identified as such (by receiving a longer than normal sentence). If this is not the case, and
some form of extendable sentence was re-introduced, then some 'dangerous' prisoners
would be released at the end of their term and others would not. Given that some of these
offenders have not yet committed a serious offence, it would be a further injustice to
detain those who have been identified as 'dangerous' beyond the (already longer than
normal) period for which they have been imprisoned. The criticism that Thomas notes is
also no more pertinent to the sentence imposed under s.2(2)(b) than it is to commensurate
sentences. If the government was concerned about release of imprisoned offenders who
present a continuing risk, and introduced measures to extend the period of imprisonment,
such measures would need to apply to all offenders since sentencers may fail to identify
some dangerous offenders. Such a policy, if unlimited in its scope, would require total
revision of the system of sentencing72.
The obvious problem with a policy of turning longer than normal sentences into
indeterminate sentences is that it totally invalidates the idea of sentence maxima or
proportionality between the offence and the punishment, which is retained, albeit in a
minimal form, with the maximum sentence limitations of s.2(2)(b). If all offenders were
liable to a variation in sentence length depending on each individual's ability to rebut
accusations of dangerousness pending his or her release, then no offender could ever be
certain of eventual release. Thomas' criticisms rather neglect to consider the overall
political ethos of the 1991 Act with its strong support for a commensurate 'just deserts'
sentencing ideology, and to recognise that the longer than normal sentencing provision
was an important and acknowledged exception to this general principle.
Within the body of English criminal law, s.2(2)(b) stands out as an obvious exception. As
noted above, there are provisions, statutes and practices that permit the state to imprison
citizens prior to conviction, and in a manner which is not aimed at achieving
72 SeeS 1.10 below
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proportionality between the offence or seriousness of the particular offence and the
sentence which is handed down by the court. Yet despite the growing number of
exceptions, s.2(2)(b) is special since it does not require the commission of a serious
violent or sexual offence to 'trigger' the consequences of the commission of such an act.
A presumption is made about the future behaviour of the offender, based in some cases,
on the evidence supplied by the conviction of a single offence. The singularity of
s.2(2)(b) is apparent, yet it fits within a history of legislation which has aimed to control
the behaviour of certain groups of citizens. As the following survey of the legislation
shows, the characteristics of such groups have changed over time. Despite being aimed at
different groups, the legislation detailed below has attempted, over the past 100 years, to
identify problematic populations and individuals, with the aim of incapacitating them,
making it difficult or impossible for them to commit crimes against the public. From
1908 to 1991, laws have been invoked to protect the public from the behaviours of those
who were perceived to be troublesome, frightening and disruptive. In short, s.2(2)(b) of
the 1991 Act, although novel, is merely the latest in a series of measures which attempt
to control those who are deemed to be dangerous.
1.7 Incapacitation and public protection: a short history
As noted in the introduction, the 1990s were not the first time in English legal history
that incapacitation was used as a form of harm (including crime) control, nor was that
decade the first time that the criminal law was knowingly used to incarcerate people who
have not yet been convicted of a crime. The long tradition of the detention of the legally
innocent on remand in order to ensure the attendance of the defendant at trial continues
and the proportion of prisoners who are unconvicted73 continues to be high. 7,950 untried
people were held in custody in 1999, down from 8,160 in 1998 and 8,450 in 1997. As the
average prison population in 1999 was 64,770, the proportion of people held in prison
who had not been convicted of an offence was over 12%. The average time spent in
custody in 1999 by male untried prisoners was at the lowest level seen during the last
decade, but was still 46 days. Female untried prisoners spent an average of 35 days in
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custody. In 1999 approximately 22 per cent of males and 21 per cent of females
remanded in custody were acquitted, or the proceedings were terminated resulting in
release without conviction74.
It was noted above that remand of untried prisoners was undertaken to ensure the
defendant's presence at trial and to prevent the defendant interfering with witness before
the trial. Justified in this way, remand is not an incapacitative procedure imposed to
prevent the defendant committing further crime75. Given the delays in the modern
criminal justice process noted above, (some) remand can be justified on the basis that
during the period between arrest and conviction, serious crimes may be committed and
that release of the defendant puts the public at risk76. Nevertheless, punishment of the
technically-innocent defendant on remand results in similar a breach of the principles of
justice as the punishment of the 'technically-innocent' offender under s. 2(2)(b) of the
1991 Act.
The reference to the 'technically-innocent offender' above points to one vitally important
difference between the remand prisoner and the 'dangerous' offender sentenced to a
longer than normal sentence. The remand prisoner may have no convictions. By contrast,
in order for the court to have the power to sentence a person deemed to be dangerous to a
longer than normal sentence, the person must have been convicted of a violent or sexual
offence. Although such offences need not be terribly serious, there is still some
significance to be attached to the fact that the person has 'qualified' for a longer than
normal sentence where the remand prisoner may not have committed any offence.
Perhaps therefore it is provocative to suggest that s.2(2)(b) provision of the 1991 Act
applies to 'innocent' people? The presence or absence of previous convictions similar to
the current offence, or the overall pattern of offending behaviour, may be a relevant
73 Of course, the people held in prison pending trial may well have had previous
convictions but they have not been convicted of the 'instant' offence for which they are
defendants before the court.
74 Home Office (2000) Prison Statistics: England and Wales The Stationery Office,
London
75 Remand is incapacitative in the logically trivial sense that failure to attend for trial
without good reason and obstructing the course of justice are further offences
76 Ashworth A (1998) Chapter 7.
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factor for the liberal state to take into consideration when considering the justifications
of incapacitation. It has been argued, for instance, that a consequence of having a
criminal conviction is that the convicted person forfeits their moral standing, in particular
the convicted person forfeits the right to be assumed 'innocent'77. Such an argument
would thus permit the distinctive treatment of the 'dangerous' convicted person
compared with the treatment of the innocent remand prisoner78.
Imprisonment under s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act and imprisonment on remand are alike in
that they invoke procedures that incapacitate the 'innocent'. Typically however, the law
incapacitates convicted offenders through the use of commensurate terms of
imprisonment (although other methods are available79). The usefulness of a prison
sentence as a way of forcing offenders temporarily to cease offending has been accepted
for at least a century. The 1908 Prevention ofCrime Act (the 1908 Act) arose out of the
Gladstone Committee's observation in 1895 that for certain offenders, typically those
who persisted in offending, punishment did not result in deterrence or reform. The
outcome of recommendations made by this committee was contained in Part II of the
1908 Act. As explained by the Home Secretary of the day it was intended for
'professional criminals who were often highly skilled in their trade and who preferred a
life of crime'80. Part II of the 1908 Act required a jury to consider the question of
whether an offender who met certain criteria and who had been sentenced to a period of
penal servitude was a 'habitual offender' (a person could also admit to this additional
charge). If it was found that the convict was a habitual criminal, the court had discretion
to impose a sentence of preventive detention. The period of preventive detention would
follow the sentence of penal servitude (i.e. it was consecutive and not concurrent) and
would add a period of between 5 and 10 years to the sentence of penal servitude as
determined by the court. A 'habitual criminal' was defined in the Act as a person who
since the age of 16 had been convicted of a crime and was leading persistently a
dishonest or criminal life.
77 Goldman (1982), Morris (1991).
78
Chapter 2 considers this question in greater detail.
79
E.g. disqualification from operating a business.
80
Quoted in Taylor (1960) p 21
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The 1908 Act was concerned to use imprisonment to control the behaviour of persistent
offenders even when this offending was not particularly serious. The 1908 Act required
that the offender was given notice that, in addition to the specific charges for which he or
she was appearing before the court, there was an intention to charge him or her as an
Habitual Criminal. The grounds for this charge included:
• that the offender was an associate of thieves and persons of bad
character;
• that for a specified period the offender had been almost continuously
in prison for various offences;
• that the licence for a previous offence had not expired;
• that the offender had previously been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment and penal servitude;
• that the offender had abandoned honest employment to resume a
dishonest or criminal life;
• that the offender committed the offences for which he now stands
committed for trial whilst on licence from a sentence of preventive
detention.
Although the habitual criminal provisions of the Act were designed to prevent crime, and
frequent or 'habitual' offenders were obviously its concern, a government memorandum
of 1911 reminded prosecutors and the police that the provisions of preventive detention
were designed to apply to persistent dangerous criminals and not just nuisance offenders
such as petty thieves or pilferers. As well, the police were advised not to request
indictment on a charge of being a habitual criminal unless the accused was over 30 years
of age, had previously undergone a period of penal servitude and the current charge was
a serious offence. This later alteration clearly indicates that other disposals were
considered more appropriate for younger offenders. Even for older offenders
straightforward punishment must have been tried before a sentence of preventive
detention could be imposed. These developments in the use of the 1908 Act's preventive
detention provision make clear the government's view that it should be used only as a
sentence of last resort. However, as a sentence of last resort it was (not surprisingly) little
used. Between the years 1912 and 1935, 1020 people were sentenced to preventive
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detention, an average of 44 convictions a year. This was despite the fact that in just one
year, 1929, 8329 offenders were held in English prisons having a penal biography which
included at least 6 terms of imprisonment81.
Although the infrequent use of the sentence of being a habitual criminal need not have
been seen as a problem, the fact that so few offenders were sentenced to preventive
detention was noted and used as an argument for revising the sentence for persistent
offenders82. Although the government's aim and explicit instructions concerning the use
of preventive detention emphasised the desire that the sentence should be used only for
those offenders whose crimes were both persistent and serious, it was apparent that
police, prosecutors and courts were keen to see some form of special sentence devised to
apply to those whose crimes were persistent if not particularly serious. As the 1932
Departmental Committee on Persistent Offenders concluded, a extension of between 5
and 10 years was obviously excessive for most merely persistent offenders and did not
provide a remedy for the offending of those younger than 30. Critics of the 1908 Act
argued that those offenders who were persistent in petty crimes, and those who were
younger, could possibly be prevented from further crimes by a shorter extended period of
detention combined with some form of training or treatment and that this option should
be available to the courts. It was this feeling that the provisions were missing their target
that led to a revision of the preventive detention provisions of the 1908 Act.
The 1932 Departmental Committee recommended a separate sentence of corrective
training for younger offenders and this recommendation was incorporated into the 1948
Criminal Justice Act (the 1948 Act). However, preventive detention of between 5 and 14
years was retained for those offenders over 30 who had at least 3 previous convictions,
had been sentenced to either borstal or corrective training and who had previously been
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two or more years. These provisions suggest
that the offenders for whom preventive detention was intended had to be relatively
mature in years, to have committed at least one relatively serious offence in the past and
81 Timasheff (1939) p 467
82 'Fewer than a thousand persons had been sentenced to preventive detention between
1909 and 1930' Report of the Advisory Committee on The Treatment of Offenders
(1963) para 9
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to have been convicted of several offences. She or he had also to have been subjected to
some kind of reformative punishment prior to the experience of preventive detention.
Such narrow specification of the criteria for the use of preventive detention shows how
this new provision was also designed as a sentence of last resort. Incapacitation was to be
used only in cases where an offender was living what seemed to the court and the
legislature to be a persistently criminal and seriously criminal life. The 1948 Act
explicitly referred to this sentence as being aimed at the protection of the public.
Like the preventive detention elements of the 1908 Act, the main criticism suffered by
the preventive detention provisions of the 1948 Act was that it penalised the 'nuisances'
rather than the dangerous criminals for whom it was intended. After some years of its
implementation, the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders
commented:
...the majority of preventive detainees are of the passive-inadequate type,
feckless and ineffective in every sphere, who regard the commission of crime as
a means of escaping immediate difficulties rather than a part of a deliberately
anti-social way of life. Very few of them are of the seriously violent or
aggressive type of personality.83
Interestingly, the report went on to say 'the Act of 1948 does not require the Court to
satisfy itself that the offender is a danger to society, but that the public need to be
protected from him' 84. This is perhaps a rather fine distinction but reflected the
Committee's view that even 'petty' offences such as the theft of a bicycle cause distress
and inconvenience to the victims, and that 'minor' offences may result in relatively
serious loss among poorer communities. However, this argument has universal relevance
and does not have any special significance for preventive detention. Poor communities
are inevitably less likely to have the resources such as insurance to protect them from
loss or the means to take action to prevent future victimisation. Although this distinction
is obviously an attempt to show some sensitivity to the subjective effects of
83
Report of the Advisory Committee on The Treatment of Offenders (1963) para 21
84
Report of the Advisory Committee on The Treatment of Offenders (1963) para 17
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victimisation, it could also be suggested from the evidence of the sentences that
preventive detention nevertheless tended to result in enhanced protection of the public
from those offenders who might otherwise be deemed 'nuisances'.
Preventive detention was also criticised for appearing to promote disparity in sentencing
of a most extraordinary kind. The Advisory Council in the Treatment of Offenders cites
an Appeal case R v Caine (1962) where it was apparently stated that 'a comparatively
minor offence against property did not warrant a sentence of more than two years
imprisonment, even where a defendant had 14 previous convictions of dishonesty, while,
on the other hand, a sentence of seven years preventive detention was entirely
appropriate in the same circumstances'85. Indeed, over a third of sentences of preventive
detention were reduced to commensurate periods of imprisonment on appeal86. As well,
concerns about the likelihood of institutionalisation were expressed by the Lord Chief
Justice of the day87.
The growing perception that there was a problem with the sentence of preventive
detention was discussed in the legal and criminological literature and inevitably came to
the attention of politicians, the judiciary and the media. The Guardian newspaper
reported a case in 1961 where a prisoner successfully appealed against a sentence of 12
years preventive detention. The judge who substituted a term of 3 years imprisonment
made clear his view that the offender was ineffectual rather than violent and therefore
was not suitable for preventive detention88. Despite the desire to limit preventive
detention to those who committed serious offences, those sentenced in this way under the
1948 Act were overwhelmingly offenders who had committed property offences. In 1956
it was observed that 35% of these property offences involved goods valued at £10 or
less89. Although these crimes were not perceived as being particularly serious even at that
time, the apparent harshness of such a sentence, resulting as it did in a minimum of 5
years further detention, must be considered in the context of the criteria which the
offenders had to meet. Those who supported the provisions could argue that the degree of
seriousness of the instant offence was only one factor in the court's determination of
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86 West (1963) pl09
87 1962 Cr AppR(S), 46, 234
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Reported in West (1963) p 107
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whether a particular offender was liable to a sentence of preventive detention. It was
certainly the case that most of those sentenced to preventive detention had many previous
convictions. In 1956, only 25% of those sentenced to preventive detention had the
minimum of three previous convictions and over half had six or more previous
convictions90. Nevertheless, as noted above, a large proportion of appeals against the
sentence were allowed on the grounds that the instant offence was not serious enough to
justify the imposition of preventive detention despite the previous convictions of the
offender.
The academic evidence that the sentence of preventive detention did not work to protect
the public from serious offenders was supported by the Taylor study published in 1960.
Taylor examined the characteristics of 100 men starting a sentence (though not
necessarily their first) of preventive detention in 1956. He noted that the offences for
which they were sentenced were relatively trivial but that the average number of previous
offences was 16.59'. Despite the wide variation in social and family circumstances,
Taylor felt able to conclude that the men had in common a cycle of conviction and
imprisonment which meant that there were few long gaps between periods of
imprisonment. He noted that, as a result of this, some the men developed few close
personal ties or entered into living arrangements such as marriage which could provide
stability. The study concluded that in general the offences committed were of nuisance
value and that the men were not dangerous92.
By 1967, Jackson was able to claim that a consensus had emerged with respect to the
lack of utility of preventive detention. It was observed that serious offences, in particular
violent offences could anyway attract long sentences, and thus the sentence of preventive
detention would inevitably be passed on those who would not ordinarily receive long
sentences of imprisonment. Jackson also noted the higher judiciary's expectation that the
sentence would be rarely used. A practice direction stated that 'Preventive detention has
thus come to be a last resort, in general limited to those nearing forty years and over, and
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not to offenders who have for even twelve months appeared to live honestly'93. However,
although the drafters of the 1948 legislation and the higher judiciary felt that the
provision should be applied to only those offenders who posed a threat of committing a
serious offence, judges were continuing to pass sentences of preventive detention on
merely persistent offenders. Jackson states:
The record of these special sentences shows that in application the result may not
be at all the same as that envisaged by the framers of the legislation or by
Parliament in passing the Act. It could be argued that judges have persisted in
carrying on with their traditional ideas of sentences and have allowed legislative
change to have far less effect than the executive and the legislature intended.94
Any disproportionate detention policy is open to criticism at a number of levels: (i)
disparity of sentence, (ii) inclusion of those for whom the policy is not intended i.e.
nuisances, and, (iii) neglect of those for whom the provisions are intended. Indeed, as a
political measure, longer than normal punishment of this form is optimistically nai've. If
such provisions are used to any extent then the punishment may appear to be excessive
and give rise to the impression that it allows sentencers to punish at random some
offenders who have committed less serious offences. If it is used rarely or not at all, such
provisions may be deemed to be failing to protect the public and sentencers could be
criticised for not making use of the full range of sentencing possibilities open to them.
The 1908 and 1948 Acts recognised that preventive detention was imposed in order to try
and prevent crimes occurring in the future and was therefore distinct from punishment
for crimes committed. The legislators and implementers of the preventive detention
provisions in both Acts were aware of the possibility that these provisions could be
interpreted as being undeserved punishment or at least disproportionate punishment. One
way they attempted to head off such criticism was by designing a more relaxed regime to
distinguish those offenders who were sentenced to preventive detention from those who
were being retributively and proportionately sentenced to imprisonment. Following the
93[ 1962] 1 WLR 403, see Jackson (1967) pl57 and Lord Chief Justice's Statement of 26
February 1962 (Appendix B in Home Office 1963)
94 Jackson (1967) p 158
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passing of the 1908 Act, a separate institution for preventive detainees was set up, at
Camp Hill on the Isle of Wight95, where the conditions were intended to be less
'punitive'96. The 1948 Act divided the period of preventive detention into three stages, in
three different institutions with different regimes. Despite the implicit assumption in the
Act that the preventive detainee is almost beyond reform, the progress to the third stage
and hence preparation for release was dependent on the detainee's 'progress'97.
Admission to this third stage was important to the detainee as it offered the hope that he
or she would be released at the end of two thirds of the sentence rather than five sixths as
was the case for those prisoners who did not progress beyond the second stage.
1.8 The decline of preventive sentencing
From 1961 to 1968 the court's use of preventive detention (or the extended sentence
which replaced it in 1967) started declining. The nadir was reached in 1961 when only
240 people (0.7% of those sentenced in the higher courts) were sentenced to preventive
detention, and this figure does not reflect the numbers of people who successfully
appealed against the sentence. By 1968 only 27 people had been sentenced to an
extended sentence (a mere 0.06% of those sentenced in the higher courts)98.
Lionel Fox drew attention to the fact that the 1948 Act had taken an explicitly
parsimonious approach to the use of imprisonment. The 1948 Act attempted to
strengthen the provisions of probation and fine as alternatives to prison for adults and
especially so for offenders under the age of 21. Fox commented: 'Except in its provisions
for the treatment of persistent offenders, it (the 1948 Act) is above all an Act for keeping
people out of prison'99. Like the 1948 Act, the 1991 Criminal Justice Act was an Act
95 Which must have only made the situation worse for those offenders who were removed
a great distance from their families and communities.
96 Nozick (1974) p 143 notes that if preventive detention can be justified (and he thinks it
cannot) then those subjected to it must be compensated, a very different notion from
holding them in slightly improved conditions of detention as was the case at Camp Hill
and very far from the usual practice whereby preventive detention is indistinguishable
from commensurate imprisonment.
97 See discussion in Fox op cit. p318ff.
98 Carr-Hill (1970) fn 31
99 Fox (1952) p 66
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designed to encourage the punishment ofmost criminals with community penalties and to
reserve imprisonment for the most serious offences or those offenders from whom the
public needed protection100. It has been argued that the drafters of the 1991 Act included
longer than normal sentencing provisions in order to counter political accusations that the
government was reducing its general commitment to the imprisonment of offenders101.
Whatever the reasons for their introduction, as with the 1948 Act, the disproportionate
sentencing provisions in the 1991 Act were expected to apply to a small minority of
dangerous offenders from whom it was felt the public needed protection. Initially a small
drop in the levels of imprisonment followed the 1991 Act, however, the numbers of
prisoners started to rise within two years, particularly after the Act's primary concern to
establish proportionality between the instant crime and the sentence passed was
weakened in the 1993 Act102.
The preventive detention elements of the 1908 and 1948 Acts both lapsed into disuse for
a number of reasons: in the case of the 1908 Act preventive detention was known to be
problematic as early as 1911. Norval Morris argued that the policy of the 1908 Act was
undermined by a lack of Judicial consistency in determining the type of offender for
whom the provisions were aimed. The 1948 Act, when reviewed in 1963 by the Advisory
Council on the Treatment of Offenders103, likewise found that Act to have given rise to
an unacceptably inconsistent application of preventive sentences - some persistent
offenders would serve relatively short terms of imprisonment reflecting the relative low
seriousness of their crime, while others convicted of the same offence would have
preventive sentences applied and would thereby serve long sentences of imprisonment104.
The Advisory Council recommended the abolition of the preventive sentence105.
There is an important difference between preventive detention in the 1908 and 1948 Acts
which sought to prevent the offender from committing more offences (of any type) and
100 Home Office (1988) para 1.1
101 Windlesham (1996) Downes and Morgan (1994)
102 Stone (1994a), Home Office (1995a)
103 Home Office (1963) Preventive Detention report of the Advisory Council on the
Treatment ofOffenders
104 Home Office (1963) para 61
105 Home Office (1963) paras 57 and 58
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the longer than normal sentence in the 1991 Act which seeks to prevent the offender
from committing serious offences. Prior to the 1991 Act it was generally assumed that
incapacitation was imposed to prevent offences of the same type (and degree of
seriousness) as the offender had already committed. An assessment of the offender's
qualifying status was based on his or her past behaviour and criminal convictions. It was
not the case that the offender could be subjected to such provisions as a result of a
prediction which assumed he or she would be dangerous in the future without having
been dangerous in the past.
Unlike the earlier Acts the 1991 Criminal Justice Act has clear criteria for identifying a
dangerous or 'dangerous' offender. The Floud report, an important and influential
precursor to the 1991 Act, noted:
Violence is almost universally regarded as the hallmark of dangerousness.
'Dangerous' offenders are presumed to be violent and violent offenders are
presumed to be dangerous... Violence undermines confidence in the usual
precautions against harm and it inspires fear by emphasising the vulnerability
and helplessness of victims and the ruthlessness or at least the recklessness of
offenders.106
The Floud Report107, perhaps reflecting the outlook of their commissioners, the Howard
League for Penal Reform, found that they were not convinced of the need for the
introduction of any new form of protective sentence unless the overall length of
sentences was reduced, in which case a protective sentence might be required for a
minority of offenders108.
The 1908, 1948 and 1967 measures all sought to provide an alternative to indeterminate
sentences for certain individuals held to pose a threat to others. In effect they were trying
to forge a strike a balance between retributive and non-retributive (utilitarian)
106 Floud and Young (1981) pp 7-8. Elsewhere (ppl 18-119) the Floud report includes
loss or damage to property, environmental damage and threats to state security as having
the potential for harm, but these are not incorporated into the 1991 Act and its implicit
definition of dangerousness.
107Floud and Young (1981)
108 See Ashworth (2000) pp 180-183
43
justifications for the imprisonment and punishment of offenders in exceptional cases.
The frequency of the changes in legislation and the speed with which they were
abandoned shows how difficult it is to find and maintain this balance. As Nigel Walker
noted:
Preventive detention, 1908 style, was followed by preventive detention, 1948
style, which was itself followed by the 'extended sentence' in 1967. The pseudo-
mandatory longer-than commensurate sentence which replaced all these in 1991
is merely the latest compromise... 109
The compromise to which Walker refers relates to the choice between a retributive
versus non-retributive justification for the sentence and a determinate versus
indeterminate term of imprisonment. The desire to find an alternative to the
indeterminate sentence was founded on a need to distinguish between offenders who are
deemed to pose a danger or problem for the public and those who are deemed to pose a
problem or threat to the public as a result of mental illness. The dangerousness
provisions of all the Acts from 1908 to 1991 relate to the sentencing and punishment of
offenders without a recognised mental disorder. However the discussion of
dangerousness and what to do with those felt to pose a danger cannot ignore the
influence of the parallel and related discussion of dangerous mentally disordered
offenders. If offending behaviour is seen to be brought about as a consequence of their
illness, the latter group of offenders at least have the advantage of the assumption that the
offending behaviour will cease should their illness recede or be cured"0. As it is not
known when this may occur, an indeterminate prison sentence may be justified, as in
effect such offenders are being incapacitated until they get better and it is felt that they
cease to pose a threat to others. This presumption is not available to offenders who are
not held to have a mental disorder.
109 Walker (1996) p 181
110 Although other disadvantages apply, Peay (2002)
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1.9 Dangerousness and mental disorder
The re-focusing of the 'dangerousness' debate on to violent and sexual offenders
emerged in public policy in the UK in the 1970's. This was, in part, due to the abolition
of the death penalty in 1965, which had offered a permanent 'solution' to the problem of
dangerous offenders, and also due to the related increase in the number of offences for
which sentencers could impose a discretionary life sentence1'1. The growth in
indeterminate sentences awakened interest in the possibility of extending indeterminate
sentencing to less serious offences in order to maximise the protective potential of
sentences of imprisonment. Bottoms"2 dates the renaissance of interest in dangerousness
to 1975 when both the Butler Committee"3 and the Scottish Council on Crime"4
published new sentencing guidelines for dealing with dangerous offenders. Both reports
recommended various forms of indeterminate sentences separate from the standard life
sentence in order to eliminate potential 'defects in society's defences'115. These defects
were differently defined. In the Scottish Council's case, the aim was to prevent the
commission of harm by violence prone persons likely to inflict 'serious and irremediable
personal injury'116. The Butler Committee defined dangerousness as 'a propensity to
cause serious physical injury or lasting psychological harm'117. For the Butler
Committee, the sentencing weakness centred on the release from prison at the end of
sentence of persons with some history of mental illness who were not suitable for
treatment in hospital i.e. they were not severely enough mentally disordered to be
compulsorily admitted to hospital under other powers.
In attempting to plug the gap in society's defences, both the Butler Committee and the
Scottish Council on Crime were extremely conservative in their perceptions of what
constitutes a dangerous person. They did not, for instance, consider offences involving
111 The use of the discretionary life sentence rose markedly from 1960, Kinzig (1997).
1I2Bottoms (1977)
113Home Office and DHSS (1975)
u4Scottish Council on Crime (1975)
115fIome Office and DHSS (1975) para 4.35
116Scottish Council of Crime (1975) para 122
income Office and DHSS (1975) para 4.10
45
breaches of health and safety regulations in the workplace to be dangerous"8, nor did
they include offences relating to driving whilst intoxicated. The Scottish Council
considered but rejected categories of crimes other than those of violence, stating,:
It is clear, however, that the category of crime which has the most serious actual
and potential consequences not only for the victim but also for the peace and
order of the country is that of crimes of violence against the person, including
homicide. It is this type of crime rather than the highly organised armed
robberies, drug trafficking or complex financial swindles which in Scotland is
the most serious in its consequences for individual members of the public.119
By advocating indeterminate, incapacitative sentences (called the 'reviewable sentence'
and the 'public protection order' respectively) and reserving them for violence-prone and
mentally disordered offenders, the Butler Committee and the Scottish Council explicitly
assumed that these groups of people are dangerous in ways that other offenders are not.
These groups were judged to be less amenable than other prisoners for standard reductive
consequences of punishment i.e. individual deterrence and/or rehabilitation, an
assumption that increases the likelihood of the use of such protective sentencing.
Peters notes that this constitutes a differentiation between certain groups of offenders.
'Normal' offenders would be punished according to the classical penal principles of
proportionality, justified by appeal to retribution and deterrence. Others, such as
juveniles, habitual offenders and mentally disordered offenders would be subject to
either therapeutic disposals or incapacitative disposals'20. In the case of the Butler
Committee it might argued that the report's commissioners121 believed that mentally
'normal' dangerous and 'dangerous' offenders are dealt with adequately by the sentence
of the courts since the report restricts its concern to those offenders with some history of
mental illness. Strangely, given the overall conclusions of the report, the terms of
reference for the Butler Committee contain no specific reference to the danger posed by
118 Unlike the later Floud report, which did consider broader notions of 'dangerousness'
pjoud and Young 1981 p 10
119Scottish Council on Crime (1975) para 8
120peters (1988) p28
121fhe Secretary of State for the Home Office and the Secretary of State for Social
Services
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mentally disordered offenders and do not direct the Committee to consider especially
those persons for whom a mental disorder may have a causal relation to their offending
behaviour.
The terms of reference of the Butler Committee are worth reviewing:
(a) To consider to what extent and on what criteria the law should
recognise mental disorder or abnormality in a person accused of a
criminal offence as a factor affecting his liability to be tried or
convicted and his disposal;
(b) To consider what, if any, changes are necessary in the powers,
procedure and facilities relating to the appropriate treatment, in
prison, hospital or the community, for offenders suffering from
mental disorder or abnormality, and to their discharge and aftercare;
and make recommendations.122
The Butler committee did consider the issue of disability in relation to the trial, and
exemption from criminal responsibility in the form of the special verdict; however, the
major part of its report is concerned to protect the public from the offender rather than to
protect the offender from the system. In the contemporary context of high profde killings
by mentally disordered people e.g. the murders committed by Graham Young following
his release from Broadmoor Psychiatric hospital123, the Committee's focus on
dangerousness is understandable. Regrettably though, the attention given to dangerous
mentally ill offenders, and in particular to their incapacitation, led the Committee to
neglect other aspects of their terms of reference in particular relating to the aftercare of
such offenders. Rather than proceed to investigate what incapacitative effects could be
arranged outside of prison or hospital, the Committee preferred to consider only the
advantage of continued indeterminate supervision in either hospital or prison. In a rather
chilling passage they note:
122Home Office and DHSS (1975) p 1
l23For an account ofYoung's case, see Prins (1995) pp 231-2
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Some of these prisoners have spent time in Broadmoor but have been returned to
prison as not treatable,124 All have either been refused parole or have exercised
their option not to be considered, and their potential dangerousness generally
excludes them from the normal 'socialising' prison pre-release schemes, such as
home leave and the pre-release employment scheme. Therefore, paradoxically,
these, of all people, are discharged direct from prison to the community without
acclimatisation beforehand or supervision and control afterwards.125
There is a suggestion here that the Butler Committee believed such re-integration
schemes to have had some value. It is unfortunate, then, that the Committee did not have
a more innovative solution to the problem of the release of mentally ill offenders at the
end of their sentence than the reviewable sentence. Given the extremely small numbers
of relevant serious offences that had been committed at the time the report was compiled,
and the fact that many more mentally ill persons were voluntarily and forcibly housed in
hospitals at the time anyway (as compared with the subsequent policy of housing most
mentally ill patients in the community), the Committee did not seem too concerned about
the false positives126 their proposal for an indeterminate sentence would certainly
generate. As they recognised;
The tendency (which many members of the public will applaud) will generally be
to err on the side of caution, with the result that some people will continue to be
detained who, if released, would not commit further violent offences.127
I24ln itself the morality of returning mentally ill people to prison because they are not
treatable is extremely dubious. It would be unacceptable for severely physically ill
people to be rejected by the medical profession just because their disease was
untreatable. The medical profession provides hospices for those dying of organic
diseases, medical and social services provide care for the mentally handicapped in a
variety of supported environments in the community, yet the severely mentally ill are
accommodated in prisons. The Scottish Council initially considered recommending that
the detention of persons under the Public Protection Order in a special institution that
was 'neither prison nor hospital' but decided that the option of detaining persons in
prison must be left available under the order. Scottish Council On Crime (1975) para
136.
125Home Office and DHSS (1975) Para 4.34, italics added
126A false positive occurs when a person is diagnosed as being dangerous who would not
go on to commit dangerous acts. A false negative, less discussed in the literature, occurs
when a person diagnosed as not being dangerous goes on to commit a dangerous act.
127Home Office and DHSS (1975) para 4.13
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The Butler Committee took an expressly rehabilitative stance on the management of the
mentally ill offender. The report says of the indeterminate sentence it recommended:
The new sentence would not be punitive in intent but designed to enable the
offender to be detained only until his progress under treatment... allows him to be
released under supervision without serious risk to the public.128
The Committee considered, rightly or wrongly, that it was recommending what was best
for the offender as well as the public. Yet it is hard to reconcile the emphasis in the
report on the non-punitive nature of the 'reviewable sentence' with a recommendation for
totally indeterminate sentences to be served in prison. They said:
We do not think it necessary or desirable for the court to lay down or recommend
a minimum period for which the offender must be detained in custody, so as to
ensure the period of detention is appropriate to the gravity of the act. As we have
said above, the new sentence will not be punitive in intent.129
The Butler Committee seemed to be unaware of, or to consider irrelevant, the
contemporary crisis that was occurring in academic criminology. This crisis was most
visible in the early 1970's, and culminated in the slogan-claim 'nothing works' made by
Martinson130 only the year before the Committee reported. The presence on the Butler
Committee of the Cambridge criminologist Nigel Walker suggests that the committee
should have been aware of the doubts being raised concerning the efficacy and ethics of
treatment programmes for the rehabilitation of offenders131. Of course, critics of the
indeterminate sentence were not considering the mentally abnormal offender specifically,




l31In fact, Professor Walker was a member of the Scottish Council on Crime and the
Floud working party as well. The differences of opinion and emphasis and the apparent
discrepancies in the choice of applied knowledge are interesting given this link between
all three reports.
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serious problems of abuse, human rights and justice, with particular reference to
indeterminate sentences of just the kind the Butler report was advocating132.
The Scottish Council were aware of the contemporary debates and criticism surrounding
the rehabilitative ethic but placed the protection of the public as a higher priority:
Such a new form of disposal [the public protection order] would have potentially
serious consequences for the individuals who fall to be dealt with in this way.
Penal detention has some sort of moral justification in that the offender is held to
have 'deserved' it by his crimes (and past crimes). Psychiatric detention of the
seriously mentally disordered has underlying it the compassionate intention that
medical treatment will relieve the patient's morbid condition, or at least provide
him with the care and nursing that the condition requires. It cannot be claimed
however, that there is any great prospect of successful treatment (in the medical
sense) of the 'dangerousness' during the detention of those who, though they
may be abnormal, are not seriously mentally disordered; the prime purpose of the
detention would be the protection of the public...133
The Butler report was explicitly concerned with the mentally abnormal convicted
offender, so it is assumed from the start that this group of people have been tested in
court and found to be responsible with respect to the offences for which they are before
the court. However, if this is so and the offender is deemed to be competent and in
control of his or her own actions, then why should the release of the mentally abnormal
criminal (as he or she is now defined) pose any greater problems than the release of other
offenders at the end of their proscribed prison sentence? There are various logical
possibilities, relying on an appeal to the offender's rationality: that people with some
mental illness may take longer than other offenders to be deterred i.e. to make the
connection between the offence and the resulting unpleasant punishment; or take longer
to be socially rehabilitated i.e. to be convinced that it is in their rational best interests to
conform to the prevailing social standards of behaviour; i.e. by an appeal to the
offender's rationality. By contrast, imprisonment may not be aimed at improving the
rational processing of the offender but by dampening this kind of thought process. It may
132
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be the case that the punishment affects (reduces) the capacity of a suggestible mentally
disordered offender to choose to commit crime by exposing him or her to 'corrective'
rehabilitative, psychiatric programmes. In effect, the offender may be 'cured' by
exposing him or her to a form of indoctrination. The latter example shows us that the
desire to eliminate criminal behaviour sometimes sits uneasily within a caring ethos.
With its overtones of coercion and paternalistic enforcement, this form of rehabilitation
suggests that the offender can be 'corrected' by removing his or her capacity for
independent responsible action134. Only if we take the weaker form of 'rehabilitation' as
being an appeal through rational argument to the offender, a form of persuasion rather
than an attempt to change him or her, can we avoid the potential for an abuse of power,
yet this assumes the offender is at least minimally rational and hence removes the
justification for treating him or her differently from other offenders.135.
It is apparent that the Butler Committee believed that, whatever the reason, the mental
illness of some offenders was such that it would increase their dangerousness upon
release, and that appeals to rationality would be ineffective. This is made clear by the
rejection of any individually deterrent theory of punishment in favour of rehabilitation
techniques, with very little examination of the data concerning the efficacy of such
rehabilitation. The Scottish Council however, concerned only with the prevention of
crime, expresses doubt at the success of treatment regimes:
The treatment of offenders may be defined as positive action - as opposed to
hurtful or preventive action - directed to rehabilitation and future avoidance of
crime by detected and convicted offenders. It is a basic difficulty about the
treatment of offenders that it seems almost impossible to distinguish its effect on
the prevention of crime from other effects. Indeed it is probably fair to say that
the treatment of offenders has only a small part to play in our present measures
for the prevention of crime.136
'"Scottish Council on Crime (1975) para 125.
134 As was attempted in the abuses of the Cultural Revolution in Maoist China
135 See chapter 4 passim, below
'"Scottish Council on Crime (1975) para 52
In the absence of rational persuasion or successful treatment, preventative detention was
considered necessary as a default position for those offenders whose offending could be
thwarted in no other way. Despite the fact that a conviction requires the legal
presumption of criminal responsibility and this implies the offender is rational and
possesses free will, both the Butler Committee and the Scottish Council adopted a
deterministic model for the disposal of mentally abnormal offenders.
The confusion felt by the Butler Committee and the Scottish Council was not new.
Duster contends that within the process of (modern, Western) law enforcement there is
often a 'switch' or a variation in the attitudes of the law to the presumed responsibility of
offenders during some forms of punishment when a change in status occurs. He observes
that different agents of the criminal justice system have inconsistent assumptions:
On the one hand, the criminal is said to be mentally balanced, and therefore
capable of, and responsible for, his actions. On the other hand, his criminal
behaviour is popularly and professionally conceived as a reflection of a disorder
of personality... the police, the prosecuting attorney, the judge and the jury all
have a tendency to view the criminal as mentally normal, sane, and responsible.
However, after conviction, and beginning with incarceration, the imputation
shifts and the criminal is suddenly regarded as psychologically disturbed. 137
Duster considers offenders who have no history or symptoms of mental illness but his
point is equally well made in the case of mentally disturbed convicted offenders for
whom the Butler Committee was recommending indeterminate sentences. If it is
established that these offenders satisfy the normal tests for criminal responsibility138 then
there ought to be no assumption that the mental disorder is causally relevant to their
offending and hence there should be no requirement for an incapacitative sentence. At
most, there can be a case made for longer sentences for mentally ill offenders on the
grounds identified above, that the rational process may be slower for the mentally ill, or
diminished in the process of rehabilitation. But, if the offending behaviour is not of a
rational kind, then it is hard to see how these offenders can satisfy the due process
137Duster (1970) p227
1380n the test for mental responsibility e.g. M'Naghten's case (1843) 10 CL&F 200 at
210, for discussion see Prins (1995) Chapter 2, Peay (2002).
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requirement for criminal responsibility, it seems they should neither be found guilty nor
disposed of in the same way as those deemed to be rational139.
Although they adopted a 'medical' model of violence, the Scottish Council discussed the
identification of the 'root causes' of crime and the relevance of studying 'remedial social
measures in deprived areas of cities'140. They commented upon the situational and
spontaneous elements that are present in much violent behaviour as well as the
contributing influence of alcohol intoxication141. In seeking to prevent such acts of
violence, they proposed various measures including 'stop and search' powers to deter
and obstruct the carrying of weapons, improved communications amongst the various
services who come into contact with violent people, and of course, they recommend the
introduction of the Public Protection Order.142
The Butler Committee was not asked to consider the case of unrepentant, non-mentally
ill, violent offenders who reach the end of their sentence professing their intention to
commit violent crime upon release. The Scottish Council on Crime did not limit the
subjects of its Public Protection Order in such a way but in its assessment of
dangerousness called for evidence (not necessarily convictions) of past and recent acts of
violence and an assessment of risk of future violence. The implementation of a system of
Public Protection Orders would depend on the choice of definitions of violence. As noted
above, these might include employers who breach health and safety standards and
careless drivers, as well as professional boxers, negligent doctors and industrial polluters.
In practise of course, none of the above would be considered, and the report's
recommendation that there be professional opinions obtained from two psychiatrists, a
clinical psychologist and an experienced social worker143 would ensure the
predominantly clinical, medical and overtly pathological definition of violence would
prevail. The recommendations that a Public Protection Order be developed were not
incorporated in the Mental Health Act 1983.
139 This argument will be considered further in chapter 3.
140Scottish Council On Crime, Para 72
141Scottish Council On Crime, Para 73 (7)
1420ne member of the Council, Professor Illsley disassociated himself from both the 'stop
and search' and the PPO recommendations.
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The longer than normal sentence provision of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act is not
explicitly aimed at mentally disordered offenders. Yet it is clear from the case of
Fawcett144 and the research findings of Solomka145 that some of those who have been
subject to the disproportionate sentence under s.2(2)(b) have been suffering from some
form of abnormality ofmind and this has not been held to be a obstacle to the imposition
of a longer than normal sentence146. Although there is evidence that a proportion of
prisoners have a mental disorder, the percentages vary from 7% to 63%147. Nevertheless,
even at the lower end of diagnosis, the figures for mental disorder are substantially
higher than those found in the general population148. As most prisoners are not subject to
psychiatric assessment on admission to prison it is difficult to know the levels of
morbidity prior to incarceration, i.e. at the sentencing stage. In general the law holds that
there should be separate provisions for the mentally disordered offender, and that this has
been stated unambiguously in government documents: '...it is government policy that,
wherever possible, mentally disordered persons should receive care and treatment from
the health and social services'.149
It is clear that not all mentally disordered offenders are diverted out of the criminal
justice system nor is it immediately clear that they should be diverted. As Bartlett and
Sandland note 'Even if a person can be shown to be mentally disordered, to show that
there is a relationship between his or her current disorder and offending is quite another
question.'150 Yet it has been argued that there is a growing tendency for the concepts of
violent criminality and mental abnormality to become conflated in both legislation and
policy151. This is despite evidence, albeit mostly from America, which has shown only a
weak correlation152 or no correlation153 between mental disorder and violent crime. Yet it
is possible to argue the opposite, i.e. that the law and criminal justice system has tended
143Scottish Council On Crime, Para 131
144 Fawcett (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 55
145 Solomka (1996)
146 Peay (2002), von Hirsch and Ashworth (1996),
147 Peay (2002)
148 Singleton N et. al. (1997)
mi Home Office (1990) para 2
150 Barlett and Sandland (2000) pi54
151 Eg- Peay (2002), Pilgrim and Rogers (1999), Rose (1986)
is? JVlonahan (1981)
is? Steadman et al (1998), Rappeport and Lassen (1967)
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to ignore the differences between mentally disordered and other offenders in its approach
to sentencing and punishment. This would account for the high numbers of mentally
disordered remands and convicts in prison and for the much lower numbers of offenders
who are diverted from prosecution, found unfit to plead or referred to hospital154.
Sentencers make the presumption that there is no issue of mentally abnormality unless
this is raised by the defence. Nor is the question of 'dangerousness' considered as a
separate issue after the determination of guilt. The English law has no equivalent of the
Canadian Dangerous Offenders provisions which have been used since 1977 and which
require a second hearing to determine 'dangerousness' after conviction155.
Current mental health legislation supplements criminal justice legislation in attempting to
incapacitate dangerous and 'dangerous' people. S (37) of the Mental Health Act 1983
provides for the compulsory detention in hospital of people who meet threshold
criteria156, and gives courts powers to impose a restriction order on those who it is felt
pose a risk of harm to others'57. However, medical ethics158 and health care policy require
medical intervention to be based on the principle that the person who is being treated
should benefit, particularly when that treatment is being administered coercively under
compulsory powers of commitment to hospital. Thus, some mentally disordered persons
whose condition is not judged to be treatable, cannot ethically be detained unless it is in
order to provide some benefit to them or at least to prevent a worsening of the their
condition159. In attempting to recognise the ethics of treatment, the 1983 Act created a
lacuna whereby mentally disordered offenders who are not considered likely to benefit
from treatment are excluded from admission to hospital160. If these untreatable mentally
154 Remand of an accused person to hospital is possible under ss. 35 and of the 1983
Rental Health Act. The power to impose a hospital order rather than imprisonment is
found in s 37 of the 1983 Act. In 1997 only 104 hospital orders were made by
Magistrate's courts in summary proceedings (Home Office Research and Statistics
Directorate, (1998) table 18).
155 See Correctional Service of Canada website
(uOVw.csc-scc.gc.ca/text.pubed/feuilles/dngoff_e.shtml)
>56 See Glover-Thomas (2002) pp 41-48
157 Mental Health Act 1983 S 41, see Glover-Thomas p 193-4.
158 See Beauchamp (1983)
159 R v Hallstrom, ex parte W (no2), R v Gardner, exparte L [1986] 2 All ER 306.
160 This is known as the 'treatability' criterion. The definition of 'treatability' has been
wjfiened in R v Canons Park Mental Health Tribunal [1995] QB 60 (see Glover-Thomas
p50).
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disordered persons are convicted of serious offences then there is no alternative to
confinement in prison under criminal justice rather than mental health legislation. As a
result of a criminal justice disposal being made, there is also no power to delay discharge
on the grounds of the offender's continuing dangerousness as would have been the case
had the offender been subject to a hospital order. The offender is required to serve his or
her sentence of imprisonment as normal, and does not have the opportunity to apply to a
Mental Health Review Tribunal for discharge161. Both of these consequences have been
seen as posing problems for offenders and the community. For offenders the sentence is
one of imprisonment, and as it fixed in length, there is no opportunity for argument that
the offender no longer poses a danger and can be released earlier than is normal162. For
the public, the threat posed by the offender is not reviewed as systematically as it would
be under the relevant mental health provisions and there is no legal power to prevent
release of even avowedly dangerous offenders at the completion of the sentence.
As even this brief discussion shows, the discourses, policy and legislation concerning the
incapacitation of mentally disordered dangerous and 'dangerous' offenders and ordinary
dangerous and 'dangerous' offenders are complex and inextricably linked. They are
linked by a shared desire to protect the public from those who have committed violent
acts and who may do so again. They are also linked by the recognition that there are
many offenders in prison who are mentally disordered, and it is acknowledged that in
some cases the mental disorder contributes to the person's offending behaviour and
propensity to commit further offences. Yet the structures of the state do not enable an
easy transfer between the two sectors163. A mentally disordered offender can only be
transferred to hospital under special circumstances, i.e. if the illness is considered to be
161 See Glover-Thomas p 48-51
162 Although a determinate criminal justice disposal (prison sentence) gives the offender
the advantage of knowing the latest possible date of release. S 46 of the Crime
(Sentences) Act 1997 give courts the powers to impose a 'hospital direction' whereby a
mentally disordered offender can be transferred to hospital temporarily for treatment, or,
assessment of the potential for treatment. However, under this provision the offender
would be returned to prison if at the end of the treatment or assessment the sentence of
the court had not expired. Thus it is increasingly unlikely that any mental health disposal
will result in a shorter period of detention (in hospital or prison) since the offender would
be anyway required to complete the sentence of imprisonment at the cessation of the
treatment programme (see Glover-Thomas p 194-5).
163 See Johnson and Taylor (2000) where it is noted that the numbers transferred from
prison to hospital are increasing but are still very low (fewer than 800 prisoners in 1999)
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treatable. The morality of such a position is doubtful as, in other contexts, patients with
incurable illnesses are not prevented from receiving palliative medical care and attention
in hospital.
Between them, the health and criminal justice sectors of English society have the power
to contain almost anyone who has committed a serious violent or sexual act. The
abandoned Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder Bill (1999-2000) had
indicated that the government was intending to extend this sort of power to those who
have not committed any offence provided they are diagnosed as mentally disordered and
it is thought that they may pose a threat in the future (see 1.10 below). The government's
proposals for the future are as yet unclear but there are hints as to the direction of
proposals in both draft criminal justice and mental health legislation currently being
debated.
1.10 The immediate future.
The latest proposals for future developments in criminal justice in England and Wales
with respect to dangerous and 'dangerous' offenders are outlined in the white paper
Justice for All'64 emerging from what has come to known as the Halliday Report'65.
These documents specify the 'paramount' purpose of sentencing to be the protection of
the public. For those deemed 'dangerous' the proposals include the recommendations
that an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment be introduced and that life licence should
be considered for these offenders if and when they are released from prison. Nowhere in
the white paper is mention made of mental illness and of its role in the commission of
dangerousness or criminal behaviour166. Following the publication of the white paper, it
is expected that a Criminal Justice Bill will be presented to parliament in 2003 proposing
new sentencing guidelines based on crime reduction, risk minimisation and
164 Home Office (2002)
165 Home Office (2001)
166 However the medical profession has recognised the implications of the policy which
wjll require the further involvement of psychiatrists in the 'hybridisation' of punishment
and health care. See Editorial, British Medical Journal (1999) 318: 549-551 (27
February)
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incapacitation167 of the 'dangerous' and persistent criminals and moving away from the
1991 Act's emphasis on desert as the primary determinant of the severity of sentence. A
'special' indeterminate sentence for sexual and violent offenders (n.b. not serious sexual
and violent offenders) is proposed whereby after the expiry of a minimum period, release
would be dependent on an assessment made by the parole board that the offender no
longer poses a risk to the community168. Although details are not yet available, the
language suggests that this sentence, if implemented, would be similar to the existing
discretionary life sentence. This proposal goes beyond the recommendation made in the
Halliday Report which had advocated determinate, proportionate sentences for
'dangerous' offenders with release from the half way point of the sentence being at the
discretion of the parole board169. Unlike the later proposal, the Halliday report's 'special'
sentence would not be completely indeterminate as the offender would know that they
would be released at the latest at the expiry of the full declared term of the sentence of
imprisonment.
The special sentences proposed in the Halliday report and the white paper relate to
offenders processed through the criminal justice system. The proposals for 'dangerous'
people with mental disorder in England and Wales have been under consideration for
some time, with legislation proposed, abandoned and revised. The Home Office and the
Department of Health jointly published a consultation paper Managing Dangerous
People with Severe Personality Disorder'70 in July 1999 and this led to the Dangerous
Persons with Severe Personality Disorder Bill (DPSPD Bill), as noted above, now
abandoned. However, a new white paper, Reforming the Mental Health Act171 and a draft
167 Section 5.8 ofJusticefor All, Home Office (2002), lists 7 purposes of sentencing, 3 of
which are relevant to incapacitation: 'protect the public', 'reduce crime' and
'incapacitate'.
168 Section 5.41 Home Office (2002). Similar proposals are made in the MacLean
Committee Report in Scotland. See www.scotland.gov.uk/maclean.
169 Non dangerous offenders would automatically be released at this half way point. An
extended period of supervision in the community, even life licence, was also proposed
for 'dangerous' offenders after release from prison.
170 Home Office and Department of Health (1999) Managing Dangerous Persons with
Severe Personality Disorder - Proposals for Policy Development. See also, House of
Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs (2000) Managing Persons with Severe
Personality Disorder 1st report HC 42, London, The Stationery Office
171 Department of Health (2000) Reforming the Mental Health Act, Cm 5016-1, London,
The Stationery Office
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Mental Health Bill has incorporated many of the elements of the old DPSPD Bill
especially those elements of the DPSPD Bill which prioritised the protection of the
public.
.. .for some people their plan of care and treatment will be primarily designed to
manage and reduce high risk behaviours which pose a significant risk to
others.'72
The new Mental Health Bill proposes that people diagnosed with a personality disorder
who are felt to pose a threat to others, even prior to the commission of a violent act, and
certainly regardless of any criminal conviction, may be detained for as long as it is felt
that they pose a threat to the public. If their mental disorder is not considered to be
treatable, and the person has committed a criminal offence, then this detention may occur
in prison.
The treatability issues of the 1983 Mental Health Act are avoided in the new draft Bill in
an interesting way, by extending the concept of the 'care in the community' to include
prisons. Traditionally care of the mentally disordered was mostly provided by families
and religious communities, notwithstanding the development of the asylum in the mid
19th Century173. Following the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act, an Act inspired by eugenicist
concerns about the fertility and promiscuity of people who were mentally handicapped or
insane, there was a bifurcation in the policy of care of the mentally disordered. The 1913
Act aimed to control the 'feeble minded' and advocated hospitalisation as a means of
doing this, but it also suggested that some affected people could be placed under the
control of guardians or local authorities in the community. The prevailing view, for most
of the century was that mentally disordered people could be treated more effectively and
efficiently in large institutions, often hospitals located in remote rural environments. In
the late 20th century, this policy was severely criticised as stigmatising the mentally
disordered and ostracising them from society. Although there had always been some
form of provision for community care, the 1980s provided a decisive move away from
172
Department of Health (2000) para 1.4
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institutional living arrangements for the mentally handicapped at first, and subsequently
for those who are mentally ill174.
To show the scale of the de-institutionalisation process that took place in the second half
of the 20th century, Glover-Thomas notes that in 1954 there were 152,000 inpatient
psychiatric beds. By 1994, the number was 43,00017\ The motives for this move towards
treatment outside of hospitals included the desire to reduce the stigma ofmental illness, a
recognition that many patients did not require such intensive treatment and indeed may
suffer from it176, and improvements in the pharmacological treatment of mental illness.
Although costings were crude or vague, politicians certainly hoped for substantial
financial savings arising from the change in policy177. The 1959 and 1983 Mental Health
Acts provided statutory support for care of the mentally disordered in the community, the
latter placing a duty on local authorities to provide care for sufferers after release from
hospital. Although the policy was criticised as being under-resourced and there were high
profile failures, it was considered quite normal for mentally handicapped adults to live in
the community, with varying levels of state provided support and for the mentally ill to
be receiving treatment and care in a variety of setting ranging from secure hospitals to
private homes.
The Consultation Document of the Mental Health Bill178 puts forward the purpose of the
proposed legislation, including:
To provide a legal structure for requiring mentally disordered people to submit to
compulsory treatment, without necessarily requiring them to be detained in
hospital...179
173 Glover-Thomas (2002) chapter 3, Jones (1972)
174 Jones (1993)
175 Glover-Thomas (2002) p71
176 Goffman (1961)
177 Ministry ofHealth (1963) Health and Welfare
178 pepartment ofHealth (2002) Mental Health Bill: Consultation Document Cm 5538-III
179 pepartment ofHealth (2002) s 2.2
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This extends to the community the compulsory treatment of all people affected by a
mental disorder. It is suggested that the use of a single definition of 'mental disorder' in
new legislation will remove the requirement that the offenders can only be detained if
their condition is treatable180. Instead of treatment having to work for the benefit of the
patient, compulsory treatment may be imposed if treatment is necessary for the protection
of others.181 But more significantly, the proposals extend the sites at which treatment can
be delivered to 'the community', extending this concept to include prisons. The
document introduces the phrase 'prisoner patients' and states:
At the moment prisoners' access to mental health care is limited by the Mental
Health Act 1983, for they cannot be treated on a compulsory basis while in
prison - the Act only allows this for patients detained in hospital.182
We are consulting about whether prisoner patients should have access to orders
in the community. We believe this will help to prevent prisoners' mental health
deteriorating to a state where admission to hospital is necessary.183
Clearly the conjunction of 'prisoner patients' and orders delivered 'in the community'
suggest the extension of the definition of the community to the prison environment184.
Although this sounds alarming, it also offers some hope that those offenders in prison
who are suffering from forms of mental illness will have more access to treatment.
However, it also seems likely that mentally disordered prisoners are at risk of getting
inferior quality mental health care in an environment which is not designed for the
delivery of medical interventions. The consultation document makes clear the policy of
extending treatment into the criminal justice sector:
The new Bill provides a framework for mentally disordered people to receive
compulsory treatment without necessarily being detained in hospital. For people
in the community, the Mental Health Tribunal may issue a treatment order based
180 Department of Health (2002) s 2.11
181 Department of Health (2001) s 3.21
182 Department of Health (2001) s 3.33
183 Department of Health (2001) p 24
184 Although, confusingly, as we will note below, a sentence of imprisonment need not be
served completely in prison.
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in the community on the basis of a care plan submitted by the patient's clinical
supervisor. There should be similar flexibility for patients to receive compulsory
treatment in prison... This would be in the patient's best interest and consistent
with best practice.185
The consultation document recognises the difficulties inherent in 'treating' mentally
disordered offenders, including those who are currently thought of as 'untreatable', in
prison. The document proposes safeguards to ensure that if a mentally disordered
offender would be better in hospital than in prison, then the transfer would be arranged.
In addition the offender treated in prison would have the safeguards offered by the
Mental Health Tribunals and be treated by Health Service staff. It is also recognised that
not all prisons are able to offer appropriate levels of care. Despite the experience of 'care
in the community' which found that, delivered well, it was more costly than institutional
care, there is no mention of the extra costs involved in turning prisons into extension of
mental health facilities 'in the community' nor of the difficulties of applying the quality
standards that apply to hospitals and other therapeutic environments to the prison estate.
Nevertheless the new proposals, if implemented, will enable mentally disordered
offenders to be held in prison, as an extension of community care. The extension of
mental health provisions to all mentally disordered prisoners will permit the
indeterminate detention of those felt to pose a danger, beyond the term of their sentence
of imprisonment, under the restriction provisions ofMental Health legislation, in order to
protect others from the danger that they are felt to pose. It does not appear to be the case
that upon the expiry of the sentence of imprisonment that prisoners will be entitled to be
transferred automatically to a form of civil detention as their treatment will be being
delivered in the community, even if this is within the walls of a prison.
An attempt to blur the boundaries between institutions and the community, and
particularly between institutions which detain people against their will and the
community has been exploited before. The concept of punishment in the community is
well established and although much research and media comment is focused on
imprisonment, it should be remembered that the majority of punishment occurs outwith
185 Department of Health (2002) s 3.35
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prison, i.e. 'in the community'186. The Carlisle Committee187, in the process of a review
of the function and procedures of the Parole system in England and Wales, introduced
the concept of a prison sentence being served partly in prison and partly 'in the
community'. However, the phrase has not entered popular consciousness, and there has
been criticism by politicians and the media of the situation whereby a sentence of
imprisonment can mean the period served is half of the full term specified as the sentence
of the court188. The Halliday report, however, retains the Carlisle Committee's
perspective and terminology189 arguing that, if certain conditions relating to supervision
and recall apply, then it is reasonable to think of a prison sentence as being partially
served 'in the community':
The sentence is genuinely, therefore, and in its entirety, one of imprisonment -
served partly in prison and partly in the community - the requirements for the
community element being determined by the offender's behaviour.190
The new proposals will make it possible for courts to detain offenders and mentally
disordered offenders in prison as well as secure hospitals. In both spheres of policy these
new proposals place the protection of the public at the centre of measures to manage the
dangerous and the 'dangerous'. Thus, if implemented, the proposals currently under
consideration will enable the indeterminate detention of those who are deemed
'dangerous' under both mental health provisions and criminal justice provisions. They do
this by widening the definitions of 'treatment' and 'the community' to include
incapacitation in prison.
1.11 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that it is necessary for state imposed 'punishment' to be
deserved for it to be punishment. Nevertheless, there are many forms of deprivation
186 Downes (1989), Home Office (1995b), Home Office (1998)
'87 Carlisle (1988) Cm 532
188 Henham (1996c)
189 Home Office (2001) chapter 4 passim
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imposed by the state which are either not deserved or which are imposed prior to the
determination that they are deserved. However, in most cases, punishment is imposed as
a retributive response to an act that has occurred, i.e. it is punishment for something that
has been done. Even where incapacitative measures have been adopted with the intention
of preventing future crimes, the legislation has been aimed at preventing crimes of the
type and degree of seriousness that has been committed by the individual criminal in
each case. S.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act is unique in that it permits the
imposition of more severe punishment (a longer period of imprisonment) in order to
incapacitate offenders who have not yet committed crimes of the type which the sentence
is trying to prevent. Under the 1991 Act, a dangerous offender is defined as someone
who commits a serious violent or sexual offence. Offenders who are perceived to be
'dangerous' and who have been convicted of a violent or sexual offence may be subject
to this sentence, despite not having committed a serious offence.
As this brief history of English and Scottish legislative efforts to control persistent and/or
dangerous offenders shows, there have been several approaches taken to try and
incapacitate those offenders who are felt to pose a problem for the public. These attempts
are examples of the theory of social defence, which promotes the use of the criminal
justice system not (only) to punish retributively those found guilty of criminal acts but
also to protect the public from the harmful acts of others. Such a policy uses the
metaphor of self-defence191 and applies it to the criminal justice context. It seeks to
provide arguments that are consistent with showing respect for all citizens as potential
offenders while protecting the public from the harm of criminal activity. Obviously, a
propensity to endanger others is not confined to the mentally ill or the violent criminal
but creating defining characteristics of such people as 'dangerous' is, in part, aimed at
providing legitimacy to the process of control.192 Teubner and Garland maintain that the
criminal justice system and welfare sectors such as the health service together provide a
potent method for determining dangerousness and managing those so defined193. The
characteristics of those whom it is thought necessary or beneficial to identify as 'the
190 Home Office (2001) s 4.8
191 Discussed further in chapter two
192For a detailed discussion of social control, including the hegemony of authorities and
institutions, see Cohen (1985) passim.
193Teubner (1986), Garland (1985)
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dangerous' vary, as we have seen, but the requirement to identify and symbolically
separate the group of people to be controlled from the general community, endures.
The incapacitation of 'innocent' citizens through the criminal law provides a sharp
dilemma for the liberal state. The liberal state takes many forms but fundamental to all is
the concept of liberty as the primary political value and the principle that no state can
exercise unrestrained or arbitrary coercive power over its citizens. The state must justify
any curtailment of citizens' liberty on the basis that the state's action will either increase
the overall liberty of the individual involved or increase the liberty of other individuals.
However, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the state's power is not justified wholly through
utilitarian calculations. Liberalism requires that utilitarian judgements be constrained by
certain non-defeasible parameters, to protect those citizens whose interests and desires
are different from those of the majority. Nevertheless, the modern state takes as its
legitimate responsibility the protection of citizens from the harmful, liberty reducing
activities of other citizens. Indeed, the state justifies its formal monopoly over crime
control and punishment as being constitutive of its responsibility to maximise the
freedom of citizens. So the state is charged with the duty of protecting citizens from harm
yet it is restricted in the power it can exercise over those it predicts will cause harm: this
is the dilemma of incapacitation.
The dilemma of incapacitation highlights the conflict between the state's duty to protect
citizens from serious criminal acts and the limitations intrinsic to the liberal state on the
power to imprison citizens for acts that have not yet been committed. It will be argued
that only a particular conception of liberalism allows the punishment of citizens for
crimes for which they have not been convicted. However, this conception, if instituted
more generally beyond the bounds of the criminal law could undermine the claim that
individuals consent to governance by the state. As a result, the liberal state adopts a
policy of incapacitation of the innocent only at the risk of losing the consent of those it
governs. In a period of increasing levels of crime and significantly increasing numbers of
violent crimes194, the attractiveness of utilitarian arguments that justify the protection of
194
Although there are problems in ascertaining the exact amount of crime (Bottomley
and Pease (1986)), it is generally believed that crime rate rose steeply throughout the
second half of 20th century (Maguire 2002). In the context of the 1991 Criminal Justice
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citizens is obvious. Therefore, if it can be shown that popular democratic will does not
require or desire the constraints on state power provided through a liberal political
structure, perhaps a policy which is effectively punishing 'innocent' people is morally
justified. Popular support can be demonstrated for the increased use of coercive power if
it results in policies that appear to maximise security for the majority195. However, as will
be shown in chapter 5, the state is reluctant to renounce the limiting liberal principles
under which it governs since a non-liberal alternative other than anarchy would require
the state to take full responsibility for crime prevention. This it is unwilling to do as the
state would certainly fail in its promises to prevent serious harm from occurring. Such a
policy would also raise concerns among those who fear state sponsored abuse. As
Matravers says:
whilst it seems plausible to think that the point of threatening sanctions must
have something to do with preventing offending, ... that is not the same as
arguing that preventing offending through the threat and imposing of sanctions is
morally permissible196
The longer than normal sentencing provisions of the 1991 Act, and the future proposals
in mental health and criminal justice show that the distinction between punishment and
incapacitation is important. The state may not wish to have the power to punish all
citizens prior to the commission of a dangerous act, but as the 1991 Act shows, the state
does wish to have the power to incapacitate citizens prior to the commission of a
dangerous act. The practical difficulty which the state encounters is, how does it
incapacitate without the infliction of punishment? To manage this difficulty, the state is
forced to adopt a technical solution to justify its apparently illiberal intervention in
citizens' lives. In the case of England and Wales the current method is to neutralise the
'dangerous' offender in prison and the 'dangerous' non-offender in a medical setting.
This seems likely to change as the distinction between prison as the site of punishment
Act, the British Crime Survey (BCS) published in 2001 suggested both recorded and
unrecorded crime from 1981 to 1991 rose at close to 3% per year. Records since the 1995
BCS, suggest that the rate of recorded crime, including violent crime, has started to fall
(Maguire 2002).
195 Dunbar and Langdon (1998) Nash (1999)
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and hospital as the site of medical care is blurred. 10 years after the introduction of
proactive incapacitation in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, the white paper Justice for
All'97 and the draft Mental Health Bill'98 suggest the government is considering an
extension of incapacitation. The use of broad definitions of 'treatment', 'imprisonment'
and 'the community' gives the appearance that the government is determined to
incapacitate the 'dangerous' in any way it can. Chapter two considers the epistemological
foundations of the arguments for such a policy of 'social defence'.
196 Matravers (2000) p 7
197 Home Office (2002)
198 This Bill was not included in the Queen's Speech of November 13, 2002 outlining the
government's immediate legislative priorities. However, the Secretary of State for
Health, Alan Milburn, has indicated that the Bill will be reintroduced following
consideration of the responses to the consultation document. Guardian newspaper, 15
November 2002, p 2.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FAILURE TO CONTROL THE DANGEROUS
This chapter will discuss the development of a modern paradigm of criminological
knowledge and note its integration into criminal justice policy and law. The theories and
methodologies arising from this paradigm have provided authority and an ontological
foundation for government policy with respect to dangerous offenders. However, none of
the theoretical perspectives adopted provided the state with effective methods to reduce
harm, prevent serious crime, or predict dangerous behaviour. One outcome of this is that
the criminal justice system rejects expert knowledge and takes decisions in isolation. The
main argument of this chapter is that when there is disillusionment with paradigmatic
knowledge the state resorts to a position of social defence (a pragmatic 'default'
position). S.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act is an example of this 'default' position where the
state has withdrawn from a reliance on theory to a position of social defence.
2.1 The development of criminological 'knowledge'
Crime and punishment have been elements in the stories of human kind for millenia.
There are stories concerning transgression, remorse, forgiveness, revenge, mercy and
power in the texts of the major religions, the mythologies of Greek and Roman antiquity
and the oral traditions of indigenous peoples throughout the world. It is not surprising
that this should be so, as human beings gathered together are likely to conflict, and
stories about the origins of conflict and mechanisms of resolution must play an important
part in the construction of social groups. Indeed, Durkheim claimed the purpose of
punishment was to bind societies together, by reinforcing the collective conscience and
acting as an outlet for a shared expression of emotion, reminding societies of the
reactions that they hold in common199.
Yet despite the long history of human discussion of crime, criminology is held to be a
modern discipline, even a late modern discipline, with many histories placing its
emergence at a mere 200 years or so in the past. The characteristically modern nature of
criminology and the criminal justice system are indeed important. Modernity is held to
199 Durkheim (1902)
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represent a move away from the inconsistent, arbitrary and violent justice that is the
stereotype of the feudal systems of justice and medieval conceptions of evil200.
Modernity also represents a move away from religious to secular explanations of human
behaviour, and consequently a move towards granting people the authority to punish,
rather than a belief that all punishment is authorised by a God whose motives cannot be
challenged201. The modern systematisation and secularisation that has occurred in the
study of crime and the institutions of criminal justice, are now embedded in
contemporary culture. They are taken for granted, so much so that it is almost impossible
for modern western citizens to contemplate any alternative202.
The two main theoretical positions of criminological discourse which have derived from
the development of a modern stance arise from accounts of human society in political
philosophy and the development of a scientific explanatory schema for human behaviour.
The former has led to the creation of institutions of justice which attempt to define and
apply the concept of justice, particularly with respect to punishment, and to emphasise
recognition of, and respect for, individual freedom. The scientific aspects of modernity
have provided a basis for attempting explanations for harmful and criminal behaviour
and offer the hope that such behaviour or its effects can be minimised. Unfortunately
these two strands of modern thought sometimes pull against one another and can lead to
a contradictory and inconsistent response to criminality203. For example, the scientific
analysis of crime may suggest methodologies for responding to crime which are ruled out
by the modern sensibilities of particular societies, sensibilities which determine what
constitutes a 'just' response to offending204.
One of the key motifs of modernity is a desire to make things better, and a belief that
through human application of knowledge, improvements in social organisation, in
technology etc. are possible. Modernity is therefore an optimistic, even Utopian,
perspective, seeking to design political structures and to make scientific discoveries in
order to improve the lives of all human beings. The reference to all human beings also
200 Briggs 1996, Foucault 1977
201 Morrison 1997 p 72, McGuigan (1999), chapter 2
202 The failure of claims that there is anything approaching a 'postmodern' criminology
are evidence of this. See Garland (1995)
203 Chapters 3 and 4 below will consider this in more detail.
204 Elias (1978a)
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points to a prevailing characteristic of modern thought, its tendency to search for
universal solutions to problems. However, recognising that not all institutions, structural
arrangements and practices will benefit all humans at all times, modernity frequently
takes a utilitarian approach to the distribution of benefits which is also a potential source
of contradiction.
The modern criminal justice system emerged as a reaction to perceived injustices of the
past. As was noted in the previous chapter, the earliest known English legal documents,
such as the 1689 Declaration of Rights, sought to make the law public and universally
applicable (at least in theory), and place the power of the law in the hands of parliament
rather than the monarch. Even in its earliest articulation the criminal justice system is
evidently modern. Then, as now, it is a system, concerned to ensure the public definition
of offences, the universal applicability of the law, the efficient administration of the
institutions of law and to provide safeguards against error and malpractice. Of course
such high aims are quickly muddled by complicated wrangling over the meanings of the
terms205, and may be corrupted in application. But the modern characteristics which
define the criminal justice system are immensely important to the legitimacy of an
institution that possesses the power to create and interpret the law and to administer
punishment.
The paradigm of modernity has been influential on both criminal justice and the study of
crime. Criminology, as the name suggests, has been influenced more by the scientific
than the political elements of modern thought. The discipline, particularly as it is
practised outside of academic institutions206, is overwhelmingly concerned with
discovering the causes of crime, i.e. using scientific methodology based on observation
and experimentation to test and revise hypotheses. This sort of view takes as its
presupposition that there is a causal process at work which the theoretical perspectives,
following the scientific method, will be able to uncover. This is the claim that science
reflects the world, a position which has been criticised in Richard Rorty's 'mirror of
nature' argument207, where he points to one of the dangers of such a view. Rorty argues
that by constituting various items as objects of study, researchers validate their existence
205
e.g. who is entitled to have access to justice.
206 i.e. in policy-driven organisations such as the Home Office in England and Wales
207 Rorty (1979)
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as natural objects of study. So, for example, 'crime' becomes an object of study as
natural as 'the eye', even though it is a far more socially constructed term. This criticism
is particularly pertinent to a discussion of the 'dangerous' offender, because, as the
previous chapter showed, the term is used in a concrete way in the official language of
government policy despite being a notoriously vague and socially variable concept.
However, the point is that cnmino/ogy is seen by many of its practitioners as a scientific
discipline, and this is demonstrated by the evidence that 'criminologists' have been
collecting data and testing theories at least since the statistical work of Guerry in the
early 19th century and the physiological typologies of Lombroso208 in the late 19th century
and Hooton in the 20th century209. These researchers were collecting data, in the case of
Hooton and Lombroso particularly relating to the physical characteristics of offenders, in
the hope of discovering the difference between criminals and 'normal' men. Hooton held
that:
Criminals as a group represent an aggregate of sociologically and biologically
inferior individuals... Low foreheads, high perched nasal roots, nasal bridges and
tips varying to extremes of breadth and narrowness... compressed faces and
narrow jaws fit well into the general picture of constitutional inferiority... very
small ears... hint at degeneracy.210
Although Hooton's conclusion and the physiological hypothesis upon which it is based
are no longer fashionable in quite this crude form, this style of investigation continues to
be funded by government and supported by scholars. The longitudinal study of children
in Scotland presently being undertaken at Edinburgh University is gathering information
on as many aspects of the lives of these individuals as possible, and the project intends to
follow the subjects from school to adulthood with the expectation that this data will help
to explain, or even predict, subsequent criminal or deviant activity211. This type of
research: scientific, evidence based and aetiological, is commonly described as being
positivist, and there is an entire theoretical position within criminology devoted to
208 Jones (2001) p 105
209 Morrison (1997) Chapter 6
210 Hooton, cited in Morrison (1997) p 129
2i' Smith (2002)
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research in this manner212. Positivist theory, as indicated by the quotation above, seeks to
discover features associated with criminality, in order to find out what is different about
criminals, or about the social conditions in which they live.
Criminological positivism is often crudely divided into three kinds, biological,
psychological, sociological. Biological positivist theories hypothesise that there is
something about the individual criminal's body that causes that person to commit crime.
Examples have included the hypothesis that Kleinfelter's syndrome (the male sufferer
has an extra Y chromosome) causes violent behaviour, that there is a gene for aggression
which may lead to crime etc. Psychological positivist accounts hypothesise that there is
something about the individual's psychological makeup which causes that person to
commit crime. The belief that children who are abused may be damaged and thereby
become abusers in adulthood is an example of this type of theory as is the idea that early
maternal deprivation may lead some children to commit theft213. Sociological positivism
is more complex, relying on a difference and pathology not within an individual but in
the environment in which an individual or group lives. Sociological positivist theory,
looks at the problems inherent in a society, social group, economic environment etc.
which separately or more commonly through a combined effect, can influence or cause
the individuals living in the affected social or physical environment to commit crime"14.
The theory that poverty causes crime, or cultural conflict215 causes crime for an
individual is an example of a theory of this type.
The many other varieties and examples of positivist theories can be found in introductory
criminology textbooks, and it is interesting that in many of these texts, the positivist
perspective dominates the discussion at the expense of available alternatives2'6. Positivist
theory exemplifies the optimism of modem thought, an optimism justified by the
advancement which science has brought to humans over the past few centuries. Few
would argue against the claim that, in the richer countries where the benefits have been
most obvious, modem science has brought immense benefits to mankind. These takes
many forms ranging from improved health care and longevity, to liberation from the
212 Farmer (1967)
213 Bowlby (1949)
2'4 For an overview of this cluster of theories see Rock (2002)
215 Sutherland and Cressey (1978)
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constant need to be concerned about the pursuit of food, shelter etc. and the resultant
opportunity to use leisure time in the production and enjoyment of art217.
Criminological positivism, echoing its modern foundations, holds out the promise of a
better future. It holds that, if scientific method is employed rigorously, and if the findings
of research are integrated into policy, then levels of crime can be reduced. If, for
example, it is possible to identify physical characteristics of criminals, by measuring
their ears, or testing their chromosomal makeup, or examining their family circumstances
then these afflicted individuals may be identified, 'cured' or removed to a place where
they pose no threat to others even before they have committed a crime. Positivist theories
are therefore frequently sympathetic to a policy of incapacitation218, even incapacitation
before the commission of an offence, if the evidence is supportive of the claim that harm
is very likely to occur unless a person is prevented from acting. However, incapacitation
is a last resort, used only when it is felt that there is nothing that can be done to change
an offender's behaviour, and only until science has found the relevant treatment for the
offender. For most of the 20th century, positivist theory and research progressed by
assuming that, with the careful collection of data, followed by the appropriate application
of theory to practice, offenders could be rehabilitated.
This rehabilitative optimism was obvious in the report of the Gladstone Committee
which proposed that offenders who could be rehabilitated would be diverted from prison
into a variety of treatment programmes219. These programmes would be customised to
deal with the problems of particular groups such as drunkards, mentally disordered
offenders, women and debtors220. The promise of rehabilitation outside of prison
coalesced with concerns about the prison environment itself. Reformers such as Beatrice
and Sydney Webb were scathing about the damage the prison inflicted:
2,6 E.g. Williams (1997), Lilly et.al. (1995), Tierney (1996)
217 Of course the alternative position holds that the ideology ofmodernity has resulted in
some of the most obscene acts of human history such as the holocaust or shoah of the
Second World War (see Bauman (1989)).
218 Modern incapacitation is not concerned to prevent the commission of all crimes, it has
been concerned to prevent crime being committed against certain groups, typically
middle class property-owners and employers. Therefore, incapacitation has taken many
forms and has included eugenic programmes, transportation of offenders to overseas
penal colonies, capital punishment and confinement in asylums and prisons.
219 Radzinowicz and Hood (1986) p 618-657
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We suspect that it passes the wit of men to contrive a prison which shall not be
gravely injurious to the minds of the vast majority of prisoners, if not also to
their bodies. So far as can be seen at present the most practical and hopeful of
'prison reforms' is to keep people out ofprison altogether.221
Throughout the first half of the 20th century there seemed to be some degree of
acceptance that prisons were causing harm, and failing to reduce crime222. However,
offenders still needed to be punished or 'managed' in some way. The new positive
sciences of psychology and psychiatry offered an opportunity for dealing with some
offenders by rehabilitating them. Women offenders were identified as being suitable for
psychiatric intervention, since low recorded rates of offending by women appeared to
support the argument that female offending was unusual and pathological223. Similarly,
young offenders were singled out for research and special 'treatment' measures as it was
expected that they could be cured before the 'disease' of criminality became
irremediable. Cyril Burt claimed to have identified as many as 170 of the factors that
were relevant to offending224 in young offenders and his work was influential in the
introduction of separate borstals for young offenders into the prison estate following the
1908 Act. The application of scientific argument, language and techniques conferred
prestige upon the institutions and practices of penality and it was some time before this
was challenged225.
The application of modern theory and practice in the period between the 1890s and the
second world war resulted in a convergence of arguments that advocated a reduction in
the use of the prison. The direction of scientific effort to the management of offenders
led to a belief that rehabilitation and reform could work to prevent all but the most
intractable offenders from re-offending. At the same time penal reformers were raising
concerns about the rights of prisoners and the damage caused by imprisonment226. A
220 Harding et. al. (1985) p205-235
221 Webb (1922) p 248
222 Bailey (1987)
223 Dobash et. al. (1986)
224 Burt (1931)
223 Garland (1985) p 82
226 p.awlings (1999) Chapter 8
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reduction in the use of imprisonment, it was held, would be good for both individual
offenders and for society. But these developments in the management of offenders were
not occurring in isolation and did not presage a reduction in state control over offenders
or indeed over citizens in general.
Ironically, reform of the penal system, and a desire to reduce imprisonment, were part of
a process of greater state intervention in, and control over, the lives of citizens. Garland
has argued that these changes were closely tied to the development of the welfare state"7.
Poorer citizens were offered help e.g. in the form of old age pensions, free health care
and education. But these benefits would only be available to those who satisfied certain
criteria i.e. were prepared to use these benefits appropriately and to refrain from anti¬
social activity in recognition of the state's 'charity'. For example, the old age pension
was only provided for those who had been in regular employment and who had put
money away while in employment228. The welfare state would provide for the 'deserving
poor' and the 'undeserving' would be subject to greater supervision, intervention and
control through withdrawal of benefits or through the mechanism of the penal system.
These welfare reforms offered the same choice for citizens as the reforms in the criminal
justice system, the state would intervene in an apparently caring way, to assist the poor
and the criminal, up to a point and subject to conditions. Garland argues that many of
these efforts were directed towards identifying those who could and would be
'normalised' into conforming with the needs of a capitalist economy and segregating or
incapacitating the others229. The criminal justice legislation provides evidence of this
strategy. Apart from the habitual offenders provisions mentioned in chapter one, the 1908
Prevention of Crime Act introduced measures that reflected the Gladstone Committee's
view that offenders should be given the opportunity to be reformed outside of the prison
environment. Only those offenders who could not be reformed would go to prison. Other
statutes of the time were also aiming to divert people from the prisons by putting in place
arrangements for probation230, making prison less inevitable for fine defaulters231, and by
227 Garland (1985), Thane (1996)
228 Hay (1977) The pension was not available to imprisoned offenders for 10 years after
their release.
229 Garland (1995) chapter 8
230 The Probation ofOffenders Act 1907
231 The Administration ofCriminal Justice Act 1913
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establishing more hospitals for offenders who were mentally disordered232. As noted in
the previous chapter, the 1948 Criminal Justice Act made a distinction between
corrective training, for offenders who were held to be reformable, and preventive
detention for those who were not. The former sentence, although expected to relate to
younger offenders, had no age limit and was explicitly rehabilitative. A sentence of
corrective training was not intended to run concurrently with a sentence of
imprisonment233 but could be served immediately after a sentence of imprisonment
expired234.
The reformative movement was born out of a concern for the individual prisoner but it
was also a reflection of the broader changes in the relationship between the state and
citizen. To the extent to which the state was offering the benefits of the welfare state,
citizens were expected to control their impulses to crime and disorder. Where possible,
knowledge of the reasons individual offenders committed crimes would be taken into
account in the state's response which would, at least initially, be corrective rather than
punitive in intent. 'Correction' was contrasted with 'punishment' because, positivists
argued, offending behaviour was the result of some difference in the criminal which
caused the criminal act, therefore punishment for the act seemed improper. The
appropriate response was to care for the offender in such a way that he or she could resist
the stimulus which caused him or her to offend, or to incapacitate him or her so that he
could not offend again. This was the prevailing ideology of the 1908 Prevention ofCrime
Act and the 1948 Criminal Justice Act, with the habitual offender and preventive
detention provisions reserved only for those considered resistant to correction, or for
whom science had not yet provided the solution to their offending behaviour.
The positivist paradigm which entered the English criminal justice system with the
Gladstone Committee report in 1895 was part of what Garland terms an 'assault' on the
traditional 'classical' jurisprudential basis for criminal justice233. He describes this
assault as operating in the following way:
232 The Mental Deficiency Act 1913 Zedner (1991)
233 R v Heritage [1951] 1 All ER 1013, n.b. corrective training was nevertheless served in
prison.
234 R v Albery [1951] 1 KB 680, [1951] All ER 491
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Against the doctrines of free will and responsibility, which formed the basis of
the whole legal edifice, there was counterposed the conclusions of science.236
According to the classical school, criminal behaviour is the outcome of a calculation
made rationally for which there can be no mitigating circumstances to alter the offender's
liability for his actions. However, somewhat against this explicit presumption of free-will
rational choice is the equally strong classical belief that, since each individual is part of a
consensus to maintain the social contract (ultimately for his own benefit), breaking the
social contract is either irrational or pathological237. This dilemma was the outcome of
the theory having been espoused by a property owning class which did not imagine that
the rational basis for action from the point of view of the indigent would be radically
different from its own. Proponents of the social contract theory ignored the fact that
protection was afforded the property owning classes by the social contract yet little was
to be gained from such a system amongst the poor. Positivist criminology avoids the
rationality dilemma of classicism by eliminating any free-will metaphysics in favour of
an assumption of determinism and commitment to the search for observable, measurable
and verifiable causes of criminal behaviour. Positivist criminological methodology
focuses on the particular offender and seeks to identify variations from the 'norm'. These
differences are aggregated, correlated and, often circularly, held to be both a symptom of,
and an explanation for, the offending behaviour. Positivists hold that since an offender's
behaviour is determined, given enough research and information, dangerous and criminal
behaviour can be predicted.
Criminological positivism typically assumes that crime is an objectively defined
phenomenon and that the contribution of the social to its definition and aetiology is
minimal. As early as the 1890's the positivist champion Garofalo had recognised the
potential difficulties posed by subjective definitions of crime and was arguing for a
'natural' definition of crime. Unfortunately this only stimulated further circularity in
positive criminology: the criminal is identified by certain observable 'natural' features,
behaviour exhibited by people with these features is therefore criminal. The failure of
criminological positivism was the failure to recognise that in the search for those features
235 Garland (1985) p 84
236 Garland (1985) p85
237 gee Chapter Three
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which would identify all and only offenders, a methodology which focuses on the
physical characteristics of people in isolation from their social environment is likely to
fail. The theory both fails to recognise the clearly subjective definition of much criminal
behaviour (how else can changes in laws defining criminal action be accounted for?) and
ignores the importance of social interactions and their role in the motivation of people to
either commit or not commit crimes. As the Scottish Council on Crime notes:
...the findings of research have not been of great value to those operating services
for the prevention of crime. The negative findings of criminological research, for
example the demonstration that certain simpler beliefs about the causes of crime
do not stand the test of fact, may have been of greater value.238
von Hirsch also observes the decline in optimism with respect to prevention strategies:
Past research about rehabilitation, deterrence, and collective incapacitation
showed a depressing cycle of optimistic projections, followed by those
projections' deflation under more careful scrutiny...239
Whilst positivism has had some success at looking for the causal factors influencing
individual criminals, it has not been able to simply and accurately (and predictively)
generalise to the whole population. The principle, practical failing of criminological
positivism is that its experimental design aims to solve the question of the aetiology of
crime for individuals, when the demand of legislators, sentencers, victims and politicians
is to provide the aetiology of crime for whole classes of people. The doctrines of free
will and responsibility and their incorporation into the criminal law enabled the
distribution of blame and the infliction of pain upon offenders. As was noted in Chapter
One240, punishment had to be deserved to be punishment, and something could only be
deserved if the person had a morally relevant connection to the act, i.e. was responsible
in some sense for the commission of the act. Yet a positivist approach which argued that
deviant or criminal behaviour was the result of some form of pathology eliminated
responsibility for the act. A man who is violent as a result of having Kleinfelter's
238 Scottish Council on Crime (1975) para 55
239 von Hirsch (1985) p 173
240 Section 1.2
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syndrome could not be blamed for his actions and morally could not be punished. He
could however, be rehabilitated and, if it was not known how to do this, he could be
incapacitated.
The abandonment of the classical jurisprudential concepts in criminological discourse
arose out of a conflict within modernity. The classical concepts emerged from the
political and metaphysical response to modernity, but were incompatible with the
scientific pursuit of social change. For one thing, the 'classical' view of punishment
focused on the harmful act that had been committed rather than any future behaviour of
the offender. In seeking to demonstrate equality and fairness in the application of
punishment, the classical approach was incompatible with the individualised approach of
the scientific paradigm. These contrasting approaches were both attempting to reflect the
values of equality and fairness that were so much part of a modern perspective on
punishment. But the classical approach argued that it was fair to treat all offenders the
same, with perhaps some exceptions at the extremes of age, mental capacity etc. By
contrast, the positivist approach argued that it was fairer to treat all offenders as
individuals, customising their treatment and punishment in order to maximise the
benefits to both the offenders and the society241. To advocates of the positivist
standpoint, classical theory was seen as being ridiculously legalistic, inflexible and a
hindrance to the development and employment of techniques to reduce offending and re¬
offending. As evidence, Garland cites Saleilles on classical penal theory:
though it attempts to make criminals pay for their debts, it does not succeed in
preventing them from contracting new and equally irresponsible ones.242
Given the confidence of the positivist approach in its ability to reform offenders, and the
resultant prevention of crime which the paradigm promised, it was not surprising that the
classical view of freewill, responsibility, proportionality and uniformity of punishment
was deprecated. It remained in the rhetoric of the criminal justice system and in the
determination of guilt, a point made by Duster243, even with respect to mentally
disordered offenders. However, from 1895 to the last quarter of the 20th century, the
241 Chapter 3 consider this point in detail.
242 Saleilles, cited in Garland (1985) p 85
243 Duster (1977), see Chapter one, S. 1.9
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positivist approach prevailed and the 1908 Act and the 1948 Act show that, even though
the doctrine which assumed individual responsibility was maintained in the criminal law,
these Acts extended the positivist ideology to all offenders when it came to measures
after conviction244.
The positivist theory, exemplified by the rehabilitative ethic which infused penal policy
and legislation from 1895 to 1991 was driven by concerns about the needs of the
individual offender. But as least as important to legislators and proponents of the use of
community punishments was the advantage that this approach would provide for
society245. Since the 19th century there had been some involvement of charitable and
religious institutions in taking responsibility for the control of some individuals,
particularly the young246, outside of prison. The 1907 Probation of Offenders Act gave
the policy of allowing offenders to be punished and treated outside of prison official
endorsement, although probation services were not initially funded by the state247. The
period between 1907 and the 1991 Criminal Justice Act saw an increase in the number
and variety of community sentences. In 2002 sentencers have the power to apply six
different forms of community sentence to adult offenders, some of which can limit the
offender's liberty quite considerably248. Although these can be seen as being punitive,
and are part of the policy, noted in the previous chapter, of the extension of
imprisonment into 'the community', for most of the post war period, community
punishments were conceived within a treatment model249 which was positivist in its
assumptions.
244 The frequent application of the dangerous offenders legislation, noted in chapter 1, to
those offenders who were merely persistent or a nuisance, reminds us that the retributive
elements of the classical paradigm were never completely obliterated by the prevailing
positivist ethos, probably because there was a difference of opinion between policy
makers and the sentencers on this point.
245 It was hoped that this advantage would be both social and financial in nature.
246 Raynor (2002) pi 172, n.b. this is similar to the involvement of charitable and
religious organisations in caring for some mentally disordered people, noted in chapter
one.
247 Garland (1985) pp210-214
248 E.g. A community rehabilitation order can specify that the offender must obtain




Although crime rates in the immediate post-war period were higher than pre-war250, it
was thought that this reflected the disruptive effects of the war rather than an increase in
the propensity of people to commit crime. Throughout the 25 years following the end of
the war there was still optimism that the changes in criminal justice, together with the
extension of welfare provisions to include housing and health care, would eventually lead
to a decline in social problems including crime251. Insofar as community punishments
claimed to reduce the need for imprisonment, and offered hope that they would be
effective in stopping or reducing the severity of offending by individuals, they would be
judged to be a success. Although even the most optimistic advocates of the positivist
framework recognised that it would not eliminate crime, the success of the programme
could only be claimed if there was some decline in the rates and/or severity of crime.
Unfortunately, as we shall see in the next section, crime rates rose throughout this period,
and the essential evidence was not forthcoming.
The early 1970s saw calls for a return to more punitive and retributive penal rhetoric. In
1966, shortly after the abolition of the death penalty, the murder convictions of Myra
Hindley and Ian Brady shocked the country. Brady and Hindley were found guilty of the
brutal killings of 3 young children, although they killed 5. The media interest in the case
was high and re-ignited the debate about capital punishment. Public opinion vilified
Hindley and Brady and it would have been impossible to countenance that the
supposedly caring and less punitive ethos of rehabilitation252 could apply to them and to
other serious offenders, even if it was carried out within the prison walls. The ideology
of positivism, with its belief in the reformative opportunities of the criminal justice
system, failed to impose itself on the public consciousness. The evidence also failed to
persuade policy makers and sentencers of its efficacy. Treatment was seen as a failure
and as a soft option for offenders.
250 Smithies (1982)
251 Rawlings (1999) pl30-l33
252 (Despite a subsequent diagnosis of mental illness and confinement in a secure hospital
fof Brady-
81
2.2 The decline of optimism
The positivist perspective facilitated the development of increasingly complicated and
differentiated responses to different groups of offenders committing different types of
crimes. Yet the theory failed to demonstrate that it was preventing crime or even
preventing recidivism. The difficulty for positivist criminologists was that the reforms
introduced were comprehensive yet they comprehensively failed to make any difference,
at least in terms of reducing the numbers of crimes recorded by the police. The police
records show that the crime rate increased eightfold between 1950 and 2000253. The rate
of imprisonment and the length of sentences likewise rose at a disturbing rate during the
post war period254, and this accelerated even more markedly during the last decade of the
century255. Some 'blame' could be directed at sentencers who persisted in using
imprisonment even when they were instructed that it was an inappropriate site for the
delivery of rehabilitative programmes, but even among those offenders who received
community sentences, recidivism continued to be high256.
Some of the reasons for the post war increase in imprisonment are generally viewed with
approval even by penal reformers, e.g. the imposition of life sentences on offenders who
would have once been subjected to the death penalty257, an increased awareness of,
reporting of, and official response to some crimes such as rape, domestic violence and
child abuse, and a tendency towards harsher penalties for alcohol-related fatal motoring
accidents. However, the continuing accelerated growth in the numbers of people held in
prison cannot be explained in full by these factors. The number of persons sentenced to
death in this century was not high enough to make a significant difference to the level of
imprisonment even if all capital sentences had been carried out and, mercifully, most
were not. The impact on imprisonment of an increase in the seriousness with which some
violent crimes are viewed can also only be part of the answer since these are the minority
of crimes for which imprisonment is imposed (although they will result in longer average
sentences and thus have a greater impact on average daily occupancy than higher
253 Maguire (2002), Fig. 11.1, p 344. Note that Maguire details the difficulty in obtaining
an accurate picture of crime trends based on recorded crime statistics.
254 Morgan (2002) p 1116
255 Ashworth (2002) p 1077
256 Brody (1976), Martinson (1974)
257 Hale (1961)
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receptions of shorter periods)258. By contrast with these minimally augmentative factors,
there were many reductionist strategies put in place in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Maximum penalties for some crimes were lowered (e.g. for theft and some forms of
burglary259), some offences were legitimised (e.g. suicide250, some forms of abortion251,
most forms of homosexuality262).
The increase in crime rates and the increase in imprisonment rates were significant in
bringing about a paradigm shift in criminology and in the criminal justice system. In the
early 1970s, a number of studies claimed that community penalties prevented re¬
offending among a small group of offenders who committed crimes infrequently, but that
otherwise rehabilitative programmes were ineffective263. Indeed, for young people, there
were fears emerging that community programmes were resulting in increased levels of
incarceration264. The optimism that had characterised policy with respect to offending
started to be open to question. A challenge to positivism emerged from two arguments,
the first being that the treatment model did not work265 (with the corollary that sentencing
on this basis was therefore manifestly impossible and unjust266), the second being that it
played down the importance of the question of the offender's culpability and
blameworthiness267.
Barbara Hudson describes the 1970s and early 1980s as a period of 'frantic innovation'
manifested by the introduction of alternatives to custody and an overt policy of diversion
from prosecution especially for young persons268. Likewise, Andrew Ashworth speaks of
a 'policy of proliferation'269 and notes that it 'was not a conspicuous success'270. Much of
this activity was designed to reduce the use of custody. To anyone unfamiliar with the
"8 See Morgan (2002) p 1130
259 Criminal Justice Act s 26
260 jhe Suicide Act 1961
261 The Abortion Act 1967
262 The Sexual Offences Act 1967
263 Shaw (1974)
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265 Martinson (1974), note that Martinson retracted his 1974 conclusions in Martinson
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reality, these factors, and the growth of alternative penalties mentioned by Hudson and
Ashworth, would suggest that there must have been a decrease in the use of
imprisonment. Yet, throughout this period there was an increase in the proportion of the
population in prison at any one time as well as an absolute increase in the prison
population271. Swamping the reductionist efforts was the ubiquitous increase in the rate
of recorded crime272, easily the most significant single explanatory factor in any account
of the rise in post-war levels of imprisonment.
Much of the blame for increased rates of imprisonment fell upon sentencers despite the
Court of Appeal's adherence to, and promotion of, a declared intention of reserving
imprisonment for the most serious cases. The Appeal Court employed many arguments
and strategies to discourage sentencers from using their power to imprison. These
included (i) stressing the totality principle which states that when there are multiple
offences before the court, the sentence should reflect the overall severity of the offences,
not the aggregate of the seriousness of each offence273, (ii) the principle that any prison
sentence imposed should be the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it
was imposed274, and (iii) the principle that prison should be reserved for the gravest
instances of the offence likely to occur275. These principles are all designed to limit the
use of imprisonment. Yet as the precise meaning of phrases such as 'minimum necessary
to achieve the purpose' is left vague, the Appeal Court cannot ensure its guidance will be
effective. Henham notes that s. 20 of the 1973 Powers ofthe Criminal Courts Act, which
provides that the court should not pass a prison sentence on a person unless it is of the
opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate, leaves the court with
unfettered discretion. Henham recognises where the blame is directed, ifnot due:
Ostensibly, since these constraints were designed to require the justification for
imprisonment to be made explicit it can be argued that they failed to create any
significant impact on the prison population which continued its inexorable rise
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evidence of the need to curtail sentencing discretion without any cogent evidence
being produced of a causal link between an incorrect sentencing approach and
rising imprisonment rates.276
Henham here seems to suggest, that sentencers' behaviour was unfairly blamed for the
rise in imprisonment. Since the statutes and the guidance of the Court of Appeal were
making clear the official position that imprisonment was to be used more sparingly, those
sentencers who continued to use imprisonment at the rate in which they always had could
not have been sentencing 'correctly'. Sentencers' use of imprisonment in a way which
might have once constituted 'correct' sentencing, had been disapproved and a policy
recommending the diminished use of custody was endorsed explicitly by both parliament
and the Court of Appeal. But, as evidence suggests that short terms of imprisonment
(surely the most substitutable by community penalties) continued to be handed down277,
it is difficult to avoid putting some of the blame for the increase in imprisonment on
sentencers. At the very least sentencers were failing to respond adequately to the demand
to be parsimonious in the use of imprisonment. At worst, it could be argued that
sentencers did not change their sentencing behaviour at all and that their failure to do so,
in conjunction with the rising crime rate, accounts for the inexorable rise in
imprisonment.
Unfortunately, it seems that, attempts to convince sentencers of the merits of reducing
the use of imprisonment and increasing their use of alternative sanctions had produced
little effect. Hence the 1991 Criminal Justice Act introduced for the first time a definitive
statement of the the primary purpose of sentencing and the justification for the
imposition of punishment. The Act set down strict criteria which had to be fulfilled
before the sentencer could impose a term of imprisonment. The wording used for the
criteria was taken from the Criminal Justice Act 1982 which gave threshold parameters
for the imposition of custodial sentences on offenders under the age of 21. These criteria
were imported directly into the adult context in the 1991 Act despite the criticisms made
of the provisions in the case of juvenile offenders. Burney argues that with respect to the
application of the threshold criteria to young persons, the criteria used i.e. the seriousness
of the offence, danger to the public and failure to respond to previous disposals, were not
276 Henham (1996) p6
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defined, leaving sentencers the discretion to impose custody as often as they chose278.
This was despite the fact that it was considered very important to avoid imprisoning
juveniles. It was feared that juvenile offenders could learn new criminal skills in
detention centres that were described as being little more than 'universities of crime'.
There was also concern that incarceration could lead to these young people, mostly men,
labelling themselves as criminals and starting criminal 'careers'. Despite the widespread
acceptance of the benefits of a policy of diversion from custody for young offenders,
custody was imposed as frequently after the 1982 Act's provisions came into force as
before279. It seems to have escaped the attention of the drafters of the 1991 Act that since
the provision had not worked to divert the most vulnerable group away from sentences of
imprisonment, it was always unlikely the unaltered criteria would reduce sentences of
imprisonment imposed upon adult offenders.
One possible explanation for sentencers' reluctance to reduce their use of imprisonment
has been suggested by James Q. Wilson, advisor on criminal justice to US President
Ronald Reagan and an advocate of the increased use of imprisonment in certain
circumstances. Wilson argued that it is reasonable to view imprisonment as only another
gradual step along the penal continuum, especially if punishment in the community is
considered as a type of deprivation of liberty280. On Wilson's model, the use of
punishment in the community could lead to increased use of imprisonment because the
similarity in the effect of punishment inflicted (loss of liberty) is emphasised rather than
the difference in kind or the quantum of punishment imposed. In 1979 Stan Cohen
echoed Wilson's view and described the 'blurring of the boundaries' between community
penalties and imprisonment; Cohen claimed that amongst its many defects this policy
caused a desensitisation to the unique severity of the penalty that is imprisonment281. As
there is evidence that government policy from the 1970s did indeed downgrade the
difference between punishment in 'the community' and punishment and treatment
delivered behind the walls of the prison282, Wilson's and Cohen's observations are
prescient. However, the effect of the policy change on sentencers is difficult to prove,
277 Morgan (2002) p 1129
278 See Burney (1985)
279 See Morris and Gelsthorpe (1994)
28° Wilson (1975)
28' Cohen (1979)
282 Greenberg (1975), Scull (1977)
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especially given the frequent reminders of senior judiciary to their sentencing colleagues
of the need to limit their imposition of imprisonment.
We have seen that the numbers of recorded crimes and the numbers of persons sentenced
to periods of imprisonment increased consistently throughout the second half of the
twentieth century283. The promise of positivism was discredited, or at least positivist
claims had to be dramatically scaled down284. That is to say, some forms of positivist
theory had failed. As noted at the commencement of this chapter, 'traditional' positivism
is divided into three forms, two of which concentrate their methodology on the
identification, segregation, treatment and/or incapacitation of morbid individuals.
Sociological positivist theorists have argued for a large variety of social and physical
factors which may influence an individual's propensity to commit crime. Included among
the research are studies that consider: whether certain physical environments precipitate
certain types of crime285, whether poverty leading to family breakdown produces
delinquency in children286, whether the strain of unfulfilled (and structurally impossible)
expectations leads to deviant adaptations287, and whether the lack of legal opportunities
for excitement and self expression lead to destructive violence288. This group of theories
pathologises social conditions rather than individuals and was the subject of at least as
much interest as other positivist approaches to a small number of criminologists289.
However, examining the social causes of crime was not as useful to policy makers as it
was of interest to the theorists. Sociological positivist theories had two practical
problems and one political difficulty. Practically, the solutions they proposed, such as
reducing family breakdown and poverty, and increasing social inclusion, were difficult if
not impossible to achieve, and would take decades rather than years to achieve - a period
of time that went beyond the terms of office even a highly successful political party was
likely to serve290. As well, it was hard to believe that the causes of the increase in crime
were to be found in social problems when the state had, on the face of it, done so much to
283 With the exception of a small a fall in recorded crime in the 1990s.
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improve the situation of the poor since the end of the second world war. Redistributive
taxation had brought about a welfare system which guaranteed the provision of old age
pensions and social security benefits for the unemployed and ill. Investment in social
infrastructure such as housing, education and healthcare had been provided yet crime
rates still rose. Politically, it was held to be wrong to label the poor and the underclass as
the group which was committing more crime and disorder, when clearly not all of the
poor were criminal. This was particularly the case when the data on crime rates were so
vulnerable to challenge. As noted above, criminologists argued that the poor had come to
be observed, controlled and disciplined by the (discriminatory) provisions of the welfare
state and that this alone might account for their increasing criminalisation291. But at the
same time, other criminologists were pointing to changes in the types of crime
committed, brought about by new opportunities292 and cultural changes particularly
among the young and urban poor293.
The practical difficulties of addressing broad social, economic and institutional
structures in order to reduce crime were immense. A radical perspective proposing
revolutionary changes to bring about social justice was never likely to receive a warm
reception from politicians concerned with instant, predictable results. Nevertheless, the
sociological positivist perspective was influential on policy. Precisely because it was not
concerned to identify the pathologies of individuals, sociological positivism offered an
alternative way of addressing the problem of crime. Although general political and
economic features were difficult to change, where there were identifiable 'pathologies' in
local environments it was possible to investigate the potential to change these areas and
to reduce crime. It was relatively simple to identify locations where there were high
levels of recorded crime and to compare these with areas which recorded low levels of
criminal activity294. Such research found that aspects of a location such as visibility, ease
of access, and the absence of preventive factors influenced the likelihood that a crime
290 Hudson (1993)
291 Cohen (1979), Garland (1985), Hudson (1993)
292 E.g. the opportunities for crime brought about by new technology such as the internet,
and a desire for excitement which generates some crimes such as football related
violence.
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would occur in that area295. This approach is positivist, its methodology is clearly
scientific and seeks causal or correlative connections, but this approach is not aimed at
finding the deviant or pathologised individual.
Unfortunately for the status of criminology, this crime prevention theory can be re-
described in a way which situates it within the competing classical, free-will theoretical
position. This view holds that humans are rational and act in ways which are likely to
best provide them with desirable outcomes and to desist from actions which are likely to
fail. Accordingly, changing the physical environment to increase the likelihood of
detection, conviction etc. will make the rational potential offender choose not to commit
a crime in a particular place and time. The fact that the success of a particularly 'common
sense' approach, i.e. situational crime prevention, could be claimed by both competing
doctrines, did not enhance the credibility of either classicism or positivism or of
criminological theory generally.
Policy makers could not be blamed for despairing, since the opposing theories could not
be distinguished by their successes or failures. Low level 'knowledge' about what works
in a particular place and time was useful, but high level theory about why certain
measures work and on whom was not. So, information concerning the efficacy of
situational crime prevention measures was accepted by policy makers and adopted into
policy programmes. But it is not surprising that this knowledge was influential in a non-
explanatory way which did not credit any one kind of criminological theory.
2.3 The emergence of a 'new penology'
The abandonment of a theoretically grounded approach to crime reduction marks the
origin of the penal model which has come to be known as the 'new penology' and which
is characterised, in part, by the sentencing provisions of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.
This penal paradigm is identified by features such as instrumental, technical and
scientific approaches to crime control, actuarial reasoning and a reliance on professional
(rather than clinical) judgement. Its most broadly defined characteristic can be
summarised as the efficient management of risk. As a result, it is deeply concerned with
295 Clarke (1995)
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the reduction and minimisation of harms and its firmly instrumental outlook favours the
use of strategies of harm reduction such as crime prevention and incapacitation. When
incorporated into practical crime control, the new penology emphasises prediction296, the
application of new technology297, prevention298 and a cost/benefit analysis of penal
measures299. The Probation Service was the first part of the criminal justice system to
feel its influence moving from a reformative, individualised service to one based on the
surveillance and control of groups of offenders300.
The new penology ideology arose from social changes which are more easily identified
in the social circumstances of the United States than in the United Kingdom and other
parts of Europe. In the USA since the 1960s labour market changes had led to a reduction
in the demand for unskilled labour. Criminal activity increased as a result of
unemployment and also made it difficult for offenders to be rehabilitated and re¬
integrated into the community through work. As communities became more deprived the
capacity of local people to participate in offender rehabilitation was reduced so e.g.
outsiders such as probation officers were required to assist offenders in reintegration
without the support of the offender's family. With the failure of the economic sector to
provide unskilled jobs, the social structure began to fail making it more likely people
would begin to offend and making it more difficult for offenders to cease their offending
behaviour301. Rates of imprisonment rose dramatically as large numbers of offenders
appeared to be uncontrollable and incapacitative policies were developed to manage this
underclass of'dangerous' criminals.
In the UK, Raine and Willson302 point to the oil crisis in the Middle East and the
consequent economic pressures which brought about changes in the management of
public funds in the 1970s. The political determination to adjust to straitened times was
forced on Britain by stipulations on monetary policy applied by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) from which Britain had needed to borrow funds to meet public
296 E.g. Simon (1971)
297 Home Office (1990b)
29g Home Office (1990c)
299 See Raine and Willson (1993) passim
300 See also Raine and Willson (1993) 2.2.1
301 Garland (1985)
302 Raine and Willson (1993) 1.3.1
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spending requirements. The demands of the IMF for tighter control over public spending
coincided with the rise of the new right in economics with its ideology of private
investment rather than public ownership, lower taxation to provide incentives for
entrepreneurial enterprise and a reduction in the welfare state. As part of this political
shift to the right, the UK government brought in policies that were hostile to welfare and
were prepared to exclude individuals and groups from economic and social life if they
were unproductive or difficult to manage. In the same way as the market economy could
operate with maximum efficiency if some people were excluded from the economic
environment303, penal policies sought maximum efficiency through the exclusion of
people from normal social life304.
Evidence that a change of thinking with respect to social policy had occurred can be
found in the new styles of management adopted by many government organs, including
those of the criminal justice system. New management styles included the introduction of
devolved budgets, performance indicators, cost/benefit analyses applied to resource
management, support for privately managed prisons, risk assessment in the management
of offenders on parole, and policing strategies designed to target police resources at those
offences which were of most concern to the public305. However, the features of new
penology only partially describe the changes in penology and crime control in the UK
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. A form of rhetoric that predates positivist
criminological theories survived to operate alongside the new perspective, and is most
visible in a tendency towards explicitly expressive language and policies. The message
that was to be communicated through these policies was one of abhorrence of criminal
activity and the threat of total state control of individuals through heightened levels of
punitiveness. New penology was not concerned to be less punitive than its alternatives,
although one of its aims was to reduce the inefficient reliance on imprisonment305;
however it was not particularly concerned with demonstrating its punitive credentials.
Before considering the introduction of punitive rhetoric onto new penology, it is
important to consider the political climate which preceded the new penology. 'Old
303 E.g. if levels of unemployment are high, then the cost of labour is cheap.
304 E.g. if a person offends repeatedly then they should be incapacitated.
305 Stenson and Sullivan (2001) Introduction and passim
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penology' is the name I shall use to describe the criminal justice paradigm that
dominated the post war period until the 1970s. Old penology was essentially positivist
social policy, seeking to understand the causes of criminality in order to put in place
measures to prevent or correct it. It aimed to find mechanisms to bring the offender back
into law abiding society, and left the development of the techniques to experts such as
psychiatrists, clinicians and social workers rather than politicians or the common sense
opinions of lay persons. Rather in the way medicine and science are felt to be specialist
subjects in which ordinary people can only rarely give an opinion, crime control was
considered best left to the experts.
In contrast to the policies of new penology, old penology did not seek to reduce crime in
the fastest, most cost-efficient way. Instead, it sought to encourage offenders back into
full and virtuous membership of their communities. As a consequence, for old penology
the social exclusion of offenders through incapacitation was seen as failure rather than
success. For the new penology, the use of incapacitation is evidence neither of success
nor of failure. It is to be used when it is the most efficient means of preventing offending
or re-offending. Of course, although advocates of new penological policy claim that the
decision about the efficient use of imprisonment is a scientifically determined matter, it
is always influenced by political facts. The rise of populist punitiveness307 meant that the
policies adopted as part of new penology in the 1980s and 1990s were never going to be
exclusively based on a scientific foundation nor would the policy with respect to
offenders be divorced from public opinion nor completely devolved to professionals.
2.4 New penology and the 1991 Criminal Justice Act
The 1991 Act can be seen as statutory articulation of the new penology. The Act set forth
a policy which sought to sentence offenders on the basis of the crime that they had
committed, not in order to correct the pathology from which they suffered. The Act was
also concerned with the efficiency of the criminal justice system, and sought to limit the
wasteful use of resources. It therefore set in statutory form restrictions on the use of
imprisonment and on the length of sentences of imprisonment. Sentence length was
306 Imprisonment, being expensive, is not seen as efficient if other penal measures
prevent re-offending just as effectively.
307 Bottoms (1995)
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required to be the minimum that was commensurate with the seriousness of the offence,
with the exception of those offenders who were found to be 'dangerous' who would be
subject to longer than normal sentences of imprisonment.
As was clear from the 1990 white paper308 which preceded the Act, the proportionality
aspects of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act were linked to the theory which had become
known by the phrase 'just deserts'. Just deserts theory posits a relationship between the
criminal act and the punishment that the act attracts. This relationship can take two
forms: the seriousness of certain criminal acts must be ranked in accordance with the
severity of punishment so that e.g. more serious criminal acts attract harsher penalties;
the second and more problematic form sets the punishment in a proportionate
relationship to the absolute seriousness of the crime. The punishment must be
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence taking into account any aggravating or
mitigating factors. The objectives of such sentencing could include: denunciation and
retribution for the crime; public protection; reparation to the victim; and reform of the
offender (preferably in the community)309. That a variety of sentencing objectives was
recognised as legitimate is suggestive of the theoretical neutrality of the new penology.
No particular sentencing rationale is promoted by the 1991 Act, although the length of a
prison sentence is determined by the retributive criterion of the seriousness of the
offence.
The just deserts sentencing framework emphasises the fairness of punishing the offender
only for the offence for which he or she is before the court310. In practice this means that
the court cannot take prior convictions into account in the determination since that is
irrelevant to the estimation of the seriousness of the current offence. The white paper
acknowledged this quoting the Court of Appeal's ruling that an offender should not be
'sentenced for the offences which he has committed in the past and for which he has
already been punished. The proper way to look at the matter is to decide a sentence
which is appropriate for the offence... before the court.'311 Nonetheless, prior good
character as shown through the absence or small number of similar offences may enable
308 Home Office (1990d)
309 Home Office 1990 s. 2.9
310
von Hirsch (1986) Although this principle was introduced in the 1991 Act, it was
severely weakened in the 1993 Criminal Justice Act.
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the court to reduce the sentence. However, within the just deserts framework, the
offender cannot be punished more harshly as a result of his prior convictions for to do so
would be to punish him or her more than once for those offences. Taking prior
convictions into account would also inevitably result in more punitive sentences with no
clear justification, and this is therefore contrary to the desideratum put forward in new
penology that punishment should be the minimum necessary or else state resources are
wasted.
We saw in chapter one that the 1991 Act, in keeping with new penology thinking,
promoted parsimony in the sentencing of offenders to prison. The Act also reduced the
maximum sentence for some crimes312: Theft (when tried on indictment) was reduced
from a maximum of 10 years to a maximum of seven years, and the offences of
conspiracy to steal and attempted theft were also reduced. The maximum sentence for
burglary was also reduced in those cases where the burglary was not of a person's home.
This is compatible with the seriousness criteria underlying much of the sentencing
revision in the 1991 Act, making a distinction between crimes that disturb the security
and safety of persons and crimes which are aimed at property. In the case of burglary of a
dwelling house, the maximum possible sentence was not reduced from 14 years. The
maximum sentences that were reduced were those which had not in practice been
approached for some time and therefore these changes made little difference except in a
presentational and symbolic sense. However, within a just deserts framework such
symbolism cannot be disregarded, as the sentence maxima are a guide to the relative
seriousness with which certain crimes are viewed, and are therefore an important guide
for sentencers even if it happens that these maxima are never approached.
The just deserts rationale provided a method by which the Executive could better control
the sentencing habits of the judiciary through a clear outline of the aims of sentencing,
and through guidelines, rules and standardised levels of punishment313. Just deserts
theory militated against many of the expensive elements of old penology regimes,
311 R v Queen (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 245
312 It must be noted that the maximum penalty for some crimes was increased in the
Criminal Justice Act 1993, notably the crime of causing death by dangerous driving, the
penalty for which was increased from a maximum of five years imprisonment to a
maximum of ten years imprisonment.
313 In the USA this led to the use of sentencing tables. See Von Hirsch (1986) Chapter 2
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particularly the long or indeterminate sentence that was claimed to be rehabilitative and
in the offender's best interest. As there was little or no confidence in crime reductive
efficacy of the rehabilitative approach, the new penology preferred punishment in the
community as it was cheaper. If it also had the effect of reducing offending through re¬
integrating the offender and making amends to victims then this was clearly desirable.
Thus the 1991 Act did not exclude the possibility that there were substantial benefits to
be gained through reparation, community service, probation, and forms of community
punishment which minimised the deleterious effects on families, and employers. The
rational calculating elements of new penology were reflected in the 1991 Act's
introduction of unit fines314. Unit fines enabled calculations of financial punishment to be
more fair e.g. to strive towards an equal impact with respect to the levels of monetary
fines imposed on offenders of varying financial means313.
Just deserts theory provided a perfect way to introduce two elements of the new penology
into the English criminal justice system. Reacting to the failure of criminological theory
to provide an explanation of the causes of crime, just deserts theory nevertheless
provided a method by which the severity of criminal sentences could be determined. By
promoting sentences determined by desert, and by taking a bifurcated316 approach to the
imposition of punishment, the policy reserved the most expensive resource of
imprisonment for those offenders who had committed the most serious crimes and from
whom the public needed protection317. To the extent to which the success of the policy
can be measured by a fall in the length of sentences of imprisonment, it was initially
successful318. To the extent that just deserts and new penology failed to reduce the prison
population in the longer term we need to look at the influence of public opinion on
politicians, and accordingly, the influence on penal practice.
314 Ashworth et. al. (1992)
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317 Taking punishment in the community as the norm and setting strict (although vague)
threshold criteria for the imposition of imprisonment.
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2.5 Populist Punitiveness
From 1950 to the mid 1970s, the arguments surrounding the effectiveness and
justifications for punishment in the post war period were largely conducted in a detached,
measured and co-operative tone between the political opponents319. However, an increase
in political conflict over law and order policy followed the 1979 British general election.
From its success in this election, the Conservative Party was seen to have a definite
electoral advantage over the Labour Party in the area of crime and punishment320. The
Conservative Party emphasised individual responsibility for crime and undertook to
spend more on police, prisons and the criminal justice system.
The origins of crime lie deep in society... the government alone cannot tackle
such deep rooted problems easily or quickly. But government must give a lead:
by backing not attacking the police; by providing a tough legal framework for
sentencing; by building the prisons in which to take those who pose a threat to
society - and by keeping out of prison those who do not; and by encouraging
local communities to prevent crime and to help the police to detect it321.
The Conservative Party's argument seemed to resonate with public concerns and clearly
distinguished them from the Labour Party's more diffuse approach to crime and
disorder322. The issue of crime was associated in the public mind with the failures of
Labour governments in the seventies to manage other forms of 'disorder' such as the
strikes of miners and public service workers323. However, in the middle of the 1980s the
Labour Party sought to reposition itself and to compete against the Conservatives on the
issue of law and order. In particular the Labour Party dropped its opposition to the
introduction of new police powers thus abandoning its previous stance of demanding
increased scrutiny of the police. The Conservatives responded to Labour's more pro-
police stance by becoming more punitive, rightly perceiving that this would be popular
319 Downes and Morgan (2002). This is despite the emotive nature of the debate over the
abolition of capital punishment.
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with voters, and a spiral of engagement formed, each party struggling to appear tougher
on crime and criminals than the other.
Garland argues that the public response to law and order is not merely a copy of the
spiral of punitiveness brought into existence by party-political posturing324. He argues
that the rising crime rate since the Second World War meant that by the time of the
1980s high crime rates have become seen as the norm. As a result of the increase in
personal experience of crime and an increase in media attention to crime, individuals and
business become more crime-conscious and start investing in crime reduction strategies
to protect their homes, business and property. Garland terms this 'adaptive behaviour',
and notes how the acceptance of the normality of crime has touched all levels of society
including the increasingly wealthy post-war middle class who had previously been
largely untouched by the problem. Therefore as these groups became more aware of
crime through personal experience and second-hand reports, they took steps to reduce
their exposure to crime.
Adaptive behaviour is particularly obvious in the business sector which invested heavily
in security and control mechanisms such as fencing, closed circuit television cameras,
patrolling security officers etc.325. The extent of the change was such that, by the 1970s,
private policing of private property had become a bigger industry than the public
police326. As well as making adaptive changes to the workplace, businesses responded to
criminal activity in ways that were designed to minimise the costs to them of such
activity. Businesses were not concerned to catch and prosecute offenders, nor were they
interested in punishing or rehabilitating them. Business concern with crime centred on
prevention, harm minimisation and cost control. This economic model for dealing with
crime originated in the private sector response to increased crime rates but was fairly
swiftly imported into the public sector and was a direct precursor to the policy initiatives
arising from the new penology.
Individual citizens and households also began to change their daily routines to make
crime less likely. Simple measures like locking doors and windows and keeping
324 Garland (1997)
325 See Pease (2002) Table 26.1
326 jsfewburn (2001)
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valuables out of sight became commonplace327, and much was made of the contrast
between the period before the war when communities were more integrated and such
measures were felt to be unnecessary or even impolite, suggesting that one could not
trust one's neighbours. Once introduced, security measures would spread throughout a
neighbourhood as individual property owners did not want their home to appear to be the
most vulnerable in the area. In the most extreme examples, entire gated communities
developed with enhanced security systems. These communities used surveillance and
boundary restraints to control the movement into and out of private residential space in
the expectation that criminals would be diverted from difficult targets onto less well
protected areas328. Such patterns of behaviour showed clear social adaptation to an
environment where the high rates of crime were considered normal329. Crime avoidance
became a conscious activity and a commonplace part of everyday routines.
Such behaviour fitted the paradigm of new penology well. The government was able to
build on already existing social changes when it sought to introduce e.g. CCTV in town
centres and placed fences and gates around schools to secure them from the external
world. New penology advice concerning crime prevention and the minimising of risk led
to a revolutionary change in the way crime is perceived by ordinary citizens. Instead of
crime being an issue only when a member of a household or a close associate is a victim
of crime, crime becomes an everyday concern. Adaptive changes such as installation of
burglar alarms, avoidance of certain areas at night etc. make citizens more aware of the
possibility of crime. This heightened level of awareness becomes a psychological fact
which is exacerbated by the reports of crime in the media. Fear of crime is generalised,
which means that householders are unable to distinguish between their likeliness of
suffering property crime and their likelihood of becoming a victim of violent and sexual
crime330. Crime is perceived in an undifferentiated way and this heightened perception
means that reports in newspapers concerning crime, and in particular all serious violent
crimes, are perceived as crimes that 'could have happened to me'.
327 Pease (2002)
328 Hayward (2003)
329 This adaptive behaviour also occurred in other spheres of life. The increased use of
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From the new penology perspective, instead of being perceived as the activity of
disturbed or disadvantaged individuals as it had been under old penology, crime was
perceived as a kind of routine activity, as a hazard which was to be avoided. If crime
could not be prevented then at least the costs resulting from it could be minimised. Public
property such as bus shelters were made of material that is easy to clean and repair after
attacks of vandalism, improved street lighting and closed-circuit television cameras
sought to prevent and displace crime from particular areas. Criminologists have
developed new penology thinking as comparable with other risk analysis systems such as
air traffic control, motorway design and the management of entertainment and retail
spaces such as Disney World331. Crime is considered as a risk which has to be prevented,
but like aircraft accidents, it is recognised that problems will occur at some stage and so
plans are made to minimise the harm caused by crime when it does occur. A risk
management model is adopted for crime which aims at reducing the number of incidents
through prevention and harm minimisation.
Prevention of criminal 'accidents' naturally requires identification of those factors which
correlated with crime. The new penology outlook stimulates the examination of groups of
offenders and, significantly, victims, to profile the characteristics of those individuals
who made up these groups. Care was taken not to blame victims for their victimisation
but nevertheless, research had provided some evidence for the proposition that victim
action could precipitate or provoke criminal acts332. This information was taken as having
the virtue of 'common sense'. If the householder made it obvious that a property was
unattended, then this behaviour could precipitate a burglary. More controversially the
methodology was extended to encompass the behaviour of victims of violent and sexual
offences. For example, the behaviour of women who were assaulted or raped by men
they knew was used as a (partial) explanation of the acts of violence against them333.
However, unlike the positivist methodology used by old penology, new penological
research into the correlates of crime was not done at the level of individuals but used
actuarial techniques to study large groups of people. The approach was correlative rather
than causal and explanatory. Data concerning the characteristics of groups could be
331 Shearing and Stenning (1987) Simon and Feeley (1995)
332 von Hentig (1948), Wolfgang (1958)
333 Lees (1997)
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collected relatively quickly and cheaply in contrast with the time consuming and
expensive process of making an assessment of an individual334. Following the
aggregation of the data, the characteristics of high rate offenders were compared with
those of occasional offenders in the hope of being able to devise actuarial categories of
risk and apply them to the prevention and incapacitation of the high rate offenders335.
As noted above, Garland argues that public involvement in crime is mediated by a daily
activity of crime prevention which promotes awareness and fear of crime336. It is
therefore understandable that householders become more condemnatory towards the
criminal who, in the abstract, has required him or her to take these adaptive steps to
prevent him or herself becoming a victim. The politician's rhetoric of toughness finds a
sympathetic audience in such an environment. Particularly amongst the middle classes
who had been traditionally more tolerant towards offenders, their experience of crime
prevention, even in the absence of direct victimisation, makes them more punitive and
more likely to see themselves as potential or future victims. Punitive attitudes spread
throughout the social classes just as they had always been prevalent in the heavily
victimised poor.
So the extension of support for punitive populism is not merely the result of political
rhetoric but a response by much of the population to their potential for victimisation.
This concern was recognised by politicians and, to give but one example, enabled
politicians to enjoy unquestioned support for expenditure on new prisons. Increases in
levels of punitiveness amongst the public have been assumed by politicians despite some
evidence to the contrary. Judgements based on the experience of victims and the public
outrage at high profile killings such as the murder of James Bulger or shootings at
schools give politicians the impression of increased levels of popular punitiveness. This
impression is supported by media pronouncements which assume that the general public
believe that criminal sentences are excessively lenient. In fact, when surveyed about the
sentence they would hand down when presented with an example of a 'normal' crime,
public attitudes to sentencing turn out to be well within current sentencing practice.337
334 Feeley and Simon (1994)
335 Simon (1988)
Garland (1997)
337 See Hough and Roberts (1998)
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Criminologists may argue over whether punitive populism exists but the fact is that
politicians have little to lose by acting as if it does. No votes have been lost by taking a
more punitive stance even if the enhanced punitiveness is not really extant in ordinary
people when considering the vast majority of ordinary offences.
2.6 The rise of a punitive 'new penology'
The perceived rise in punitive populism in the early 1990s was partially brought about by
increased crime prevention measures and a greater awareness of crime. It encouraged
politicians to use punitive rhetoric in their statements on crime and punishment. This
meant that new penology strategies had to become more 'political'. While new penology
ideology was developing public policy that was evidence based, actuarial and striving for
efficient use of resources, the newly politicised debate surrounding crime was expressive,
moralistic and focused on the prison as a symbolic central icon of punishment. The
punitive discourse was driven by the novel element of universal public interest and
involvement in criminal justice and was heightened by proselytising and interactive
media coverage of crime338.
From the early 1990s, public participation in the debate around criminal justice was not
concerned with the rehabilitation of offenders. Following the Bulger case, discussed
below, there was not even public interest in calls for the rehabilitation of young
offenders. This reflects the position of new penology thinking which is not
straightforwardly positivist in the way that old penology had been.
New penology thinking and public opinion shared a pragmatic approach to crime control
that was not concerned to discover the causes of crime in order to correct them. New
penology resolved the 'mad vs. bad' debate by advocating sentencing on the basis of
offence seriousness. For serious offenders, it appeared irrelevant to discover whether
they were 'mad' or 'bad', the only thing of concern was that the public need protection
from them. Flowever, when the ingredient of populist punitiveness is added to the debate,
338
E.g. the Crimewatch television programme on the BBC, which requests public
assistance in the detection of criminals, and the DailyMail newspaper 'name and shame'
campaign which exhorted people to identify and challenge alleged paedophiles in their
community.
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all offences are redefined as serious. In this environment, the prison (or secure hospital)
is perceived to be primary site for punishment. The prison is the presumptive form of
punishment because only by imprisoning can the state provide protection from all
offenders. Instead of serious offenders being considered dangerous, all offenders are
considered to be potentially or actually dangerous. Thus, new penology sentencing
ideology which based sentence severity on the seriousness of the offence had to be
reconsidered. A punitive new penology was required.
Punitive new penology policies, in contrast to the instrumental policies of the new
penology, are expressive. They seek to reflect and respond to the anxiety felt by the
public about crime. Rather than being economically rational, populist punitive policies
are moral-absolutist in outlook. With punitive populism, value for money is less of a
consideration. Rational, evidence-based policy is cast aside in favour of sentiment,
symbolism and 'common-sense' wisdom. Instead of looking at the data and analysis
provided by researchers, punitive populism is anti-expert and anti-professional,
preferring the judgement of popular opinion usually expressed through the tabloid press.
Advocates of punitive new penology sought the increased use of imprisonment for all
crimes339. Since protecting the public is a central concern, imprisonment of offenders has
become an increasingly desirable outcome of the whole criminal justice process. Punitive
new penology is satisfied with the sentencing policy of just deserts so long as the level at
which the seriousness of an offence and the commensurate punishment for that offence is
high. In effect this has meant that punitive new penology accepts just deserts' emphasis
on the ordinal ranking of offences as long as the newly punitive political climate is
reflected in the cardinal ranking of offences.
In the USA the expressive feature of populist policies led to the increased stigmatisation
of criminals through the use of chain gangs and striped clothing and the resumption of
the use of the death penalty in many states. High profile crimes committed by some
offenders following release made it impossible for politicians to take risks over the
release of prisoners or the commutation of the death penalty. In Britain and the US, crime
policy became more responsive to the expression of vengeance, anger and fear by the
339 E.g. Michael Howard, Home Secretary from 1995-7
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public. The rhetoric of policy pronouncements became increasingly punitive and did not
reflect the views of their own researchers e.g. in the Home Office Research Unit14".
Instead, penal policy followed the lead given by market researchers, echoing the public's
common sense view that if you punish offenders severely enough they will stop
offending, and if all else fails, you can lock them away so they cannot re-offend. Policy
pronouncements were simplified and made emotionally appealing, for maximum impact
they were often given in the highly dramatic arena of party conferences before a very
sympathetic audience341.
Punitive populism was most clearly visible in Britain in 1993 following the tragic
abduction and killing of James Bulger, a toddler, by two boys aged 10. This killing and
the shock and outrage which accompanied it led directly to the re-introduction of secure
units for children which were in effect prisons for children342. Other examples of the
results of punitive populism could be seen in the revival in rhetoric if not in practice of
the 'boot camp', and the 'short, sharp, shock' theory which argued that giving young
offenders a taste of custody would deter them from behaviour which could lead to longer
periods in custody. For adults, a change in prison regimes occurred, with a reduction in
what were known as 'privileges' (these included family contact and home leave) and a
regime of austerity was instated. Security was emphasised over all other considerations
leading to some extreme measures such as the handcuffing of women prisoners whilst
they were giving birth. Proposals for mandatory minimum sentences were imported from
the USA as was the idea of community notification of the release of certain offenders,
particularly sex offenders. The rhetoric of the day resounded with punitive slogans
'condemn a little more, understand a little less', 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of
,343
crime .
Of course, punitive new penology shares some characteristics with new penology, the
theory on which it is based. Both approaches justify the imposition of punishment
primarily on retributive grounds but the goal of punishment is to prevent re-offending.
Neither theory is concerned with individualised sentencing based on what is best for the
340 Hudson (2002)
341 Gamble (1994)
342 Newburn (2002) p 555-7
34? Downes and Morgan (2002)
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offender. Hence neither are they interested in rehabilitation unless that 'rehabilitation'
can be incapacitative (e.g. the chemical castration of sex offenders). Where the two penal
paradigms differ is that new penology is essentially rational, seeking to get the best use
of public money in the operation of the penal system. This being so, it is concerned to
use the prison as little as possible (although this may still mean quite a high use of the
prison), mainly for the incapacitation of dangerous and/or repeat offenders. New
penology thinking is sceptical about the crime reductive potential of reformative
programmes. It therefore concentrates resources on situational crime prevention,
surveillance in the community and the incapacitation of certain offenders based on
projections of risk. New penology justifies punishment on a retributive basis, with the
minimum possible use of the prison, but it permits an element of enhanced punitiveness
to incapacitate dangerous and 'dangerous' offenders.
Punitive new penology by contrast, is irrational, it is not interested in making the best use
of public resources and it is not willing to take any chances with future offending.
Punitive new penology takes the view that crime rates will fall if all offenders are
rounded up and locked away for a long, long time. The offender is felt to have abdicated
his rights as a citizen and should therefore be removed from society. Any calculation of
the likelihood of re-offending is unnecessary since he is going to be incapacitated
anyway. For advocates of punitive new penology, increased use of the prison is a (highly
desirable) outcome of increased punitiveness imposed retributively. An offender's
conviction shows that he or she is capable of causing harm, and arouses an emotional,
irrational reaction against the offender. In this political environment, when the offender
is reviled and it is not known how to prevent him or her from re-offending, the only
apparent option available is a long sentence of imprisonment.
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The movement in political thinking that favoured punitive new penology led directly to
the decision to allocate funds for the provision of new prisons, and more prison
accommodation344. This expenditure and activity was almost contemporaneous with
introduction of the prison-reducing measures introduced by the 7997 Criminal Justice
Act. As part of a political 'package' of law and order reforms, imprisonment became
central to criminal justice policy and, if one were to believe the rhetoric, was almost the
only weapon available in the battle to defeat crime.
2.7 New Penology, Punitive New penology, and the 1991 Criminal Justice Act
We have seen that the new penology policies which the 1991 Criminal Justice Act
embodied very quickly began to be undermined by a return to more punitive styles of
penal rhetoric and policy. In Cunningham345 it was stated that sentences could be passed
for the purpose of deterrence. Ashworth notes that this decision effectively 'torpedoed
the proportionality principle' with the consequence that fewer community sentences were
passed and sentences of imprisonment became longer346. However, although significant
changes were made in the 1993 Criminal Justice Act, the 1991 Act was not repealed and
general sentencing policy of just deserts remains in place in 2002. Just deserts ideology
was retained in the language of proportionality featured in the Act but not in its
implementation. Politically, the shortcomings and expense of imprisonment were spoken-
of less frequently and the language of condemnation and blame was revived. Instead of a
discourse which advocated imprisonment as a measure of last resort, the changes in penal
rhetoric culminated in the statement by Michael Howard that 'prison works'347.
We have seen that the two competing government policies of the post-7997 Criminal
Justice Act period reflect the underlying ideologies of new penology and punitive new
penology. The policy that underpinned the Act, which advocated reducing the prison
numbers by limiting the purpose of imprisonment to the incapacitation of the dangerous,
was a reflection of the new penology paradigm. Translated into penal policy, this model
344 Morgan (2002)
345 Cunningham (1993) 15 Cr App R (S) 444
34« Ashworth (2002) p 1098
347 Home Secretary Michael Howard, cited in Newburn (1995b)
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sought to make best use of penal resources which meant the use of structured and
demanding community sentences where possible. It was the case however, that the new
penology supported the use of imprisonment for the purpose of reflecting the seriousness
of some offences. Additionally, s. 2 (2) (b) of the Act expressly allowed the imposition
of longer than normal periods of imprisonment for those offenders whom it was felt were
at risk of committing a serious violent or sexual offence in the future.
It is important to emphasise, as has been hinted above, that the new penology perspective
is not necessarily anti-prison. The new penology approach to the use of the prison centres
on the most appropriate use of the prison as an expensive penal resource. The main
purpose of the prison is to incapacitate offenders since all other penal outcomes can be
achieved outside its walls. If the prison is used for other purposes, such as rehabilitation
and deterrence, then it is a wasteful use of public money. Rehabilitation is at least as
effective when delivered outside of prison, and any deterrent effect brought about by a
sentence of imprisonment is at best extremely short-lived348.
The incapacitation effects desired by advocates of the new penology can be broadly
divided into two types. These are commonly referred to in the incapacitation literature as
'selective' and 'general' incapacitation. These designations, unfortunately, are slightly
misleading. 'Selective incapacitation' suggests, correctly, that the individuals chosen for
this type of punitive disposal are chosen for some particular attribute of their personality
or of their offending behaviour. It implies however, that those persons who are subjected
to a policy of 'general incapacitation' are not chosen. In fact this is not the case, what is
often termed 'general incapacitation' in the criminological literature refers to the
incapacitation of larger numbers of people than those incapacitated selectively, and is
based on entirely different qualifying criteria. The incapacitation that occurs with general
incapacitation is still selective, so it is neither general nor non-selective.
The new penology does justify incapacitation differently for two distinct groups of
offenders. Qualitative incapacitation seeks to incapacitate those offenders who pose a
risk of committing very serious offences and hence of causing high levels of harm. This
is the type of incapacitation advocated in the disproportionate detention provision of the
348
von Hirsch et. al. (1999)
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1991 Criminal Justice Act and it is usually characterised (as it is in the Act) as
incapacitation of violent or sexual offenders. It is, as the name suggests, incapacitation
based on some quality of the act or the offender. Quantitative incapacitation by contrast,
seeks to incapacitate those offenders who commit the most crime, and its goal is not the
prevention of serious violent and sexual offences but a reduction in the overall crime
rate. This has been justified by the assertion that a substantial number of crimes are
committed by a small number of offenders. Therefore, the incapacitation of a few
offenders will have a disproportionately large effect on the reduction in the crime rate.
This policy can satisfy the new penology criteria of penal efficiency provided there is
substantial reduction in losses caused by the incapacitated offenders being unable to
continue offending. This reduction in criminal loss may offset the cost of imprisoning the
offenders, leading to a net economic gain349. New penology could, in principle, favour on
utilitarian grounds the application of either quantitative or qualitative incapacitation
although it naturally prefers qualitative incapacitation as this results in the fewest
offenders being committed to the most expensive penal resource. Both groups of
offenders singled out for the incapacitation would need to be selected for particular
qualities, either the risk of serious crimes being committed in the future or the risk of the
commission of high rates of crime in the future350. The net effect would be either a
reduction in the levels of serious harm committed or a reduction in the cost of criminal
activities to victims. However, it is important to note that new penology, based as it is on
rational cost-benefit analysis, does not advocate the application of the universal use of
incapacitation.
Conversely, the rhetoric of punitive new penology strongly supports a model of truly
general incapacitation. This rhetoric advances the view that all criminal behaviour is
serious, and that all criminals are liable to imprisonment whether or not they would
commit further offences. Once there, imprisonment serves to protect the public from their
criminal activities, whether these be serious or high rate. It is not surprising to note that
under the punitive new penology the phrase 'persistent petty offence/offender' has
disappeared. In this paradigm, no offence is considered petty, and all offences are liable
to attract the most severe punishment i.e. imprisonment. Not only does imprisonment
349 See Zimring and Hawkins (1995) Chapter 3
350 Imprisoning those who only commit a few offences is not justified since the cost of
their crime is not outweighed by the cost of their imprisonment.
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represent the most severe sanction the state administers as punishment, the increased
severity results in enhanced levels of incapacitation as a useful by-product.
We have seen that punitive new penology is content to keep the sentencing model of 'just
deserts' (providing of course that the levels of sentence severity are high enough). We
have also seen that the punitive new penology is not necessarily motivated to seek
incapacitation for its own sake, incapacitation is a welcome consequence of a punitive
sentencing regime which focuses on the prison. Punitive new penology arrives at
quantitative incapacitation not through a quasi-economic justification as might be
achieved under the new penology, it believes that anything less than imprisonment does
not reflect the seriousness ofmost criminal behaviour.
So how well do the disproportionate sentencing provisions of the 1991 Criminal Justice
Act fit the punitive new penology paradigm? We have seen that the disproportionate
detention provision enables sentencers to punish medium to high seriousness offences
with longer than normal terms of imprisonment. The policy which gives rise to this
provision can be described in incapacitative terms, as it was in the policy documents
leading to the Act, but crucially it can also be described as variety of increased
punitiveness. The disproportionate detention provision of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act
is useful therefore in that it allows for the sentence to be extended to the ceiling of the
maximum sentence even when the offence before the court is not the most serious
example of its kind. Thus the court is given extra discretion to apply more severe
punishment on retributive grounds, because this punishment has an incapacitative by¬
product. The Act gives the scope to supply an incapacitative justification for what may
be simply enhanced punitiveness. The underlying penal ideology may have changed from
new penology to punitive new penology around the time of the introduction of the Act,
and the disproportionate sentence provision of s.2(2)(b) is flexible enough to survive the
change.
The disproportionate sentencing provision of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act is notable
since it manages to satisfy the demands of these two different penal policies. The role of

































Both new penology and punitive new penology result from adaptive changes which bring
about an increasing awareness of crime and potential victimisation. However, the
responses to the changed penal environment take entirely different forms and the
successes of the policies based on the paradigms are measured through different
outcomes. In particular, success for the new penology is measured through a reduction
(or no increase) in crime rates and with a corresponding decrease in rates of
imprisonment. Success for the punitive new penology is reflected in an increase in the
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use of imprisonment. A change in crime rates for this paradigm would not be critical to
establishing its success. Even if there is no fall (or if there is an increase), this may just
reflect an increase in the commission of crime since the incapacitative effect of
imprisonment is taken for granted. In fact, an increased crime rate could favour punitive
new penology theory as it proves the need for more and more incapacitative capacity351.
The revival of disproportionate detention in s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act
was compatible with changes in the political environment towards a rhetoric of 'law and
order' as well as to the managerial, actuarial approach to punishment. Disproportionate
punishment provided the evidence that punitive government rhetoric was genuine, while
satisfying those who wished to limit imprisonment to the incapacitation of the serious
violent or sexual offender. However it is justified, disproportionate detention, and the
move towards incapacitation as the symbolic goal of punishment are symptoms of a
political ideology known as social defence that seeks, above all, to ensure that the public
is protected from the dangerous offender.
2.8 Social Defence: The Theory
Social defence theory is a broader sociological account of the changes that have been
identified above in the context of the imprisonment of offenders. It is not a term that has
been used as widely as new penology in criminological discourse. Yet it is just as useful
in describing the change that was noted in chapter one, that is, the change from the
state's incapacitation of those people who have committed a dangerous act, to the
incapacitation of those who are predicted to commit a dangerous act. We noted that new
penology policy advocates the qualitative incapacitation by imprisonment of serious or
dangerous offenders while punitive new penology policy advocates the quantitative
incapacitation by imprisonment of high rate offenders. Both policy positions are less
concerned about discerning the reasons for offending than in incapacitating offenders
following the commission of an offence. Social defence theory adds one extra dimension
to this debate, and one that is particularly relevant to the incapacitation of the
'dangerous' offender, i.e. the convicted offender who is predicted to be dangerous but
has not yet been convicted of a serious violent or sexual offence. Just as the individual
351 This may in fact be what has occurred in the USA.
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target of an aggressive act is morally entitled to defend him or herself before the act
occurs, so social defence theory claims that the state is entitled to defend itself from
some offenders before they have committed some offences. Therefore social defence
theory provides the justification for pre-emptive incapacitation of the 'dangerous'.
Social defence uses the metaphor of self-defence, the doctrine which states that it is
legitimate to harm another if this is necessary to prevent that person harming oneself, and
applies it to the debate about the state's use of pre-emptive incapacitation as exemplified
by s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act. The theory thus encounters the same
philosophical difficulties as any account of self-defence, e.g. when is it right to harm an
unlawful aggressor who has an equal right as his or her victim not to be harmed? In the
version which is of interest here, the question can be phrased as follows:
When is it right to imprison for a longer period than is deserved, persons who
have not yet committed a dangerous act?
The immediate problem with of all such discussions is the difficulty in separating the
moral questions from the epistemological question. We might all agree that it is morally
right to imprison a would-be future murderer before that person kills anyone, but there is
the practical impossibility of knowing that the person will kill before he or she has done
so. If however, we defer the epistemological question and assume that the 'dangerous'
offender is indeed dangerous, then we are left with the question of the moral justification
for pre-emptively incapacitating a dangerous offender.
Locke's second treatise provides one answer:
...by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as
possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be
preferred352.
Locke's solution fits within the framework of social defence because it effectively
redistributes the burden of danger from the innocent to the 'guilty'. This redistribution
352 Locke (1952)
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cannot be unqualified however, if it is to be a moral redistribution. There are conditions
which must apply, including the requirement of proportionality. For the distribution of
harm among those who are to blame for that harm must be proportionate to the harm that
would be caused to innocents if the distribution were different. That is to say, it would be
improper to burden an offender with the pain of punishment, if the harm prevented is
insignificant, in order to prevent the innocent victim from harm which, had it been
inflicted, would have caused only minimal pain.
The second condition that must apply is that the redistribution of harm will not impact
more upon some innocent persons in the process of protecting other innocent persons.
This can be interpreted in a number of ways: that the harm caused to innocent families,
employers etc. of offenders being prevented from causing harm by the imposition of
punishment should not be more than the harm prevented to innocent victims. More
controversially, it could be argued that all innocent citizens suffer if the burden of
punishment exceeds the harms prevented to victims, because of the reduction in 'justice'
and security presented in such a redistributive process.
Social defence is goal driven, pro-active, interventionist and utilitarian. As the second
condition above shows, its utilitarian calculus is based on more than the anticipated
effects of crime reduction. As Ancel conceives it, social defence in practice is largely
based on education and the substitution of rehabilitation for retributive punishment with
the use of incapacitation reserved for cases of rehabilitative failure353. He makes this
clear when he says:
Social defence presupposes that the means of dealing with crime should be generally
conceived as a system which aims not at punishing a fault and sanctioning by a
penalty the conscious infringement of a legal rule, but at protecting society against
criminal acts... The intention of social defence is to carry such social protection into
effect, quite naturally, by means of a body of measures that are generally outside the
353 Ancel (1965) and Ancel (1987)
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ambit of the criminal law as such and are designed to 'neutralize' the offender, either
by his removal or segregation, or by applying remedial or educational methods.354
Notwithstanding his claim that social defence measures must operate outside the criminal
law, Ancel recognises the importance of the criminal law in achieving social defence. To
this end he calls for the criminal law and the penal system to adopt what he calls 'social
individualism' and become 'humanised' by which he means the development of an
individualised regime which attempts to (literally) re-socialise the offender. In so doing
says Ancel social defence theory demonstrates 'the desire to promote or to safeguard the
concept of the human person, to whom none but humane treatment may be applied'355.
Ancel notes that social defence is not synonymous with a positivist framework for the
disposal of offenders under the criminal law. Social defence undoubtedly exhibits strong
positivist influences through an interest in classifying offenders in order to prevent
dangerous behaviour. But social defence extends into areas of social life outside of the
legal and criminal justice arenas. It advocates using social policy to create a society that
maintains order by supporting individuals and institutions without recourse to formal
government institutions.
Although Ancel makes the point repeatedly that social defence is not concerned merely
to repress crime, social defence theory could be described as having the potential to put
at risk the rights of the individual. The complaint has been made that the teleological
perspective of social defence theory offers the potential for the degradation of human
rights through e.g. an excessive response to minor infringements of the law and the
infringement of rights in the name of rehabilitation and/or incapacitation. Naturally, this
form of social defence is unacceptable to those who support the idea of punishment for
purely retributive purposes and who believe that penal measures must only be imposed in
proportion to the harm done356. Peters notes:
354 Ancel (1965) p 24-5
355 Ancel (1965) p 28
356 E-g- Andrew von Hirsch, see Von Hirsch (1986)
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In the classical school the main concern was with the definition of right and
wrong. Punishment served the purpose ofmoral clarification. The modern school
was intent on acting upon individual criminals and punishment was conceived as
treatment. In the school of social control the concern is with systems of action;
punishment has become an instrument of policy.357
The methods of social defence theory are incompatible with those liberal thinkers for
whom the essential individual basis for the actions of the state renders the idea of
scientific classification and treatment of offenders unworkable. If, as Jeremy Bentham
maintains, punishment should be the minimum necessary to achieve general deterrence,
then the notion of social defence which individualises punishment according to the
danger posed by the offender is unpalatable. But punishment under a social defense
model may result in the offender being punished more leniently, since a particular
individual may not require a particularly harsh punishment in order to deter them from
reoffending.
Even when there may be no empirical difference between the quantum of punishment
delivered to an individual offender it is important to ascertain the purpose behind the
quantum of punishment to be administered. It is possible that a particular sentence could
be handed down in order to stimulate general deterrence and the same quantum of
punishment given to an individual offender in order to protect society. Much depends on
the way the protection of society is envisaged: whether society is thought to require
protection from a few dangerous people or from the selfish actions of many people338. If
general deterrence is desired, the punishment should be the maximum needed to deter the
majority or 'the reasonable man'. It will therefore be at the higher end of the punishment
spectrum for it is aimed at the least easily deterred individual in the majority population.
Beccaria believed the law served not to preserve moral codes but to serve the needs of
the particular society, a view that is supported by advocates of social defence theory. As
357Peters (1988) p32
358 See Alexander (1980) Quinn (1985) Farrell (1985) Montague (1995) for different
accounts of social defence.
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noted above the use of punishment through social defence criteria can also be justified on
utilitarian grounds. Like Bentham and Beccaria, social defence theorists argue that
punishment is only moral if it serves to prevent future crime, simply retributive
punishment is immoral as it serves no utilitarian purpose. These theoretical positions
concerning punishment all share with the social defence position a strong teleological
justification for punishment. Punishment is not an abstract good in and of itself, but a
means to an end: preserving social harmony. However, social harmony does not
necessarily mean social control and Ancel and others recognised that curbs on the state's
power to monitor and suppress those it sees as troublesome are always necessary.
Unlike liberal policies discussed in the next chapter, social defence takes an explicitly
moral approach to the offender being punished. The state's role is to prevent the offender
from committing actions which result in harm and to communicate to others the
unacceptable nature of the offender's deeds. What social defence does not seek to
achieve is the symbolic rejection of the offender as a person worthy of respect, rights and
consideration. Social defence theory, as characterised by Ancel, bears a striking
resemblance to the rehabilitative ethic at its best. It has three main features, each being
sufficient to show the moral foundation of ideas of social defence:
a) a concern for the protection of society expressed through a reaction to crime that
brings about benefits for society;
b) the desire to bring about the amelioration of the offending behaviour through the
re-education of the offender, the goal of punishment being more than the
infliction of a purely exemplary or retributive penalty;
c) the desire to safeguard the dignity of the human person through a re-integrative
response to criminal actions if possible with exclusion used only as a last resort.
In common with classical legal theorists, the dominant strand of the social defence
movement accepted the doctrine of free will and personal responsibility for one's actions.
This is reflected in the social defence movement's attitude towards the individual's
culpability for his criminal act. Ancel says:
116
The new social defence movement, in readapting and giving fresh thought to the idea
of responsibility from the point of view of the individual human being, evidently has
to look for the feeling of moral obligation in that individual, and therefore tries to
stimulate the idea of his duty towards his fellows, as well as encouraging him to
become aware of a social morality to which he is necessarily subject.359
An important consequence of the re-introduction of the notion of moral responsibility
into penal policy is that the individual-state relationship is thereby seen as part of a
network of responsibilities arising out of a social contract. Included in this network is the
responsibility of the society to the individual through respect for human autonomy and
freedom. In the social defence context, this means that the system has limits to its power.
These limits are based on classical foundations of law. As Ancel puts it:
Respect for human dignity, or the need to safeguard individual freedom - which is the
first condition of the individual's exercise of his rights and the development of his
personality - thus leads to the maintenance of a system founded on the rule of law, to
the establishment of judicial rules of procedure, and to an instinctive distrust for the
institution of an administrative system of preventive measures which might be
arbitrarily laid down ante delictum.360
Not all social defence theorists take this view. Herschel Prins361 developed a theory of
social defence that included a wholesale denial of the problem of whether there is such a
thing as personal responsibility and free will. Prins believed that the two extremes forced
on criminologists by the diametric opposition of classicism and positivism served only to
leave society undefended from dangerous citizens. Arguing against the classical tradition,
Prins noted that the belief that the offender enjoys free-will failed to provide adequate
protection for society. The classicists' desire to punish according to retributive and
proportionate grounds, Prins argues, leads to a policy of mass (often short-term)
359 Ancel (1965) p 104
360 Ancel (1965) p 105
361 Prins H (1899) Science penale et droit positif and (1910) La defense social et les
transformations du droit penal
117
imprisonment alongside a tendency to develop an ever widening defence of diminished
responsibility for those who are obviously mentally impaired. Prins argued that, in the
classical legal framework neither the punishment of the majority of 'normal' offenders
for minor offences that attract short sentences of imprisonment nor the pardoning of
those who are not 'normal' offers the framework of protection necessary to provide
social defence.
Prins also recognised however, that positivism does not provide the solution to the
problem of reducing harmful offending behaviour. As evidence of the inadequacy of its
determinist stance, Prins noted that many strategies had been tried to predict and then to
reform the offender, with a conspicuous lack of success. At the time of the publication of
Prins' book La Defense sociale et les tranformations du droit penal in 1910362 the most
pressing problem in criminology was how to reduce or eliminate repeat (mostly petty)
offending. As noted above, the positivists have some way to go in convincing others of
the success of their predictive, corrective and preventive techniques in reducing repeat
offending363.
One reaction to this popular criticism of the failure to reduce reoffending was to limit the
goal to one of reducing the likelihood of serious repeat offending. Yet still positivists
cannot claim to have developed the techniques and provided the results that enable their
case to dominate. Indeed, serious offending may be more difficult to predict and control
than petty offending as it is less common, less amenable to environmental changes such
as locks and alarms and more closely associated with mental illness. If it is the case that
with enough knowledge the behaviour of individuals can be predicted with substantial
accuracy, then the positivists have thus far failed to provide methods for obtaining this
knowledge and applying it to individuals. For Prins and others, this failure to
demonstrate the utility of determinism undermined the positivist argument.
362 Prins (1910) Cited in Ancel (1965) p 50 no further bibiliographic details given
363 An echo of which is found in Martinson's frequently cited phrase 'Nothing works',
see Martinson (1974)
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Prins laid the foundation for his theory of social defence by pointing out the futility of
the ubiquitous argument between the positive and classical schools concerning the
existence of freedom of the will. The extremes taken by these two schools and any
compromise composed out of elements of each brought about the result that society was
never protected against the actions of the dangerous offender. Ancel makes this point:
For Prins, the justification for the theory of social defence lay in the inadequacy of the
classical idea of moral responsibility. In doctrine, the theory of moral responsibility
led to an impossible choice between determinism and free will; in practice, it led to a
multiplication of short prison sentences and an ever increasing acceptance of the
notion of diminished responsibility, leaving society practically defenceless against the
most dangerous criminals. Thus criminal law based on moral responsibility failed to
provide effective protection for society. Nor did the traditional prison system, which
was inspired by the same ideas, provide any better protection, for the system of
solitary confinement and the supposedly curative action of the traditional type of
prison had proved to be completely ineffective; this is sufficiently indicated by the
considerable increase in the incidence of recidivism, especially at the close of the
nineteenth century.364
For some of the writers on social defence such as Prins, the abandonment of all theories
of the origin of action from criminological discourse was liberating. It did not matter why
the offender presented a danger to society, whether it be through his or her freely made
choice or due to some physical or socially-induced chain of causality. What mattered was
how society could neutralise the danger that the offender presented. Unfortunately, Prins'
denial of the relevance of the positivist/determinist divide offered little in the way of
solutions.
To devise a utilitarian social defence strategy requires some sort of practical framework.
Both the classical free-will approach and the positivist determined view of the offender's
mental state offer some way forward in the plan to reduce harmful behaviour. Prins'
364 Ancel (1965) p51
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position offers no standpoint from which to construct a methodology for predicting or
preventing harm. Without looking at the aetiology of harmful behaviour, Prins relies
solely on the state reacting to harmful behaviour in order to incapacitate those who
exhibit it. In this sense, a Prins' style social defence theory (unlike Ancel's) presaged
some contemporary penal systems particularly the policy of mass containment that has
been employed by the USA365. The USA takes a Prins' style pragmatic view on the
causes of criminal behaviour, preferring not to engage in the debate on whether crime is
chosen or determined. Instead it focuses on identifying and classifying criminals and
incapacitating them (by imprisoning them for long periods) immediately a sufficient
number of criminal offences have been committed. This policy has led to a very high
increase in the proportionate levels of imprisonment, without, it must be pointed out, any
noticeable overall decrease in crime levels or perceived improvements in levels of
community safety366.
The concept of modern social defence as described by Ancel takes elements from both
positivism and classicism and combines them. Clearly there is much that is taken from
the positivist framework in the form of attempts to educate and reform the offender, and
treating the offender with humanity is seen as being an essential component of successful
rehabilitation. This rehabilitative framework can be re-described in a classical way as
offering instruction in rational decision making, re-incorporating the offender into
society and its social-contractual relationships thus helping him to make non-criminal
choices. In both paradigms those who cannot be 'cured' of their criminal propensities, or
'rationally persuaded' of the disadvantages of crime are a residual problem. For these
people, social defence recognises that incapacitation is necessary as a last resort,
protecting the society against dangerous impulses of the mentally ill or the habitual or
serious offender through segregation of them from others. It is this form of social defence
theory that is reflected in longer than normal punishment provisions.
365 See Garland (2001), Mauer (2001)
366 The argument about whether mass imprisonment decreases crime can never be won or
lost. If crime rates do not fall (or even rise) supporters of the policy can always claim that
crime would have been even higher if it were not for the incapacitative effects of
imprisonment.
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Social defence theorists took the foundation of classical penal theory, with its goal of
punishment imposed proportionate to the offender's culpability, to be unattainable. As
Ancel put it:
...the root of the trouble lay in the fact that theories of moral responsibility tried to
assign to criminal law an absolute and unrealisable objective: to punish the criminal,
in the fullest sense of the word, in exact proportion to the moral fault he had
committed. But the purpose of criminal justice, an essentially human process, can
never be anything other than relative. Its only purpose must be to ensure in the best
possible way the protection of the personal security, life, property, and reputation of
citizens. This can be truly achieved, however, only if the idea ofmoral responsibility
is replaced by the notion of the dangerousness of the offender... According to this
first view of social defence, the means of dealing with the criminal should even, if
need be, involve depriving him of liberty for a longer period, where such action
appears essentialfor the betterprotection ofsociety367 (emphasis added).
Although not all the elements of social defence were explicitly adopted as a justification
for longer than normal sentencing in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, the reasoning that
was adopted for the introduction of longer than normal sentencing drew on many of the
ideas and aspirations of the social defence movement368. It was this governmental
concern with social defence that promoted the introduction of provisions such as
s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act and it is this form of governance which must be examined
closely in the light of liberal political theories and the potential conflict between coercion
and protection.
2.9 Social Defence and Incapacitation
There are two contrasting perspectives in social defence which consider the moral
responsibility of the offender. The first is Prins' stance which argues that since there is
no evidence in favour of the assumption of freewill, but nor is there conclusive evidence
367 Ancel (1965) p 51
368 See Floud (1977)
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that criminal behaviour is physically or socially determined, the discussion is void.
Therefore, he claimed, any debate about responsibility and culpability is irrelevant to the
objective of protecting the public from dangerous people. The criminal justice system,
according to this view, should focus not on punishment but on social defence. This has
the result of producing a criminal justice system based on incapacitation of known
offenders since there is no other way of preventing criminal acts369.
The contrary argument, put forward by Ancel, claims that even if it is not the case that
moral responsibility exists, it feels to human beings as if it does and therefore it is
worthwhile trying to inculcate the values of society into the offender through education
and reform. As well, respect for human agency leads to a system of safeguards which
prevent any penal policy based on social defence from becoming corrupted by despotic
or totalitarian regimes. This has the effect of ensuring that classical legal safeguards such
as nulla poena sine lege (no punishment unless a law is broken), no retrospective
legislation and no treatment without the consent of the offender continue to operate,
despite their potentially unprofitable consequences for social defence.
An Ancel style social defence theory accepts that human agency exists but acknowledges
that there may not be a direct link between the agency of a particular offender and the
harm that he causes. In this respect intentions become both more and less important as a
result of their interaction with the concept of dangerousness. Intentions become more
important where an offender has attempted a crime but has failed to carry it out.
Intentions are less important where a person has not intended to commit serious harm but
has done so in the course of committing an offence e.g. an armed robbery where the
robber has not intended to shoot bystanders but has done so in the course of the robbery
(perhaps while trying to damage the security system). The social defence view places the
failed attempt at the same degree of dangerousness as the commission of the act and the
non-intended, but performed act at the same level of dangerousness as the intended act.
The offender can be dangerous as a result of his intentions (even if they are not carried
out) or as a result of his incompetence (when unintended acts occur). Examples such as
369 Crimes can of course be committed in prison, against staff and prisoners and even
members of the public given that it is impossible (and undesirable) to prevent prisoners
122
these show that social defence theory can only operate outside of regular sentencing
policy. Unlike sentencing policy, social defence is based on a relationship between the
culpability of the offender, the events that have taken place and the harm caused by the
events.
With respect to penal policy, Ancel comments that his conception of social defence
means that 'in relation to enacted law, social defence would take its place on the edge of
traditional penal law with its system of punishments'370. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, this is a fair description of most legislation where longer than normal
punishment is approved. The social defence provisions are imposed within the criminal
law but operate outside the standard justifications for the imposition of punishment. In
social defence strategy, the criminal law functions as a tool for identifying the dangerous
who are then separated from other lawbreakers, subjected to incapacitative sentences that
are different from the traditional retributive or deterrent justifications for imposing
punishments.
Social defence provides theoretical support for longer than normal punishment by
providing an argument for measures that stand outside the 'normal' retributive
justification of punishment. Social defence works backwards from the desired ends of the
criminal law to its methodology. In so doing it resolves (by ignoring on the one hand and
integrating on the other) the problem of the choice between free-will or determinism that
has so beset criminology and criminal justice. By absorbing element of both classicism
and positivism, social defence theory provides two possible lines of argument why
ascertaining the presence or absence of a mental state (the mens rea) of the offender
should not be the priority for the criminal justices system when responding to harmful
behaviour. The mental state of the offender, in a social defence model, should not
complicate the system which is seeking to exercise its authority over him. It is the
offender's dangerousness that matters, not issues such as his or her intentions or
culpability. Whether such dangerousness stems from the exercise of free will or from
socially or physically determined behaviour is unimportant.
from having any access to the outside world.
370 Ancel (1965) p 15
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The social defence paradigm also makes a strong argument for the retention of preventive
measures in the criminal justice sphere and as a proper part of formal penal apparatus
rather than e.g. a medical/quarantine model for dangerous offenders. Ancel emphasises
the importance of the safeguards that the legal process can and should supply and the
restrictions on the grosser excesses of positivism such as prior preventative action
imposed on those deemed likely to offend but who have not yet offended at all. The
classification of offenders, although a useful tool in the social defence armoury, is only
to be applied once the offender has been shown to exhibit dangerous tendencies for the
purpose of his rehabilitation or incapacitation. This combination of positivist
investigation into the causes of dangerous and criminal behaviour (and the means of
preventing its recurrence), together with classical human rights safeguards are the
primary feature of social defence as Ancel envisaged it.
Social defence differs from a neo-classical conception of justice in that it rejects the idea
that the primary purpose of the criminal justice system is to offset the harm caused by a
particular act with a carefully calibrated quantum of punishment. In the social defence
framework, the punishment is determined only by the measures that are required to
neutralise the danger that the offender poses to the society through his harmful
behaviour. The longer than normal punishment provisions of the 1991 Criminal Justice
Act fit a social defence model as they require an offender to be convicted of an offence
before preventive detention is imposed. This satisfies (if only minimally) classical rules
about the necessity of crime preceding punishment, which is then followed by the use of
positivist predictive methodology in order to protect society from the identified threat.
Social defence theory has three main advantages for the policy maker attempting to bring
in longer than normal punishment as part of a bifurcated penal system which aims to
punish most offenders in the community. A social defence policy-maker would support
the use of rehabilitation and community punishment, with their aims of re-integration and
re-socialisation. But the theorist of social defence would also advocate in extremis the
use of incapacitation to protect society from those that are truly felt to be so dangerous or
so incorrigible that no other measure is sufficient to protect members of a society.
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Social defence works backwards from goals to means, it includes elements of positivism
and classicism which will satisfy those supporters of each paradigm, yet it allows for a
methodology of operation which can circumvent or ignore the classical and positivist
debate as to the aetiology of harmful, criminal behaviour. It is the combination of
satisfying a large intellectual constituency and at the same time providing demonstrable
practical outcomes that makes this type of theory politically attractive. What is not clear
is whether the theory undermines the structural foundations of the liberal political
philosophy on which the modern state and the modern criminal justice system is built.
2.10 Conclusion
The period since the 1970s has seen a decline in the belief of policy makers and
politicians in positivist criminological 'knowledge' to supply the solution to the problem
of dangerous and 'dangerous' offenders. This belief may have been overstated and
Utopian but it had provided a working paradigm for the construction of criminological
theory and penal practices since the beginning of the 20th century. Disillusionment with
this paradigm led to the perspective known as 'new penology' which scaled down its
claims for the success of crime prevention, took a hyper-rational view of crime control
and adopted a prudential approach to the allocation of resources. The new penology was,
however, a largely administrative approach which did not elicit media or judicial support.
The lack of support and incidents such as the killing of James Bulger, brought about an
increase in public punitiveness and revised the new penology to bring about a greater
reliance on the use of the prison to incapacitate many more offenders regardless of cost.
Despite the policy changes brought into effect by the new penology and punitive new
penology, approaches to crime control and punishment never completely abandoned the
rehabilitative approach which had dominated positivist criminology. This is why the
model of social defence more accurately describes English penal practice in the late 20th
century. Social defence describes a position that can rely on rehabilitation, reintegration,
deterrence and incapacitation, both in the penal system and in the medical sector. It can
incorporate both classical and positivist conceptions of the offender as its efforts are
focused on crime prevention however this can be achieved.
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New penology concentrated on the efficiency of the penal and criminal justice system,
with minimal use of incapacitation. Punitive new penology focused on the retributive and
denunciatory purpose of punishment with the maximum use of incapacitation. The social
defence metaphor takes a 'hybrid' approach to crime control with prevention being the
overriding goal. Social defence also captures the mentality of fear and perception of the
need to be proactive and defend oneself from criminal loss that is explicable in a period
in which high levels of crime are normal. We can see the influence of social defence
thinking in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act in particular with respect to the bifurcated
approach to sentencing of offenders. Like new penology, social defence based policy
reserves imprisonment for those who either commit serious offences or cannot be
deterred or rehabilitated. Prison is thus a last resort for many offenders, when community
penalties have failed to prevent re-offending. However, like punitive new penology,
social defence is content to use the prison more readily for those offenders who may not
pose a threat of serious criminality. The retributive and denunciatory elements of
punitive new penology are present in a policy which will imprison offenders, however
insignificant, who do not desist from crime. As with both new penology and punitive
new penology for social defence incapacitation is therefore the default position.
The policy of imposing longer than normal imprisonment on those who are held to be
likely to commit serious offences in future fits more comfortably within the social
defence framework than within the other positions. Advocates of the new penology,
seeking to use resources in the most efficient way, would be reluctant to imprison an
offender for a longer than normal period unless a professional risk analysis shows that he
or she is very likely to pose a danger to others. On the other hand, punitive new
penologists would be very willing to use expensive penal resources in this way, as the
non-rational response to crime brings with it a desire to incapacitate all offenders for a
long or longer than proportionate period of time. Social defence theory operates
somewhere between the two, with longer than normal sentences of imprisonment
reserved for those people who somehow qualify by suggesting the possibility of a threat.
The qualifying action, the commission of a violent or sexual offence, however minor, is
sufficient for the risk of serious future offending to be taken into account in the
distribution of penal measures. Thus a penal policy based on social defence would not
automatically imprison all offenders, nor would it try and minimise the use of long terms
of imprisonment. It would use community penalties where possible, and proportionate
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terms of imprisonment for some serious crimes and recidivists. Where the danger of the
potential violent or sexual offender is identified, then social defence theory will justify
the imposition of longer than normal sentences to prevent future serious harm. Social
defence theory thus best describes the sentencing policy contained within the 1991
Criminal Justice Act. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, social defence does
not fit quite so comfortably within a liberal political structure.
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CHAPTER THREE
LIBERAL GOVERNANCE AND 'THE DANGEROUS'
3.1 Liberalism(s)
The power to punish citizens for what they might do rather than what they have done is
prima facie anti-liberal since such measures place the freedom of all citizens at risk from
the coercive power of the state. People subject to such measures are being proactively
punished. This is effectively what occurs when a person is sentenced under s.2(2)(b) of
the 1991 Criminal Justice Act where an offender is imprisoned for a longer than normal
period than is justified by the offence for which he or she has been convicted. Although
the convicted offender has committed an offence, the punishment with which the
offender is sentenced, is based on a prediction that he or she will commit a serious
violent or sexual offence in the future. For some offenders sentenced under this
provision, no dangerous act has ever been committed, and may never be. Thus the extra
term of imprisonment cannot be justified on the grounds that the offender has
demonstrated a definite (serious) threat to others. The person given an longer than
normal sentence not only loses his or her liberty for a longer period of time, but also the
freedom to be presumed innocent of any additional criminal act until the determination
of guilt371. He or she may appear to pose a serious threat but it cannot be known that any
threat will be realised. Even if it could be known that a dangerous act would take place
there is no possible procedure that can establish the degree of culpability nor is it
possible to take mitigating factors into account in setting of the sentence.
Clearly the state should not take lightly the power to imprison people for a longer than
normal period: incarcerating people is expensive and incarcerating people on the basis
that they are 'dangerous'372 brings with it reminders of political regimes that put at risk
371 This is significant as even if the act predicted would be certain to occur, the lack of a
trial eliminates the possibility of the defence obtaining some non-guilty result such as
'not guilty by reason of insanity' which produces a different sentencing outcome.
372The policy of the incarceration of people on the basis that they have a certain
constitution (and not that they have committed a certain act) will be discussed in chapter
3.
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the rights of citizens and others373. The Green and White papers which preceded the 1991
Criminal Justice Act stressed that the introduction of a sentence of longer than normal
imprisonment was to be used sparingly374. Liberal democratic states such as the UK aim
to promote a society in which difference can be tolerated. Therefore the imprisonment of
persons for longer than they deserve must be justified on grounds which are impervious
to the criticism that people are being subject to such measures merely as a result of their
race, religion, age or cultural and social choices. Of course, in a multicultural,
multiracial, multifaith society, it may never be possible to have a consensus on the
provision of policies, laws and principles which enable each individual or group the
freedom to live life as freely as possible. However, the prediction of the behaviour of
mentally normal people relies on assumptions about their cultural and social choices.
Therefore a penal measure which relies on prediction of behaviour is always going to be
more vulnerable to the criticism that it is unfairly discriminatory than a penal measure
that is based on actual behaviour.
The tension between the need to produce a system which treats all people the same and
the need to take account of differences of opinion and choice is a permanent problem for
the liberal state. As John Gray notes:
From one side, toleration is the pursuit of an ideal form of life. From the other, it
is the search for terms of peace among different ways of life. In the former view,
liberal institutions are seen as applications of universal principles. In the latter,
they are a means to peaceful coexistence. In the first, liberalism is a prescription
for a universal regime, in the second, it is a project of coexistence that can be
pursued in many regimes.375
This chapter examines whether it is possible to construct a fit between the competing
principles of liberalism noted by Gray, and the practice, exemplified by s.2(2)(b) of the
1991 Criminal Justice Act, of incapacitating offenders through imprisonment for crimes
more serious than they have committed to date which they might commit in future. The
373
E.g. Stalinist Russia, China during the cultural revolution, states such as the USA,
Britain and Australia that imprison without trial foreign nationals who are suspected of
involvement in terrorism.
374 Home Office (1988) and (1990d)
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question under consideration is not whether the perfect376 liberal state can approve of the
general policy of incapacitation, but the specific use of incapacitation for an offender
who is convicted of a violent or sexual crime, and who is predicted to commit a serious
violent or sexual crime in the future.
It is difficult to characterise liberalism exhaustively or to state what is an exclusively
'liberal' political policy since liberal themes permeate and overlap with many of the
principles of competing political ideologies. Heywood suggests that so pervasive and
persuasive is liberalism in the modern West that it is more appropriate to think of it as a
meta-ideology under which various ideologies can be accommodated378 Francis
Fukuyama controversially claims that liberalism has come to dominate world politics to
such an extent that we have reached 'the end of history', by which he means that
liberalism is the zenith of political development379. Even though the existence of popular
non-liberal forms of political activism such as environmentalism380, and the stability of
states and movements whose political philosophy is founded on a religious ideology381
suggest Fukuyama's argument is not yet proven, elements of liberalism can indeed be
found in political ideology ranging across the spectrum from libertarian conservatism382
to anarchism383 and liberalism has an obvious influence for some socialist writers384. So,
it is not surprising that the plasticity of the concept means that it is difficult to rule in or
out particular practices as acceptable within a liberal political framework385. Nonetheless,
for reasons that shall be discussed below, imposing longer than normal punishment for
offenders who have not committed a serious offence is hardly prima facie a liberal
375 Gray (2000)
376 I.e. the hypothetical state which exists without any internal inconsistencies, or
deviations from liberal principles.
378Heywood (1998) p 27
379 Fukuyama (1993) For a discussion of contrary views see Gray (1995) and Holden
(1993)
380 Versions of which do not privilege the human individual.
381 E.g. Islamic states such as Iran, Christian fundamentalists in the USA, Buddhist
nationalists in Sri lanka etc.
382 As exemplified by Adam Smith and Frederich Hayek, for a brief overview see
Heywood (1998) chapter 3.
383 E.g. Michael Bakunin
384 E.g. Herbert Marcuse and TH Green, see Marcuse (1964), Green (1988)
385 Possibly the best example being the liberal state's desire to outlaw sado-maochistic
sexual practices. See chapter three below.
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policy. However, by taking into account the different constructions of liberalism and the
use to which these are put, it will be possible to determine how it came to be the case that
a country with a liberal democratic political system such as the UK386 introduced what
appears to be an inherently illiberal measure. The discussion that follows is necessarily
somewhat artificial, as no state ever maintains a consistent and ideologically pure form
of governance. However, the crucial distinctions can be made with reference to particular
policy contexts and are therefore ofmore than just theoretical importance.
3.2 Liberalism and the social contract
Liberals accept that groups of people living together need some sort of collective order.
This acknowledgement of the need for governance and the existence of an enforcing
power is what distinguishes liberals from anarchists who believe that individual freedom
is unduly restricted in a political structure with any form of authority. Liberalism does
allow ideological space to atomists or possessive individualists who believe that each
person is, and ought to be, self seeking and maximally self reliant387 if their selfishness is
constrained by a tolerance for the wishes of others. Such self seeking behaviour may
condone the use of 'illiberal' forms of governance if the atomist thinks it is unlikely to
apply to him or herself388.
The need for an organising structure to facilitate the common pursuit of (different forms
of) the good life was recognised as long ago as 1651 by Thomas Hobbes. Although far
from being a liberal, since he believed that an absolutist government was necessary to
protect society from disorder, Hobbes is nevertheless important from a liberal point of
view. His masterpiece, Leviathan, shares several themes with liberalism. Principally,
Hobbes advocated a separation between religion and politics, making obedience to the
rulers independent of religious affiliation. Although the purpose of Hobbes' argument
sought to ensure that state authority was not threatened by the schisms of Christianity in
386 Of course the provision only operates in one of the UK's jurisdictions, England and
Wales.
387 Interestingly, the British Prime Minister in power at the time of the introduction of the
1991 Criminal Justice Act was Margaret Thatcher whose dictum 'There is no such thing
as society, only individuals and their families' and her policies reveal her to be
sojnething of a possessive individualist. Quoted in (Heywood 1998) p 73
388 1 will return to this argument in chapter 4.
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the context of the English Civil war389, it had the effect of promoting an early and limited
form of freedom of religious expression and toleration, and movement towards a more
rational and secular understanding of law and governance.
Hobbes was influenced by contemporary scientific discoveries and he sought to apply the
methodology of science to the understanding of human society. He hypothesized that
without law, each individual will seek to satisfy his or her desires in an unconstrained
way since the fundamental psychological instinct of human beings is selfish390. As all
people will be pursuing their own ends simultaneously, life will be full of mistrust and
danger. There would be no scope for the benefits and pleasures of science or art, as all
would be engaged in defending themselves and attacking others. In his most famous
paragraph he describes this pre-political 'state ofnature':
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is
uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation; nor use of
the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no
Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare and danger of violent death;
And the life ofman, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.391
Of course, as Hobbes admitted, this rather depressing picture of human existence was a
fiction, it did not exist in his time and may not ever have existed. Indeed it is not even a
plausible picture, for although Hobbes cited the mundane empirical evidence of locking
one's doors and providing for one's personal security whilst travelling392 as evidence that
it is a normal state of affairs for individuals to anticipate and protect themselves from
attack by others, he knowingly sets out an extremist position that considers no alliances
389 For a detailed account of the origins of Hobbes' thought see Hampsher-Monk (1992)
chapter 1.
390 This is not a morally reprehensible state, just a necessary condition of life and self
preservation.
391 Hobbes (1991) p62 of original edition of 1651
392 Jbid. p 63
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of family, tribe or territory393. This is so while the rest of his theory points out that it is
clearly rational to form such alliances. However, Hobbes' point is well made even if he
has exaggerated or set up a straw man argument. Human beings will recognise the benefit
to be gained from forming groups with others to share responsibilities. By developing
trusting relationships which can afford more effective and efficient arrangements, the
pursuit of the good life will be achieved more easily than is the case for isolated
individuals. Hobbes' understanding of the natural world of social animals, and his
interest in the physiology of the human body reinforced this conception of human
society. He saw the merits of organisation in systems and the advantages of specialisation
and co-operation as essential to the individual organism's well being.
The point of the state of nature argument is that the unconstrained pursuit of happiness
by all inevitably leads to less happiness for all. In order to avoid chaos and to put in place
the conditions for security, it is required, says Hobbes, for there to be some form of
sovereign power to maintain order, by force if necessary. Hobbes and liberals here agree:
the setting up of some kind of authority with power of enforcement will increase the
chances of individuals achieving the good life, and humans are rational enough to
recognise this fact and to act on it. In making this argument, Hobbes draws attention to
two important elements of liberal thought developed later by others: the theory of
utilitarianism and the recognition of human rationality394.
Hobbes notes that the setting up of any system of government inevitably involves the
derivation of rules, and sanctions and mechanisms to enforce those rules. This obviously
imposes a restriction on the liberty of the individual as he or she is required to obey the
rules or to suffer the sanctions imposed if he or she does not. However, the purpose of
rules is that they may indirectly lead to greater liberty for the individual as the rules so
imposed protect him or her from the liberty restricting actions of all others, the rules
being applied equally to all. To illustrate the agreement by which individuals agree to
393 There are obvious connections here to a literature which points to the failures of
humans, most obviously the fall of Adam and Eve in the Old Testament. Hobbes may
also have been influenced by the anthropological explorations of his time which were
making Europeans aware of the possibility of other (to them, alien and barbaric) forms of
human life (see Hampsher-Monk (1992) pp 26-29).
394 To be considered in chapter 4
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give up a certain amount of liberty in the process of setting up a government, Hobbes
used another fiction, the social contract. He gives an example of this sort of agreement:
I authorise and give up my Right of Governing myselfe, to this Man, or to this
Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and
Authorise all his Actions in like manner.395
The governed society can be set up in two ways, de novo, by agreement of the sort cited
above or through the subjugation of a society in war. In the latter case, the vanquished
individual must still agree to the sovereignty of the victorious power, claims Hobbes, and
in return he receives his life 'and the liberty of his body'396. Hobbes is at pains here to
show that it is only through consent that a person can be justly governed. Hence, slaves,
who do not enter into any agreement with their owners, are entitled to escape or even to
kill them, but servants, who enter into an agreement with their masters, are not397. This
has some relevance for punishment. Firstly, it shows how the establishment of governed
societies requires the consent of the governed, even if in the case of those who have been
conquered in war, this consent is impelled by the desideratum of life. Secondly, Hobbes
argues that even if it is the case that those who are conquered give their consent because
they really have little choice, that consent still gives rise to an obligation to obey. Hobbes
is concerned to ensure that obedience to the ruler occurs through consent rather than
through coercion, even if the consent gained through the threat of death is a very weak
form of consent. Consent is necessary to Hobbes' theory since societies that are governed
by consent commit no moral wrong in demanding the obedience of the subject. Whether
consent is gained through agreement, through birth, or through coercion, the giving of
consent means the sovereign power is able to demand obedience and to punish the
disobedient398.
Hobbes' preference for absolutist governance leaves no room for dissent once a society is
founded. Consent, once given, is all embracing. In return for security and order (and life
395 Hobbes (1991) p87 of original edition of 1651
™ Ibid, p 103
397 Ibid, p 104
398 For Hobbes, the obligation to be obedient arises out of the contract, the ruler's power
t0 punish does not arise from the contract but is a right of natural law.
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for the vanquished) the ruler rules absolutely399 and may punish (or not) anyone in any
way he pleases. This is not a liberal society. Liberalism arose out of a desire to oppose
the use of arbitrary decision making, particularly in the areas of taxation and
punishment400. Liberals agree with Hobbes' state of nature argument in so far as it holds
that humans are better able to achieve the good life within certain constraints that
structure society. They also agree that a legitimate authority can only be constructed
through the consent of those it governs. But they do not agree that the consent supplies
the ruling authority with unlimited power that can be exercised arbitrarily. For liberals,
the social contract involves more than passing over the authority to exercise power. The
liberal social contract involves subjects (or citizens) and ruler forming a mutually
binding agreement, which sets out specific principles and obligations on both sides.
These duties and obligations flow both ways and as they legitimise the authority in
power, they structure and constrain the authority's use of its power.
So, can we know whether the writers of a liberal social contract would consent to longer
than normal punishment for incapacitative purposes? Hobbes argues that, as it would be
irrational to consent to harm to oneself, it would be irrational to consent to a contract
which might lead to one's harm. But this is itself an irrational argument. As Hobbes
advocated an absolutist government with all the vagaries that implies, there would be no
guarantee that the subject would be protected from harm by others, and therefore little
point in him or her consenting to obey in the first place401. In a contract enforced by an
absolute ruler, the benefits of the contract for the subject are uncertain. The ruler may
impose order and in so doing relieve the subject of some of the burdens of selfprotection
he or she was under in the state of nature. As a result the subject would be no worse off
than he or she was in the state of nature. It is also the case that the perfectly rational
person, believing him or herself to be among other perfectly rational people, will see that
the contract will result in a net benefit in terms of individual freedom, and will enter into
the contract in good faith, intending to keep to it. As such there is no irrationality in
399 Indeed, as suggested by the quotation above, the contract binds the subjects with each
other and the sovereign is not bound by any contractual obligations to his subject. See
Hobbes (1991) p99 of original edition of 1651
400 See discussion of the writings of Locke below.
401 It is also irrelevant whether the subject consents to punishment since, for Hobbes,
rulers have a right to punish under natural law and presumably potential subjects know
this when they agree to the contract.
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consenting to punishment for others who are not so rational, honourable or disciplined.
Indeed it would be irrational not to permit the punishment of others since contract
breakers threaten the security of the contract. In the worst case, if the ruler does not
ensure compliance with the contract through punishment and there is no enforcement of
the agreement made between subjects, then the subject is actually worse off as he or she
is bound by an obligation to the ruler and still needs to be on his or her guard against
fellow subjects.
For the social contract to operate successfully, punishment for wrongdoing must be
explicitly guaranteed and the governing authority must acknowledge an obligation to
carry out such punishment for the advantage of all. Such a contract would set out the
rights and obligations binding all parties including the sovereign power. If a liberal social
contract, not based on a Hobbesian, natural law doctrine, was drafted which excluded
punishment, what protection would be afforded to citizens by the contract? Assuming the
contract to contain binding obligations on the ruler as well as citizens, a social contract
could be put in place that afforded protection from invasions by foreign powers, a
guarantee of health care and education, a guarantee of housing, income, employment etc.
The contract does not obviously need to include punishment for serious crimes. But
without a system which punishes those individuals who breach the contract by acquiring
or damaging the property or person of others, the liberty-generating value of the goods
afforded in the contract would be limited. If, e.g. it was left up to individual households
to protect their person and property, then the benefits of education, income and good
health would be put to use in the protection of property and person. The reduction in
income is a restriction on liberty, and the practices of crime prevention that would need
to be employed permanently would be invasive and restrictive of liberty. If e.g. no one
enforces breaches of minor regulatory rules such as parking restrictions, inconvenience
and disruption result, inevitably restricting the freedom of all motorists. Citizens would
be better off than in a state of nature, but they would not be as well off as they could be if
the contract included a duty on the ruler to punish certain harms. So it appears that,
unlike an absolutist social contract which is an agreement between subjects that is
arbitrarily enforced by the ruler, a liberal social contract places obligations on citizens
and ruler, including a duty for the ruler to arbitrate and enforce the relationships between
citizens. This arbitration and enforcement will inevitably require coercion and hence will
necessitate the use of punishment.
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It is also possible to imagine a contract containing a reference to punishment that would
satisfy a minimalist liberal. It could include some sort of clause that stated that, in return
for a promise to obey certain well specified laws pertaining to non interference with
others, lawbreakers would be punished. Providing the laws are acceptably minimal, such
a clause is inoffensive and justifies the incursion on citizen's freedom inflicted by the
state. It is an essential and necessary condition for the construction of a minimal state
that the areas within which the state may interfere in the lives of citizens are clearly
demarcated. In practice this means a body of law that makes as clear as possible the
grounds for state intervention, particularly with respect to punishment, which is,
arguably, the greatest inhibitor of liberty available in most liberal states.
The contractual basis of liberalism is fundamental, for without it the state has no
legitimacy to provide any benefits for citizens or to impose punishment on citizens. The
contract, in effect, enables citizens the freedom to give up certain freedoms. A contract
which permits the state to regulate the behaviour of all, must also permit the state to
impose punishment in order to enforce the contract. The liberal state can only impose
punishment due to the contractual nature which is the foundation of the relationship
between the state and citizens. As Hobbes showed, consent is crucial, and therefore the
contract model of governance, however fictional, is at the heart of the justification of the
liberal state.
Hobbes argued that whilst the duty of the subject to obey arises out of the contract, the
right of the sovereign to punish arises not out of the contractual agreement but is a
natural402 right. Liberals however, believe that the contractual relationship between
rulers and subjects or citizens binds both parties in particular ways. In particular, the rule
of law binds the sovereign as much as it does the subject, and if the state fails to fulfil its
obligations to the subject the subject can dissent. John Locke expressed it thus:
Freedom ofmen under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common
to everyone of that society and made by the legislative power erected in it, a
liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not, and not
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to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
403
man.
In a similar way, Hayek argued that the rule of law:
.. .means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand - rules which make it possible to see with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances and to plan one's
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.404
Dworkin agrees, stating:
Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would
be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as
licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past
political decisions about when collective force is justified.405
These and other liberal thinkers who stress the role of the rule of law do so because they
see it as operating an essential constraint on the state's exercise of coercive power.
Writers such as Locke, Hayek and Dworkin argue that, without the rule of law it would
be impossible to maximise individual liberty. The rule of law constrains the state and it
also constrains the actions of one citizens against another. The law, on this view,
provides a barrier which impedes the passion of public morality and the populism of
politics from interfering with individual liberty, a separation which is essential in a
pluralistic society.
Liberals accept the state of nature argument justifies the necessity of a political authority
with some coercive power. But unlike advocates of authoritarianism such as Hobbes,
liberals see the social contract as authorizing rulers to act on their behalf, to put in place
the minimal framework of restraint needed to prevent the society from becoming
402 A natural right is one granted by nature or God, not through treaty or contract. It
therefore cannot be annulled by treaty or contract.




disordered and dangerous for all. What liberals do not countenance, because it gives the
sovereign power too much control, is a situation whereby the sovereign puts in place
measures that prevents all danger to all individuals. Individuals therefore still have some
responsibility for their own safety and welfare. As a result, it is not to be expected that
the state will protect individual citizens by putting in place invasive preventive measures.
For the reasons that shall be articulated below, the sovereign's role in controlling
'dangerous persons' must be limited, reactive and proportionate if the state is to be truly
liberal.
John Locke put Hobbes' conservative ideas into a truly liberal political framework,
developing a theory of 'protective democracy' where the involvement of the people sets
out the basic terms of the social contract but where limitations on the extent of
intervention into areas of social and economic life prevent what de Tocqueville406 called
the 'tyranny of the majority', the possibility that the goals of the minority are
overwhelmed by the demands of the majority. Others, such as Madison407 argued along
similar grounds for there to be constraints on the rule of the majority. It says something
about their class and status that they argued this way, not only to protect the powerless
from the powerful, but in order to protect those with property in particular, from the
demands of the property less408. Locke sought to found a society based on shared rules - a
form of life which is shared by autonomous individuals, with autonomy being protected
by the state and with all citizens bound by the 'rule of law'. This form of liberalism
requires the state to provide the rules to promote and defend a society in which every
individual has access to the goods which are to be shared by all.
So just as liberal ideology is uncomfortable with the arbitrariness of absolute authority, it
also has some difficulty with democracy which can, if unconstrained, become a
comparable tyranny. We cannot therefore just ask whether the majority would approve of
longer than normal punishment as an affirmative answer does not of itself guarantee that
405 Dworkin (1977) p93
406 de Tocqueville (1968)
407 The fourth US president (1809-1817), Madison played an important part in the
drafting of the US Constitution.
408 perhaps along the lines of the experience of (white) farmers in newly independent
African countries where the poor (black) majority are strong in numbers and in physical
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the measure is liberal. If the only argument for an illiberal measure rests in the support of
the majority, particularly if that support is based on fear and ignorance, then that measure
is despotic and illiberal.
3.3 Liberalism and negative and positive liberty
The fundamental premise of liberalism is that there is no one way in which humans can
pursue a good life. The way society is organised must reflect this fact and allow humans
to pursue the good life in any way that they please. In this way liberalism promotes
toleration because a multiplicity of ways in which one can live a good life means that
differences of opinion on this matter must be accommodated409. Liberals of all varieties
believe in the importance of the individual, and the freedom of the individual to pursue
the good life, so long as this does not interfere with other individuals pursuing their
version of the good life. So, clearly individuals do not have unlimited freedom or
'license' and active intolerance such as discrimination is not permitted. Importantly for
our purpose, should an individual's pursuit of the good life impinge on others' then force
may be used against the individual. Consider John Stuart Mill's comment:
.. .the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member
of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others410.
Mill's liberal view, in this phrase, suggests that he is advocating a conception of
liberalism that is restricted to providing minimal and negative liberty411. It is minimal in
that it seeks to limit the reasons for the use of force or coercion to the one, the prevention
of harm to others. It thus allows the commission of harm to self, accidentally or
deliberately. It is negative because it does nothing to promote the individual's pursuit of
presence and can both legally and illegally take the 'private' land into the control and
ownership of the majority.
409 This connection between toleration and liberalism has resulted in an alternative (often
derogative) use of the word 'liberal' to mean 'broadminded' - even 'defender of
amorality'. In the case of punishment, 'liberal' is often used to mean lacking in the desire
to punish offenders harshly (or at all). These uses of liberalism, while closely related to
the political sense of the word, should not be confused with it.
410 Mill [1859] (1972) p 73
411 The distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' liberty is due to Isiah Berlin, see
Berlin (1969)
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the good life. It does not uphold a right to anything other than freedom from harm by
others and does not encourage the individual to take advantage of opportunities, even if
these would self evidently help the individual toward his or her goals.
In fact, although the short phrase from On Liberty above, lifted out of context, expresses
a form of negative liberty, Mill believed that the liberal state has a duty to provide the
conditions under which individuals could more easily, and equally, pursue their
individual conceptions of the good life. This conception of a 'positive liberty' is a more
interventionist and ontological view of liberalism, which accepts that the state has a role
to play in the well being of citizens and that its role should be to provide the conditions
for the pursuit of the good life through e.g. minimal conditions of security, welfare and
education. This conception of liberty is more in keeping with Gray's first depiction of the
purpose of liberal institutions. Gray describes one liberal approach to governance as the
application of 'universal principles' to facilitate the good life for citizens, rather than
providing the means to bring about 'peaceful co-existence'412. The determination of
which principles are 'universal' is of course a political question driven to some extent by
the demands of the electorate, and the individual beliefs of elected representatives. As we
saw in Chapter One when the social changes brought about by the welfare state were
discussed, these 'universal' principles are subject to change and political negotiation and
are never universally accepted413.
An interventionist state is prepared to limit the freedoms of its citizens beyond the
absolute minimum in order to help them achieve their goals. Would such a state permit
incapacitation of the dangerous as a purpose of punishment? Quite likely, yes, it would.
The state so described is not unlike most western liberal democracies. To a greater or
lesser extent the modern liberal state such as the USA or Britain does see part of its role
as being the provision of the means of the pursuit of each individual's version of the
good life, which clearly involves the prevention of (certain types of) harm to that
individual. This means that where a danger is identified, such as a person who commits
proscribed acts which restrict the liberty of others, the state can intervene and punish that
person. Where such acts are harmful and serious the state is justified in punishing in such
4,2 Gray (2000) and note 375 above
413 Chapter five will argue that the state's responsibility to provide social defence is one
of these 'universal' principles.
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a way that the offender is incapacitated at the same time. So proportionate sentences that
incapacitate as a side effect are notprima facie illiberal.
Would such a state permit longer than normal sentences in order to protect citizens from
'dangerous' offenders? This is much more difficult to assert. The liberal state (whether
interventionist or not) cannot afford to guarantee its citizens protection from all predicted
harm. Such a policy is clearly impractical and impossible. The decision of when the state
may intervene requires consideration of the balance between the extent of intervention
required and the freedom thus generated. Consideration of this balance means that
criteria must be devised in order to compare different types of freedom under conditions
of uncertainty. The mere fact that harm prevention and incapacitation can fit within a
liberal framework does not automatically mean that a policy of longer than normal
sentences for those predicted to be dangerous is acceptable.
From the perspective of minimal (non-interventionist) state and its responsibility to
provide only negative liberty, the sort of provision exemplified by s.2(2)(b) of the 1991
Criminal Justice Act is even more troublesome. As the quotation from Mill suggests,
liberal doctrine does approve of the restriction of an individual's liberty in order to
prevent harm to others, and this is clearly the goal of s.2(2)(b). However, Mill's
statement does not make clear whether the harm to be prevented must be immediate, nor
how certain it must be that harm will occur before an individual's freedom can be
restricted414. The idea of the minimal state surely implies that government intervention
should be sufficient to enable pursuit of the good life and no more. The extent of
government intervention involved is therefore crucial. Although a prima facie case can
be made for the introduction of a measure such as s.2(2)(b), the details of the policy and
of its implementation are important to the determination of whether it is acceptable under
this form of liberalism.
The distinction between negative and positive liberty is important and relevant with
respect to the types of responsibilities that the state assumes. Both negative and positive
liberty adopted as founding modes of governance can enable the individual's pursuit of
the good life. However, the difference between these forms of governance results in a
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difference in the way citizens maximise personal freedoms. The difference relates to the
extent to which the liberal state ought to take account of the diversity of human talents,
abilities and disabilities of its citizens. This natural difference between individuals means
that some are naturally better able to recognise and pursue their own version of the good
life. However, among the diversity of humans, some individuals will be born who,
however hard they strive will never achieve their version of the good life. The problem
for states which aim to provide negative liberty is that the natural difference between the
abilities of citizens appears to lead to natural unfairness in the distribution of liberty-
enhancing benefits.
Negative liberty is provided by the state's retraction from interference in citizens' lives.
It theoretically allows the most amount of freedom for citizens as everything that does
not interfere with the liberty of others is permissible. The state's role in ensuring
negative liberty is limited to ensuring freedom from interference by others, through
deterrence and by punishing breaches of rules. The state however does nothing else. It
does not promote certain strategies as being likely to result in the good life as it is up to
each individual to determine for him or herself how this will be accomplished and to take
the necessary steps to succeed. The state which guarantees negative liberty also does not
intervene in order to prevent reckless, self harming or risky behaviour of citizens where
such behaviour does not affect others.
So, the absence of laws requiring e.g. the wearing of seat belts in cars, the absence of
welfare provisions to provide for the unemployed, the absence of free health care, are all
examples of the types of provisions that might be found in a state which guarantees its
citizens only minimal liberty. Often the lack of provision of state benefits is related to
other seemingly more private freedoms, e.g. the freedom not to wear a seat belt can only
be seen to leave others unaffected if the person who suffers injury as a result of not
wearing the belt is also the person who bears the costs of the medical bills required to
treat him or her following an accident. If other citizens paid taxes in order to fund a
national health system415, or if other private individuals share the burden of risk in a
414 An unintended consequence of Mill's statement is that consensual harm would be
ruled out as it involves harm to another, but this is a quibble and easily remedied.
415 This would not be a state offering merely negative liberty.
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health insurance policy416, then the individual's risky action of not wearing a seat belt
does have the capacity to affect others' liberty and would therefore be prohibited. As
well, some individuals would have responsibility for ensuring the least risky strategy is
taken for those individuals who are not competent to choose for themselves their
preferred degree of risk. So, a parent could not risk his or her child's life by failing to use
a suitable restraint in cars, even if it is the parent's own expression of his or her own
liberty to drive unbelted.
The existence of a modern state which offers only negative liberty is practically
impossible unless a very broad notion of harm is taken. To illustrate: a state that offered
only negative benefits would not, e.g. be able to state which side of the road citizens
should drive upon and chaos would result. Unless one wants to define chaos as harm, the
state which provides only negative liberty is powerless to resolve this problem. Giving up
the liberty to choose what side of the road one drives upon seems a very small sacrifice if
the state is prepared to ensure everyone drives on the same side (most of the time) and
thereby each driver gets to his or her destination more easily and quickly. The ideology
of negative liberty also does not offer citizens any scope for assistance if they cannot
pursue their version of the good life unaided. As noted above, citizens who are or who
become disabled, and are thus unable to provide for their own basic needs, will suffer.
Such people will have fewer choices, and less liberty than their counterparts in a state
which offers positive liberty. For some citizens, the state which provides freedom from
interference may, in effect, be providing those citizens with the freedom to 'choose' to
starve. The explanation that this is a desirable consequence of their liberty is a fiction.
Since there is some risk of harm in all human activities, positive liberal ideology does not
imply that the state takes control over all aspects of life which potentially involve one
person harming another. If the state did this, then its incursion into the everyday personal
and professional lives of citizens would be all encompassing and it would hardly be
liberal. From the perspective of an interventionist state, seeking to maximise positive
liberty, liberal doctrine suggests that it is the state's responsibility to provide those
416 This situation could arise if there is a obligation to avoid taking certain harms in the
insurance contract. A breach of such a clause would be policed privately, thus not
affecting the citizens' relationship with the state just with the other private individuals
and the corporate structures involved in the insurance contract.
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goods, such as education, welfare benefits, healthcare etc. that enable each individual to
flourish. But these are all positive goods, providing citizens with some benefit, rather
than protecting them from some disadvantage. Of course, such benefits can be described
negatively, healthcare provides protection from illness, welfare prevents starvation etc.
However, whatever way the positive provisions are described, they aim to provide a
beneficial outcome by enhancing the circumstances under which individual citizens go
about their pursuit of the good life. A state which aims to provide only negative liberty
does not become involved in such issues, it is concerned only to prevent liberty
restricting behaviour between individuals, as far as is possible, and to punish instances of
liberty reducing behaviour when these occur.
In a state which offers positive liberty, provisions extend beyond the restriction of harm
from others. Such a state provides a minimum standard of benefits which, it is felt, give
individuals the freedom to determine and achieve his or her own mode of enjoying the
good life. Typically such benefits include freedom from: hunger, homelessness, untreated
severe illness, and the provision of basic education. These are assumed to be universal
goods in Gray's sense without which any citizens is unable to make meaningful choices
about how to attain the good life. However, not surprisingly given that resources will be
limited, the provision of even such basic goods entails a certain responsibility on the part
of those citizens who benefit from them. A health service funded out of general taxation
can justifiably demand that its users are not profligate with resources and will take
reasonable steps to avoid unnecessary and unavoidable expenditure. Using the example
above, the wearing of seat belts can be demanded as the expense of treating those persons
who are more severely injured in an accident than they might otherwise have been falls
on those who pay for such care or who also call upon its resources417.
The problem with the state's provision of positive liberty for its citizens is that every
citizen who claims these benefits is, in effect, reducing the liberty of all other taxpaying
citizens. This creates a dependent and sometimes hostile relationship between those
417 A counter argument would exist if those people who wanted to resist the command to
wear a seat belt could demonstrate that in any accident they were more likely to die and
thus cause minimal cost to the health service, in which case the economic argument
would fail. This argument would be even more compelling if those who opposed the
requirement to wear a seat belt argued that in any fatal accident their organs could be
used in transplantation to treat others, thereby saving money and lives.
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whose taxes provide net benefits and those who claim them. To manage this tension there
are rules as to the eligibility and behaviour of those who claim the benefits. For example,
claimants of unemployment benefits must show that they have been actively looking for
work. Such rules automatically reduce the claimants' liberty. The state must take the
decision as to the degree of freedom which is sacrificed by citizens who wish to claim
these benefits. It must answer questions such as: How much (liberty reducing)
inconvenience can the state reasonably demand of its unemployed citizens before it will
supply them with money to provide (liberty providing) food and housing?
In practice, all modern states offer citizens forms of positive liberty although the benefits
offered can vary considerably. Most states offer assistance to those who are bom unable
to care for themselves and for those who find themselves unable to provide basic
requirements of living. Some, but not all, liberal states offer free health care for all
citizens. The provision of order among millions of people requires that the state's role
extends beyond the mere prevention or punishment of others who interfere with
individual freedoms. As well, the international responsibilities of the state, including
defence, trade and immigration require that the state make and enforce a set of rules
concerning relations with other states. These rules e.g. the requirement to have travel
documents, will necessarily reduce the freedom of citizens. However, if this were not the
case, the state could not ensure that the citizens who are eligible for its positive benefits
are the same as those who are contributing (or would contribute if they were able to do
so).
3.4 First and second order benefits.
The United Kingdom is a state which overtly aims to provide positive liberty for its
citizens418. This is evident from the existence of a national health service, the availability
of free education for children, and a welfare system that provides an income for the
unemployed and those unable to work. The purpose of government in providing these
benefits is that they supply the means for the individual citizen to pursue his or her
version of the good life. In so far as this is achieved, these benefits are morally justified,
but they require an incursion into the liberty of each individual beneficiary. As the state
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must decide how such benefits are to be organised, funded and distributed, and resources
to fund the benefits are limited, the recipients must satisfy qualifying criteria. As a
welfare recipient, choices are taken away from individuals and certain behaviour may be
enforced by the state. Nevertheless, the provision of basic services does enable those who
would otherwise be at a disadvantaged to gain the tools to make choices and to explore
the best way to live their version of the good life.
So, the positive liberal state provides at least basic amenities which enable all citizens to
exercise a level of choice in their lives. I shall call this type of state-supplied provision a
first order benefit. A first order benefit acts directly to provide a benefit for the person on
whom the state is acting. For example, a first order benefit is the provision of free
primary school education for children. This aims to provide the children with the tools to
make choices in later life and it does so by acting upon an individual child directly. That
this is purely a first order benefit is shown by the fact that an education is provided even
for those children for whom there is little expectation that they will have the opportunity
to use their education to benefit others in adult life419.
By contrast, the state may act upon an individual in such a way that the state's
intervention gives rise to a benefit for another individual. I shall call this advantage a
second order benefit. For example, the state may require that modifications are made to a
vehicle so that in the event of that vehicle hitting a pedestrian, the pedestrian's chances
of survival are maximised. In such a case the state's intervention requiring the owner of
the vehicle to make modifications to the vehicle offers no advantage to the owner
(assuming he or she is not at risk of being hit by the vehicle) but only to an unknown
third party in the event that the vehicle is involved in an accident. Laws restricting the
publication or distribution ofmaterial that is deemed to be offensive, pornographic or an
incitement to violence also provides only second order benefits. The restriction on the
authors, publishers and retailers to display or sell such material is applied not in order to
provide benefits for them, as such laws are detrimental to commercial profits, but to
418 The terms 'citizens' encompasses residents of a state who are entitled to the same
benefits as nationals.
419 For example, the UK as a positive liberal state, ensures the education of people with
severe learning disabilities, where such education can only be to the benefit of the
individual recipients.
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provide benefits to members of the public who do not wish to encounter such material
unexpectedly or who it is felt may be damaged by viewing these items.
A great many state supplied provisions give rise to both first and second order benefits,
indeed this may seem the ideal use of public resources. For example, the expensive state
funded training of an individual who becomes a medical doctor gives that individual a
career, status etc. and also provides an advantage to all of the patients whom that doctor
is able to treat. Welfare benefits may appear at first sight to be first order benefits but the
fluctuations of the labour market require that a healthy workforce is available at short
notice420. Thus the provision of unemployment benefit can be explained as offering first
and second order benefits by ensuring a ready supply of labour as well as providing a
legitimate source of income for people who would otherwise need to turn to illegitimate
methods in order to survive.
There is little moral or political difficulty with state intervention that gives rise to both
first and second order benefits. There is however a genuine difficulty when the state's
intervention produces only second order benefits, i.e. the state intervenes in a way that
does not provide a benefit for the person being affected but the benefit is felt by one or
more others on whom the state is not applying interventions. For example, in the example
given above, the requirement that certain publications are only sold or displayed in
particular areas where they will not be seen by casual customers reduces the liberty of the
producers and sellers of such material. The producers and retailers bear the cost of these
restrictions and may feel justified in arguing that their liberty is being reduced in order to
advantage other persons.
It was noted that a first order benefit e.g. a medical education that is provided to an
individual may provide second order benefits for others in the form of healthcare
expertise etc. However, the primary beneficiary is still the recipient of the education as
he or she then has the choice of whether or not and how to use that education. The skills
and employment the education provides gives the individual more choice about how to
live his or her life, and there is no compulsion by the liberal state to make the individual
put to use his or her medical education in any direct way. If the doctor wants to qualify as
420 Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939)
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an architect at the conclusion of state funded medical training there is nothing to prevent
him or her from doing so. Therefore, there is no general test for whether state provided
benefits will be first and second order benefits, although solely first order benefits will
generally be apparent in the choices they offer the recipients of such benefits.
As the example above shows, second order provisions may not produce benefits that
specifically advantage particular individuals, they can be based on assumptions about the
advantage that accrues for the general public. This is significant, since, while it can be
argued that the general public is merely a collection of individuals so that benefits for the
public inevitably lead to benefits for many individuals, without identifiable benefits for
individuals, any claim that a policy benefits the public may be impossible to verify, or the
quality of the benefits may be difficult to measure. As will be shown below, liberal
policy requires that all intervention, but in particular solely second order intervention,
produces verifiable results, else it is vulnerable to the criticism that it is unnecessary
government interference.
Solely second order benefits are those which provide some advantage not for the subject
of state interventions but for others. In such cases, the liberty of an individual is reduced
in order to increase the liberty of others. Clearly for this to be a politically and morally
acceptable position, the advantage that accrues to the recipient must be substantial and
verifiable. The benefits of some solely second order provisions can, of course, be shown
statistically. If we consider e.g. the success of a policy of enforced culling of apparently
healthy animals on a farm that is contiguous to a farm that has suffered an outbreak of
foot and mouth disease421. The advantage that accrues from killing apparently healthy
animals is clearly solely second order since there is no immediate benefit to that farm (or
indeed animal), but the second order benefits can be measured in the reduced rate at
which the disease spreads in the neighbouring farms and general animal population.
Even in the absence of a uniquely identifiable farm which gains the second order
advantage of its animals not catching the disease, such a policy of contiguous culling can
fit a liberal model because the benefits are substantial and verifiable. But consideration
of second order gains does mean that calculations about the maximisation of individual
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liberty become generalised, incorporating within them the question of utility. Utility
inevitably takes into account a balance between the liberty producing consequences of
policies for groups rather than for individuals. This does not mean such provisions are
necessarily illiberal but they raise questions about the priority of individuals in liberal
governance.
3.5 First and second order benefits and penal policy
With respect to the benefits of criminal justice measures, all forms of general
deterrence422 such as the publicity given to penalties and the use of situational crime
control technology423 (call these 'preventive' measures) which are designed to act on a
potential offender, have both first and second order benefits. To the extent that
preventive measures thwart initial offending the person who does not commit a crime
avoids the possibility of liberty-reducing prosecution and punishment and thus gains a
first order benefit. The prospective victim is relieved of the liberty-reducing
consequences of the crime and thus receives a second order benefit. So preventive crime
control measures produce first and second order benefits. Yet, the primary appeal of
preventive policies and strategies which are designed to produce general desistance from
crime must surely be to first order benefits. That is to say, these policies rely for their
force on the argument that it is to the advantage of the individual citizen to be law
abiding. The publication of penalties, and the visible presence of detection mechanisms
reinforce the idea that it is not worth committing crime because this brings about the first
order benefit of not being caught and punished.
It is equally possible to demonstrate that there are first and second order benefits arising
from individual deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation (call these 'reductive'
measures). These measures are aimed at individuals who have already committed crimes
and are intended to stop the offender committing further crimes. Assuming the desired
crime reductive effect takes place, and no further crime is committed, the criminal
421 Such a policy was employed during the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the
United Kingdom in 2001.
422 General deterrence is aimed not at preventing a particular offender from re-offending,
but aims to prevent the general public from contemplating a crime.
423 Closed Circuit TV, street lighting, speed cameras, car alarms, visible policing etc.
150
receives the first order benefit of no further punishment424. However, the advantage that
is gained from these measures is primarily second order i.e. the intended recipient of the
benefit is the prospective victim(s) of the crime(s) that are prevented. This is apparent if
we consider that the first order 'benefit' the offender receives (assuming the measures
work) is an absence of future punishment but this benefit is achieved only through the
implementation of present punishment.
The situation becomes more complicated when the likelihood of future punishment is
considered as it must be if the first order benefit of not being punished is to be taken into
account. A utilitarian calculation concerning the effect of any action may make a
potential offender take the risk of bringing about the state's response to his or her
offending behaviour. If the likelihood of detection is low, then the remoteness of the
possibility of the first order effects brought about by punishment, suggests that
committing crime is more likely than abstention from crime to produce liberty enhancing
benefits.
The first order benefits of the criminal justice system differ according to whether the
benefits are preventive or reductive and depend on the likelihood that they will be
imposed. For the individual who is contemplating a criminal act, effective preventive
measures do provide the first order benefit of no punishment, but this must be set against
the advantages that accrue from the crime and the likelihood of detection and conviction.
For the offender who has been detected and convicted, effective reductive measures
impose a loss of liberty in the course of generating a first order benefit of preventing
future imposition of punishment. Successful reductive measures produce for the desisting
would-be criminal the first order benefit of not being punished in the future but they do
this only by the imposition of (liberty reducing) punishment (and this must still be set
against the advantages which result from the commission of crime). This can be seen as
providing a net advantage for the offender on whom the reductive measures are applied
as any uncommitted future offending may be have been more serious and even offences
of the same degree of seriousness may have resulted in more severe penalties. However,
the first order advantage to the offender who desists from future offending as a result of
424
Ignoring of course for the moment, the likely fact that much acquisitive crime at least,
must provide more liberty for an offender since the monetary gain provided by much
crime effectively buys choice, opportunity and status.
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the imposition of reductive penal measures is less obvious than is the case for the
potential offender subject to preventive measures. This highlights the value of
considering reductive forms of punishment as being primarily intended to produce
second order benefits.
In the case of preventive punitive measures, the benefit produced is first order and
second order, i.e. the measures act upon individuals and those individuals benefit from
the avoidance of punishment. The potential burglar who desists because of his or her
knowledge of the likelihood of detection and punishment receives the first order benefit
of not being detected and punished. The preventive measures also provide benefits for
others as other individuals are not victimised. The potential victim of a burglar also
benefits from the success of the preventive measures which have, in this case, worked to
stop the burglary. Despite the fact that there are first and second order benefits of
preventive measures, the measures are designed to influence the choices made by the
potential offender and thereby they are predominantly affecting his or her liberty.
In the case of reductive measures the balance falls the other way: those on whom the
measures are applied are not the main recipients of the benefit, it is the general
population, each of whom may be a potential victim, that is the (second order)
beneficiary. It seems inappropriate for a minimal liberal state to have as its primary
purpose the provision of predominantly second order benefits for its citizens. Even an
interventionist liberal state would limit those second order benefits from which some
citizens might gain liberty. Yet both the minimal and interventionist liberal states
consider that protection from harm is an essential duty of the state. If this is so, will it be
possible for the liberal state to avoid responsibility for the provision of solely second
order benefits? Can any truly liberal state remain liberal while still offering even limited
protection for its citizens?
The question for a liberal state is whether its role in punishment should be confined to
the provision of first order benefits for citizens (which may provide second order benefits
as well) or whether it should extend its mandate to include the provision of solely second
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order benefits425. There are no genuinely solely first order benefits in the context of
punishment as almost all penal measures offer the potential to prevent future offending
and therefore provide second order advantages for those who would otherwise become
victims of crime. Even the unconditional discharge has potential second order
consequences as it may result in the convicted offender desisting from future offending
by the experience of detection, conviction etc. that has given rise to the sentence. Only
where no available measure would deter the offender will the impact of punishment fail
to result in second order benefits. Such cases will be rare, e.g. the person who
consistently parks in prohibited places and incurs penalty fines but does not cease the
practice of parking illegally. In such cases of course, the first order benefit of avoiding
future punishment also does not result from the imposition of the penalty.
Criminal justice measures, including punishment, can be seen to offer both first and
second order benefits, assuming that they work to stop initial offending or recidivism. As
we saw above, both preventive and reductive measures, provide the offender with the
advantage of no further punishment, and provide the potential victim with the benefit of
not being victimised. The calculation of benefits though, shows that for preventive
measures, there is a definite first order benefit, the potential offender avoids future
punishment by eschewing the opportunity to commit crime. For reductive measures, the
first order benefit is less apparent, as the first order benefit of no future punishment is
achieved only by the reduction in liberty brought about by the imposition of punishment.
The imposition of punishment as found in s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act on
'innocent' offenders raises an interesting question about the benefits of punitive state
intervention on citizens. It has already been argued above that reductive penal measures,
although they may offer first order benefits, primarily provide second order benefits by
either deterring, rehabilitating or incapacitating offenders. In the case of longer than
normal punishment, the benefit of the punishment is solely second order. The fact that
the offender is already subjected to penal measures suggest that any first order benefit
would be delivered in the course of the proportionate element of the sentence. Therefore
the disproportionate extra punishment imposed on the 'dangerous' offender cannot be
425 The answer to this question will vary depending on the context, so, for example, the
answer with respect to the culling of animals during an outbreak of disease may be
different from the answer given in the context of punishment.
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imposed to provide any advantage for him or her. It must therefore be a solely second
order advantage provided to benefit the potential future victims of the 'dangerous'
offender.
A provision that acts upon people who are assumed or predicted to be dangerous, and
imprisons that person for a longer period as a result, gives rise to a solely second order
benefit. The individual who is immediately affected by the state's action by being
incapacitated is not the beneficiary of the provision. The beneficiary is another, possibly
unknown person or persons. In this sense at least, there is an important question to be
addressed concerning whether advocates of positive liberalism, still mindful of the need
to restrict the powers of the state, have in mind solely second order provisions.
Solely second order benefits are consistent with a liberal political structure if two
conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are necessary to ensure that the state's
intervention does not contravene the liberal requirement that all citizens are treated
equally.
1. A solely second order benefit must be universally available to citizens, and all
citizens must be liable to any state intervention that gives rise to a solely
second order benefit.
2. The advantage that accrues from a solely second order benefit must be
substantial, specific and measurable to justify the disadvantage that brings it
about.
Does s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act fulfil these two conditions? The first
condition can be addressed by a consideration of political and legal criteria, the second is
an empirical question. In the sense that the English criminal law applies equally to all
citizens, then the provision of s.2(2)(b) can be seen to be universally applicable and
therefore condition 1. is met. However, if we consider the singular importance of
s.2(2)(b) in English legislation then this question is not so straightforward. As was noted
in chapter one, s.2(2)(b) is unique in introducing to the criminal law the ability of
sentencers to punish an offender more than he or she deserves. It allows a sentencer to
sentence an offender who has committed a violent or sexual crime to a longer than
normal term of imprisonment if it is felt that the offender is likely to commit a serious
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violent or sexual crime in future. The offender who is subject to such a measure is treated
differently from other offenders in two senses. Firstly, by committing a qualifying
offence he or she is singled out for an undeserved punishment, secondly, the decision to
apply the extra punishment to this particular offender is discretionary. Although many
sentencing situations offer the sentencing magistrate or judge considerable discretion,
and there are guidelines for the appropriate exercise of discretion, most discretionary
powers are concerned the imposition of proportionate punishment. Discretion in such
cases is employed to decide which of several options is sufficient to reflect the
seriousness of the crime. S.2(2)(b) offers the sentencer the discretion to impose
undeserved and disproportionate punishment. This is a unique power is not universally
applicable to all citizens or even all offenders. It therefore fails the first condition and
cannot be justified under liberal political ideology.
With respect to the second condition, the advantage must be substantial and measurable.
To the extent that being detained in a prison makes it difficult for an offender to commit
violent and sexual crimes against members of the public, incapacitation in prison does,
trivially, prevent further offences for the period of incarceration. It is impossible to
measure the numbers of crimes prevented and the seriousness of the crimes prevented426.
Given that the offenders subjected to longer than normal imprisonment under s.2(2)(b)
have already committed a violent or sexual offence, it can be argued that they show a
propensity for such crimes and merit incapacitative measures. However, it should not be
forgotten that such offenders may not have committed a serious violent or sexual offence
in the past, and the sentence is based on an assumption about future behaviour. To the
extent that many discretionary sentencing decisions are based on the offender's future
behaviour this is not unusual. However, as we have seen, 'normal' reductive sentences
have at least the potential for some first order benefits. The imposition of a longer than
normal sentence under s.2(2)(b) cannot supply first order benefits to the offender and so
the assumption of future serious offending must be based on firm evidence if the
presumption is to be justified.
The lack of a method for testing the effectiveness of longer than normal imprisonment to
prevent serious violent and sexual crime means that there is no compelling empirical
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argument in favour of such a sentence. An obvious second order benefit cannot be shown
to exist and this second order benefit therefore does not outweigh the disadvantage that
accrues to the offender subject to the provision. Since the benefit of such state
intervention falls only on others, and cannot be justified by the demonstrable prevention
of serious crimes, s.2(2)(b) fails to satisfy condition 2 above. As it has also been shown
to fail condition 1, on the basis of the equality requirement of liberal governance, the use
of a measure such as s.2(2)(b) cannot be justified.
The practice of making it physically impossible for a person to commit harm, takes
different, though related, forms for the mentally ill and for those found guilty of crime.
The justifications for the incapacitation of both categories of dangerous person are also
different, as a result of consideration of the criteria of rationality and the conceptual role
which rationality plays in both legal and medical discourse. As a result different policy
and legislation has been implemented to deal with both groups, in an attempt to reflect
differences in rationality and hence culpability427. However, concurrent practice of
incarceration of the mentally ill 'offender' in prison and the criminally insane 'patient' in
special hospital seems to blur rather than sharpen any distinction between categories of
'culpable', 'blameworthy' offenders and 'mentally disturbed' patients. Throughout the
development and implementation of the policies of incapacitation, the state, the media
and the public have cared little about the conditions under which incapacitated people are
held, concern has been directed only at the security of the public.
Chapter four will analyse the liberal justification for incapacitation in the legal and
medical contexts through examination of the concepts of 'rationality', 'responsibility'
and 'quarantine'. It will be argued that differing conceptions of 'rationality' can justify
differential treatment of the mentally ill from the criminal offender. It is argued that the
rational subject of law cannot be subjected to an disproportionate incapacitative disposal,
since to do so denies the subject's citizenship and fails to acknowledge their essential
humanity. But the non-rational citizen still has certain rights which preclude the
imposition of longer than normal punishment on him or her unless it can be shown that
such incapacitation is primarily in his or her best interests.
426 Monahan (1981), Philpotts and Lancucki (1979), Pratt (1997). This will be discussed
further in chapter 5.
427 See chapters 3 and 4 below.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RATIONALITY, SCIENCE AND DANGEROUSNESS
This chapter advances the argument that scientific concepts continue to be significant in
a society which utilises an implicit policy of social defence. This is so, despite the fact
that social defence arose out of a general disillusionment with the promises of scientific
criminology. Whilst criminological science failed to convince policy makers of the value
of positivist methodology in general, medical science provides the authority for particular
forms of intervention. So, a general lack of belief in the utility of the guidance provided
by science coexists with a reliance on scientific techniques to identify, select and manage
some offenders.
Norbert Elias' account of the civilising process helps to explain the mechanisms by
which society identifies those individuals who are different from the majority and are
perceived as 'dangerous' as a result428. Elias argues that each society's conception of
normal and acceptable behaviour is founded upon sensibilities, the emotional response to
certain behaviour. The presence of sensibility responses to certain behaviours defines the
behaviour as acceptable or unacceptable. Similarly, certain forms of punishment are
considered acceptable (do not offend general sensibilities) within the context of a
particular society at a particular time. In the 20"' century, a period where there is an
increasing awareness of the risk of crime, people become more sensitive to the 'offence'
that is crime. There is an increase in expressions of outrage and disgust at the
commission of crime, even less serious property crime, but especially of violent and
sexual crimes.
So society's conception of 'the other', the 'dangerous' person, is based on non-rational
sensibilities. Yet, in the liberal state, it is not enough to justify intervention such as
incapacitation in prison by appealing to the fact that some offenders bring forth an non-
rational emotional response. There must be an argument before the state can coercively
restrain these 'dangerous' people. In the case of the longer than normal punishment
428 Elias (1939) (1978 a and b)
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provisions of the 1991 Act, sentencers need not obtain advice from experts such as
psychiatrists or social workers as to the 'dangerousness' of the person before the court.
This in effect means the sentencer alone and without advice has the discretion to apply
(or not) vague standards from outwith the criminal law in determining whether to impose
a longer than normal period of imprisonment under the authority of the criminal law. The
foundation which underpins this power is that the sentencer is guided by scientific
principles and evidence when he or she comes to make the decision about sentencing the
'dangerous' offender.
Although the status of science is exploited in order to justify treating some groups of
individuals differently, such measures must also have political justification or else they
appear arbitrary or discriminatory. Thus the incapacitation through imprisonment of the
'dangerous' offender must be seen to be appropriate and necessary. Medical science
provides both a model and the authority for doing this, in the form of the concept of
'quarantine'. However, the use of such a model carries with it conditions that rule it out
in the response to the rational offender's criminal acts. Quarantine is an appropriate
response to the non-rational offender, but if the concept is to be used in the criminal
justice context then it must be employed impartially, and where possible in the best
interests of the 'patient', if it is to be ethically acceptable.
4.1 The Construction of Dangerousness
Concerns about dangerous offenders are often associated with categories of mental
illness such as schizophrenia and psychopathy429. However, unlike the term 'dangerous',
there are frequent and constant attempts to set objective criteria for medical terms430.
Definitions of dangerousness might be thought to follow some common sense patterns
such that a person is likely to be considered dangerous only if the relevant activities are
persistent rather than isolated; they cause harm rather than mere nuisance; and the
individual is of a predatory character responsible for his actions rather than being
429 Campbell (1995), Johnstone (1996), Prins (1986). This tendency is exacerbated by
media characterisations of mental illness such as the representation of the cannibal
Hannibal Lecter in the film 'Silence of the Lambs'.
430 Pilgrim and Rogers (1999), Bartlett and Sandland (2000)
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accident prone. However, there are some potential contradictions within this account as
the cultural and media concept of 'the dangerous' person also includes the person who
commits sporadic and unpredictable violence. Just as the predatory, rational actor is
dangerous so too is the uncontrolled, irrational and irresponsible mentally disordered
actor regardless of the benign underlying character of the person. The mentally
disordered person is considered to be especially dangerous if the mental disorder is not
amenable to treatment or control. So the 'dangerous' offender may be someone who is
making calculated plans to cause harm to others or the person who is committing
violence without intending to do so.
We saw in chapter two that a policy of social defence institutes measures to control the
dangerous regardless of the reasons for the commission of dangerous acts. In particular,
social defence policy aims to put in place measures to prevent harm, and this will include
rehabilitative and medical interventions. However whether the measures put in place
under social defence are based on incapacitation in prison or rehabilitation and
incapacitation in a medical setting, justifiable criteria must be developed and
implemented to ensure that the power to coercively detain or treat a dangerous or
'dangerous' person is not misused. The language of 'dangerousness' is dangerously
vague, a point made by Radzinowicz and Hood when they argued 'it should never be
introduced in penal legislation'431. The problem with the absence of a clinical account of
'dangerousness' is that policy based on nebulous social and cultural concepts influenced
by media reporting of current events, has the potential to be unnecessarily coercive and
even corrupt.
Categories of dangerousness are socially constructed and therefore will be politically and
morally potent432. Mary Douglas observes the way that the concept of 'danger' can be
used by governments to maintain public order and to justify policies of social defence
through patterns of explanation and practices of blaming433. Douglas observes that there
is a gap between subjective concepts of danger and objective calculations of risk and that
this discrepancy is explainable sociologically. She claims that by turning the language of
'danger' into the language of 'risk' the modern industrial society and criminal justice
431 Radzinowicz and Hood (1978) p722
432 See Scott (1970)
433 Douglas (1992)
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system benefits from a (spurious) scientific objectivity. This superficial objectivity hides
the political sensibilities which underlie the imposition of the term 'dangerous'.
Douglas argues that the new sense of the word 'risk' has political and cultural force
because it only refers to negative outcomes. The word 'risk' has been pre-empted to
mean bad risk434. The promise of benefits in contemporary political discourse is couched
in other terms such as 'choice' 'opportunity' and 'rights'. Those elements of social life
that bring about distress and unhappiness are termed 'risks'. Ulrick Beck argues that this
means that governance is concerned with the redistribution of (bad) risks rather than the
redistribution of goods435. For these purposes 'danger' would have once been the right
word, but plain danger does not have the aura of science or afford the pretension of a
precise calculation. Risk also depersonalises the potential harm that may occur from most
activities and this can be useful for governments. So, for example, the 'danger of driving
a car because fatal car accidents do occur' becomes the 'risk of having a fatal accident
whilst driving a car'. The former reminds one of the unavoidable nature of harm
occurring, the latter that everything one does carries with it the possibility of harm. The
former is more direct and certain, the latter raises the mere possibility of harm. Posing
the 'danger' in terms of 'a risk' gives the impression that risks are something that one can
control whether through government intervention or through individual measures. The
discourse of risk also brings with it the knowledge that some harmful acts will occur as
no measure can be taken that reduces risk to zero.
As Douglas goes on to say, our theories about risk perception are not as scientifically
objective as might be thought. Risk analysts must consider the production and control of
information, the production of scientific consensus and the development of public
expectations if they are to provide practical guidance about interpreting the social world
and developing social policy. In practice this does not happen, and the generation of
knowledge operates through an unquestioned reliance on the objectivity and authority of
science. She says:
Appealing to degrees of risk is appealing to an external arbiter, an independent,
objective judge of the rights and wrongs of the case. Normally an appeal to
434 See also, O'Malley (2000)
160
experts to settle questions of accountability works when their methods and
results are backed by authority. In the present circumstances the appeal to
science is made because of the absence of respect for any adjudicator. But when
science is used to arbitrate in these conditions, it eventually loses its independent
status and finally disqualifies itself.436
As the quotation shows, Douglas argues that there is a possibility that the use of
scientific authority in a political context has the capacity to reveal the inherent
subjectivity of science. However, the strength of our belief in science is such that there is
a reluctance to view science as being less than perfectly impartial and objective. Almost
any explanation can be given for the failure of science except where that explanation
might threaten science itself. So trusting are we in science that we do not even apply
science to itself, it is uncritical in its self-preservation. David Bloor demonstrates this
characteristic of science by utilising Durkheim's distinction between the sacred and the
profane437. Bloor extends the analogy of faith in a religious phenomenon to our attitude
towards science. He asks principally why there is a resistance to the scientific
investigation of science, why science is presumed to be immune from comparison with
belief, custom, tradition. Science, argues Bloor, occupies the sacred ground in our
knowledge discourse, and it is prohibited that we should even compare the sacred with
the profane world of social interactions such as politics.
4.2 Dangerousness and science
The discourse surrounding dangerousness reveals an interaction between the scientific
and legal domains which is further exposed through the rhetoric used by the penal and
psychiatric establishments when discussing dangerous offenders and patients. There can
be no discrete separation of the scientific and the legal since dangerous behaviour is
conceived through its harmful effects on other persons, effects which may require
forensic disclosure or explanation, while harmful relations between persons are
ultimately regulated through the legal system. Also, considering the nature of the science
used in debates surrounding dangerousness, especially the use of psychiatric knowledge
435 Beck (1992)
436 Douglas op. cit. p24
437 Bloor (1991)
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and methodology, it is often impossible to differentiate strands of argument that originate
from moral and social analyses of behaviour and those made on the basis of scientific
theory. What is possible however, is to recognise the use of particular types of discourse
that are relied upon in the justification of decisions made concerning dangerous
individuals.
The argument and methodology of many criminological theories and penal programmes
rely heavily on science for their persuasive power but in order to deprive individuals of
their freedoms, the recommendations of scientists must be approved through the legal
system. Insofar as the legal system is a representation of the dominant moral attitudes
prevailing in a particular society at a particular time it is necessarily both reliant on and
critical of the arguments put forward on a scientific basis. When a decision is reached
that results from the conjunction of science and the legal system it has a special
impregnability. Science supplies expert knowledge and status for the decisions made, and
the legal system provides moral sanctioning and administrative authority in the carrying
out of these decisions.
Many commentators claim to observe an embarrassment within the field of social science
caused by the failure of social scientists to develop an agreed paradigm for the methods
of discovery and explanation in their various fields. For example Rabinow and Sullivan
in the introduction to the second edition of Interpretive Social Science comment:
While not denying the persistence and theoretical fruitfulness of certain
explanatory schemes in the social sciences, social investigators have never
reached the extraordinary degree of basic agreement that characterises modern
natural science.438
Rabinow and Sullivan make the observation that the 'baseline realities' in the human
sciences are practices i.e. socially constructed actions that provide meaning. They
emphasise that human actions are the product of interrelationships, interaction, discourse,
conflict and communication. As a result, interpretation is the principle mode of
understanding and a recognition of the priority of interpretation requires the full
438 Rabinow and Sullivan (1987) p 3
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acceptance of the distinction between the observer and the observed. The methodological
limitations imposed ensure there is argument and debate concerning the validity of
results.
Charles Taylor takes a similar view, claiming there can be no verification (or
falsification) procedure, rather that competing interpretations take the place of standard
scientific justifications for phenomena. Taylor states:
We can only continue to offer interpretations... some differences will be
nonarbitrable by further evidence, but each side can only make an appeal to
deeper insight than the other.439
It is not a criticism of science to observe that much scientific language and practice is
socially constructed. Bloor holds that the respect with which science is held inhibits the
sociological analysis of scientific methods and applications. Yet Bloor stresses that
without a scientific approach to the nature of knowledge, theories are vulnerable to
prevailing ideologies and will lack autonomy and development as a result440. What is
required is a sociological analysis of science and a scientific analysis of social theories.
The latter is prevalent in the form of positivism, the former is, as Bloor observes, much
more difficult to achieve. In addition, there are competing motivating goals and similar
organisational pressures in scientific as well as social and legal enterprises. Pure
scientists are looking for verifiable and falsifiable causal processes and to determine the
truth or otherwise of beliefs about the dangerous. Practitioners and policy makers in the
legal realm are looking for at best utilitarian, and at worst pragmatic, ways to manage the
risks that arise from the dangerous. All professionals are seeking to maintain the status of
their expertise and knowledge and use whatever ideologies they can to achieve authority
and influence.
The divisions that exist between science and the juridical in legal systems are often
crudely expressed as being between positivist and classical theories. The United
Kingdom's legal systems operate on a neo-classical fusion between the classical, so-
439 Taylor C. in Rabinow and Sullivan (eds.) Op. Cit. Chapter 1 'Interpretation and the
Sciences ofMan' p75
440 Bloor (1991) passim
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called 'justice' model of the offender which assumes rationality and free will, and
positivist criteria which presuppose individual deviation from an abstract rational norm.
As we saw in chapter two, individualistic positivist criteria are seen as undermining the
universality and objectivity of the classical theoretical position. For example,
determining the objective material facts of the case is insufficient to determine guilt at a
criminal trial. For most offences, the criminal law requires an assessment of the
responsibility and culpability of the individual defendant before it can convict the person
of that crime441. In some cases, particularly those relating to violence and sexual
offending, the test of the responsibility of the offender for his or her behaviour is
devolved to expert scientists, especially psychiatrists. The effect of this application of
scientific evidence is that the classical assumptions in the criminal procedure are
qualified by the use of positivist criteria. Psychiatry is used as the arbiter of who is mad,
as a result it also becomes the arbiter of who is bad and gains enormous legal power and
social status in so doing.
As has been noted in chapter two, for the past 20 years there has been a diminution of the
expected benefits of rehabilitation programmes for the reform of offenders. Since it is a
branch of medicine, which is held to be concerned with the well-being of patients and a
desire to rehabilitate those affected by illness or injury, psychiatry should be motivated to
involve itself with the treatment based, caring management of offenders. It might be
expected that psychiatrically-influenced penal practise would also have declined due to
the loss of faith in the rehabilitative effects of punishment. However, it has been argued
by Johnstone that the term 'rehabilitation' means something quite different in the penal
environment than in the medical environment442. The rehabilitative programmes of prison
regimes have always been directed towards preventing the repeat of criminal behaviour,
even if these regimes were understood broadly and encompassed general vocational and
recreational education. Whatever value might be derived by the prisoner, the focus of the
regime is not primarily aimed at making his life more comfortable by helping with
mental or physical illness, although this may be a desirable (and crime reducing) side
effect. Johnstone argues that the benefits of all penal rehabilitation programmes, unlike
medical rehabilitation programmes, are not aimed at the offender but at the offender's
future victims and society. Johnstone's argument provides evidence that a policy of
441 Lacey (2002)
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social defence is in operation in which state intervention in citizen's lives in the name of
rehabilitation, is in fact aimed at reducing reoffending regardless of whether this
treatment was in the offender's best interest443.
Johnstone's argument helps to explain how the sacred status of science is useful in
justifying a state policy of social defence, despite the absence of belief in positivist
criminological theory. Calling upon the scientific discourse of risk also helps to justify
longer than normal punishment of the type enabled in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.
Government policy can rely on the argument that whilst society may not know how to
prevent or cure 'dangerous' offender, the use of actuarial models, psychiatric diagnoses
and risk analyses can at least help to identify 'dangerous' offenders. In the absence of
any ideology strong enough to challenge the dominant scientific discourse, these types of
calculations will hardly ever be challenged. This is made clear by the fact that almost
every policy document and article on the subject of dangerousness refers to the high rates
of 'false positives'444 which result from predictive judgments of dangerousness. Yet such
evidence has been ignored in favour of a willingness to incapacitate those whom any
scientific evidence suggests may pose a threat. The overriding concern for the protection
of the public means that false positives are not important, on the other hand the
awareness of risk means that false negatives443 are totally unacceptable. The combination
of the lack of concern for the equality of offenders as citizens and the determination not
to take any chances with public safety means that a policy of using longer than normal
punishment to incapacitate the 'dangerous' is unchallenged.
The concept of dangerousness that is employed by agents of the criminal justice system
is underpinned by narrowly utilitarian (crime reductive) justifications for the prevention
of harm. A judgement of dangerousness is an assessment of the likelihood that serious
harm will be caused to others. The Floud report argued that those who deliberately place
others at risk of harm are more dangerous than the merely reckless or accident prone.
442 Johnstone (1990)
443 Johnstone's argument offers support for the view that penal interventions are
primarily aimed at producing second order benefits, as argued in chapter three.
444 Individuals identified as dangerous who would not go on to commit future dangerous
acts.
445 People who are not identified as dangerous who would go on to commit future
dangerous acts.
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However, victims and the public are concerned with the consequences of dangerous
behaviour regardless of the intent of the person whose behaviour has caused harm.
Despite this, the dangerousness provisions in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act contain
criteria for the attribution of dangerousness which do not incorporate strict liability or
accidental harm, as they are based on a predicted pattern of future behaviour. The
expectation that specific prohibitions for the reckless and those prone to endanger others
inadvertently can be enforced on the majority of these offenders, also contributes to their
not being classified as dangerous.
4.3 Dangerousness, Civilization and Control.
The process of becoming identified as deviant, criminal and dangerous may have very
little to do with the actual likelihood of the commission of harm. Obviously, a propensity
to endanger others is not confined to the mentally ill or the career criminal but defining
some people as dangerous is, in part, aimed at providing legitimacy to the process of
control446. Teubner and others maintain that the criminal law and the welfare state
together provide a potent method for determining dangerousness and managing those so
defined447. The reasons why it is found necessary or beneficial to identify 'the dangerous'
vary, but will require the group of people to be controlled to be symbolically separated
from the general community.
The theory of the 'civilizing process' put forward by Norbert Elias448 can be used to
explain how governments may exploit the public's reactions to crimes in order to bring in
controversial or coercive legislation. By appealing to the affronted sensibilities of the
majority and acting in response to particularly horrific crimes, a government can make
the introduction of such measures seem urgent, necessary and natural449. Sensibilities
also help to show 'us' who are the 'dangerous' and therefore who 'we' need to be
protected from. Even within a supposedly tolerant liberal society, those who fail to
446For a detailed discussion of social control, including the hegemony of authorities and
institutions, see Cohen (1985) passim.
447Teubner (1986) see also Garland (1985)
448Elias (1939)
449How sensibilities are communicated is an interesting question. For an analysis of the
arguments concerning the role of television in public perceptions of crime and criminals
see Sparks (1992).
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exhibit the same sensibilities as the vocal majority can be identified as deviant and
possibly dangerous. For some individuals their inability or unwillingness to share the
majority's sensibilities will be considered a pathology and they may receive help rather
than punishment. The force of Elias' argument is shown by the words which are used in
describing breaches of the criminal law. Law breakers are 'offenders', their 'offending'
actions arouse an emotional response and bring forth a demand for a punitive response.
Elias recognised that the successful co-existence of millions of people who are strangers
and have no direct vested interest in each other's welfare, results from having a shared
system of sensibilities which controls and inhibits certain behaviours. That this self
control is brought about through emotional reactions rather than e.g. despotic rule,
suggests that the internal controls are operated unconsciously and feel very natural.
Despite the mutual dependence of all, there is an impression of freedom and the limits to
freedom seem minimal and unintrusive. However, close scrutiny of any of the new
'informalisations' and freedoms reveals a structured if disguised system of controls.
Elias' interdependence thesis relies on shared systems of disapproval as a means of
preventing breaches of the prevailing sensibilities. In a similar way, Bottoms45" argues
that the primary focus of crime prevention in criminal justice systems is not in the
punishing but in social control through the communication of norms of acceptable
behaviour backed up by punishment only when necessary. This fits in with a policy of
social defence. The agencies of government, in particular the criminal justice system,
have a law-enforcement effect primarily through the articulation of social rules which
work because so few people even contemplate breaking serious rules. It varies from
individual to individual but most people would not contemplate committing the most
serious crimes unless placed in extraordinary situations. There are many crimes which
offend and cause outrage, and many crimes, of greater and lesser degree of seriousness,
that most people would not contemplate committing. Elias' argument shows that much
inhibition is the result of our attitude to criminality and each individual's perception of
him or herself rather than any lack of opportunity. The inhibitions that sensibilities bring
about are instrumental in ensuring that levels of crime remain endurable. Our reactions to
450Bottoms (1983) pi86
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crime as individuals and as society through the media ensure that the norms are
communicated to new members of the society.
As part of his analysis, Elias draws heavily upon Freudian psychoanalysis for his
description of the changes in the interactions between individuals. In essence, Freud
details the necessity of repressing, via the anxiety ridden super-ego, that part of human
psychology which is self-centred and 'free', and which otherwise might prevent the
individual from accepting and sharing the norms of society. The desires of the individual
to act purely selfishly, e.g. the driver who would arrive faster by driving through a red
light, must be repressed in order that society functions smoothly. Although the taking of
advantage by one individual does not threaten the smooth workings of the society, a
general breakdown in the norms would produce a Hobbesian state of nature, which, in a
highly integrated, modern society is counterproductive to both general and individual
well being. It is in the individual's best, long term interests that others control their
selfish desires and comply with the norms of the society in which he is living, and as a
result he has a duty to do so himself. This is, of course, a version of social contract
theory discussed in chapter three, with the difference that, for Elias, rehabilitation of the
offender results in him complying unconsciously in society's norms. Elias shared the
overall utilitarian framework of the contract theorists but the influence of Freudian
psychology suggested to him that it is the subtle instilling of the prevailing sensibilities
into the offender, until he feels they are his own, that leads to conformity rather than any
form of rational calculation about self interest.
Elias noted that, a reaction, often in the form of punishment, is triggered when an
individual or group challenges the sensibilities that enable the interdependent society to
operate smoothly. This aspect of Elias' thesis is very similar to Durkheim's account of
the integration of social life although without the excesses of Durkheim's functionalist
stance451. Durkheim believed that crime, and the punishment of it, re-enforced the unity
of society by permitting the expression of condemnation and by inhibiting members of
the community from offending or deviating; a unifying/deterrent effect. This deterrence
is achieved on Durkheim's account through the stigmatising of the individual and the re-
enforcement of the community's rules for the all members of the society. Elias, like
451 Durkheim (1902)
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Durkheim, puts forward an argument that emphasises social adaptation and the symbolic
importance of condemnation for the development of sensibilities and inhibitions.4'2
These inhibitions are necessary given an integrated, interdependent society, as
contravention of the societal norms must be punished to ensure the continued smooth
operation of the society. The punishment communicates to all in the society the reaction
and the punishment which is provoked when a prohibited action takes place.4'3
As a negative example of Elias' thesis, the failure of the criminal justice system to
operate effectively against white collar crime, and other crimes of the powerful when it is
apparent that these do cause great harm, is evidence of the absence of the sensibilities
that condemn this type of crime and which would otherwise define those who participate
in it as dangerous, which is of course, a first and essential factor in deciding who is to be
policed, prosecuted and punished. The presence of legislation to enable investigation and
prosecution in cases of white collar crime is less significant than the absence of a strong
general sensibility against it, even amongst those who are its victims. Discrimination of
'the other' is a crucial step in the process of determining who is dangerous since it is
difficult to condemn and punish 'ourselves'.
We saw that in the 1991 Act there was the explicit adoption of a penal policy which
promoted the practice of 'bifurcation'454 in the use of imprisonment. This policy sought
to discriminate between offenders who must be incarcerated in the interests of public
safety or the seriousness of their crime, and other offenders who may be punished in the
community. Implementation of this policy depends on a clear and consistent
identification of those offenders who do pose a threat to the community, those offenders
who are dangerous and the seriousness of any offence. As we saw in chapter three,
changes in attitudes to offending mean that all offending is considered serious, this
provides an easy way for sentencers to avoid having to make decisions on the dangers
posed by offenders. So the need for an assessment of 'dangerousness' is, for the most
part unnecessary, as the criteria of the seriousness of the offence can be used in the
452Durkheim claims that the conscience collective becomes less important as social life
becomes more pluralistic. The structures that underpin the integration of society are less
emotional and more pragmatic, rather than reflecting common codes of sensibilities,
ethical norms are more metaphysical, such as tolerance and freedom.
453 See also Duff (1992)
454 Bottoms (1983)
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decision to impose imprisonment. The perception of all crime as serious leads to the
perception of all criminals as being 'dangerous' and therefore of an increase in the use of
incapacitative forms of punishment, particularly of the prison. The use of scientific
assessment is really only required when a longer than normal period of imprisonment is
being contemplated under s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act. In this case the sentencer has to
arrive at a determination of the offender's likelihood of committing serious harm in
future, a decision which must be justified in a rational and scientific way.
The criminal law must, to a large extent, reflect social norms in order to retain the
support of the public. But changes in popular sensibilities need to be recognised and
absorbed into the institutional sensibilities before they can be acted upon. For example, it
was only when the issue of domestic violence became publicised and politicised, and an
issue for the middle classes, that the police and sentencers reacted accordingly, re¬
defining domestic violence as a public rather than private crime and therefore within the
scope of the criminal justice agencies455. The sensibilities of the system as well as those
of the public were re-tuned into condemning and punishing acts of violence between
marital partners. This raises the question of how far the criminal justice system can be
influenced by the refinement, change and spread of sensibilities. The knowledge that the
exploitation of sensibilities may disguise the hegemonic and manipulative behaviour of
government, and the unequal operation of power may provide opportunities to counteract
these processes.
The theory of 'the civilizing process' not only provides a compelling and distinctive
account of the actions and reactions to behaviour in society. It also points the way for
these to be harnessed in the pursuit of change. Elias' theory offers guidance for penal
reformers, prison treatment programmes and for political resistance to certain forms of
punishment. When 'dangerous' offenders are seen as human beings rather than 'the
other' then restraint will be exercised in the application of indeterminate or longer than
normal sentences. If reduction of the harm caused by crime is the aim, then inter alia it is
required that people share the sensibilities that inhibit the commission of crimes. This
gives scope for a re-evaluation of treatment and rehabilitation programmes in the penal
system. However, it also forces decision makers to accept that the inequalities in society
455 Heidensohn (2002)
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determine people's sensibilities and affect their behaviour. In a pluralistic society the
criminal law should reflect only those offences against social sensibilities which are
inclusive of most members of society. Until this occurs the sensibilities of elites will
prevail, preventing any prospect ofjustice in punishment.
The insights of Norbert Elias' theory of civilization have shown that the desire to
discriminate the 'dangerous' offender is a reaction to the perceived threat within the
chains of interdependence which enable a highly specialised modern society to function.
In this way, the concept of dangerousness is useful to the social policy apparatus which is
concerned to maintain social defence in any way it can. For a system that is concerned
with results rather than the considerations of due process and justice, the problem of the
over generalisation of scientific criminological results will not be a major concern.
4.4 Dangerousness, criminal justice and mental health
Changes in psychiatry's attitudes to its patients have been mirrored in the attitude of the
criminal justice system to the dangerous. As Johnstone points out punitive and medical
conceptions of crime and treatment have been 'harmonised'. Johnstone notes the benefits
that this has had for the study of penality.
Criminology, by framing its theories and propositions in medical-scientific terms
could utilise the scientific status, social prestige and caring image of medicine in
order to promote its medical theories and penal programme. Penal reform
programmes were likely to meet with greater success if they were expressed in
the idiom ofmedical science.456
Johnstone goes on to note that 'treatment' does not carry the same meaning when
employed in discourses of penal policy as it does when it is employed in the context of
somatic medicine. Both disciplinary mechanisms (psychiatry and the criminal justice)
have relied upon repression and incarceration for both the 'treatment' and study of their
subjects, most obviously in the sites of the asylum and prison457. Both have increasingly
widened their subject base i.e. psychiatry now focuses on more than insanity and has an
456 Johnstone (1990)
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wide sphere of interest; dysfunctional families, children, sufferers of mild depression.
Similarly, criminal justice systems have been accused of widening their net beyond their
natural subject base of law breakers (as is evidenced by the role of police in community
crime prevention activities which may in themselves lead to labelling and thus augment
crime rather than reduce it). Both psychiatry and crime control agencies have relied on
the therapeutic value of segregation, justified as being for the benefit of the offender or
patient by removing him or her from the environment that caused the deviance or illness.
However, as we saw in chapter two, when segregation could not be justified on these
grounds, it was renamed as incapacitation and was justified on the grounds that it
protects the public.
Mental illness has come to be established in the authoritative domain of psychiatrists
although this was not always so, and the management of incurable psychopathy is still
the responsibility of the criminal justice system458. The development of the criminal
justice system's concern with dangerous offenders has followed a similar pattern to that
of psychiatry's concern with its patients. It is important to be cautious in taking the
insurance metaphor too far, but it can be noted that one technique insurers use to reduce
their exposure to risk is underwriting. Underwriting excludes people deemed to be of
high risk from obtaining insurance. Psychiatrists are underwriting their patient base when
they exclude persons from their patient population and their services and study. The most
obvious group that is not currently underwritten by psychiatrists are some types of sex
offenders. Although to the lay person it would appear that certain bizarre forms of non¬
consensual sexual behaviour are indicative of mental disorder, the lack of success with
treatment of sex offenders seems to have led to a reluctance in the psychiatric profession
to acknowledge their behaviour as an illness and to supply therapeutic intervention.
Psychiatric and criminal justice techniques of control are subject to the same critiques,
these being - theoretical, institutional, juridical and technological. The processes of
becoming criminalised and psychiatrically diagnosed are similar, as are the consequences
of obtaining such a label. Both institutions have been criticised for the power that is held
over their subjects and for their perceived creation of a need for control over an
increasingly large number of people. By medicalising and publicising deviance both
457 Foucault (1977)
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institutions establish a need for their services and are thus their own advocates in the
justification of their activities. And of course both claim to unambiguously work in the
best interests of the public as well as of offender/patients.
The concept of 'treatment' for psychiatry and the criminal justice system has shown a
historical shift in the notion of who treatment is aimed at benefiting. Of course it has
usually been assumed that it is the patient or the offender who would be cured of his
illness or offending behaviour with the happy consequence that the just as the offender's
life improves so would the condition of others who would no longer be at risk from the
offender/patient's deviant behaviour. However, as was noted in chapter three, it is
increasingly obvious that it is the public who are seen as the chief beneficiaries of
treatment, and that the aim of treatment is to prevent a recurrence of deviant behaviour
regardless of whether this also contributes to an improvement in the circumstances of the
offender or patient. Ultimately, if deviance cannot be reduced to acceptable levels
through treatment, incapacitation is used to guarantee the protection of the public.
The classification of an individual as 'dangerous' is a socially influenced judgement.
This has so far failed to be taken into account by the criminal justice system which has
sought to relinquish the 'diagnosis' into the hands of pseudo 'experts' including judges.
Unfortunately, even medically qualified and experienced experts are not very good at
predicting uncommon events such as violent behaviour459, so it is natural that their lay
colleagues prefer to err on the side of caution. The likely result is that this results in the
imposition of many unnecessary incapacitative sentences. Notions of the treatable and
the unbeatable also have changed throughout the century with the rise and fall in the
popularity of the rehabilitative ethic in both psychiatry and criminology. We saw in
chapter one that psychiatry is still in a process of defining its patient population to
include only those who are amenable to treatment and cure, with the residue being left to
the management of the criminal justice system. There is an apparent reluctance to see
much offending behaviour as related to patient's mental health problems. This is partly
because the definition of those who are appropriate subjects for psychiatric rather than
criminal justice intervention is controlled, determined and safeguarded by the pseudo-
expertise of the courts.
458 Peay (2002)
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There is an abundance of studies concerned with the empirical prediction of
dangerousness460. Predictive studies are vulnerable to criticism on methodological
grounds because of problems of limited time scales and small sample size and due to the
perennial problem of ascertaining levels of offending due to the 'dark figure' of crime,
i.e. the number of offences that are not reported and/or recorded. There is considerable
expense and professional risk in compiling results from long term follow-up research.
The consensus seems to be that the most methodologically sound of the cited research on
the prediction of dangerousness takes the form of following the behaviour of patients
diagnosed as being dangerous after they have been released from hospital or prison. The
well-known Baxtrom461 case details the circumstances of a group of allegedly dangerous
mentally ill patients who were released following court decisions which determined that
they had been detained unconstitutionally. The researchers followed the progress of a
sample of the patients after release and found the levels of dangerous and criminal
behaviour to be very low and concluded that the incapacitation ofmost of these patients
had been unnecessary. The Baxtrom case is interesting because it allows for analysis of
the false positive and false negative rates of the same group of offenders (although, as the
Butler committee noted, caution must be exercised as a result of the advanced age of
many of these patients when released, which may have had an effect on their offending
behaviour).
The Baxtrom case raises many questions for the disposal of the dangerous person in
either the prison or hospital systems. As Bottoms notes, the concerns of the Butler
Committee were with the mentally abnormal offender who is identified as being
dangerous during the progress of his sentence. The Baxtrom case centres around a patient
who was diagnosed as dangerous and then transferred to a secure hospital at the end of
his prison sentence. Obviously, such a disposal would still be open to the authorities if
the offender was seen to come under the powers of the appropriate Mental Health Act.
However, the reviewable sentence which the Butler Committee proposed relies on
sentencers identifying all dangerous persons at the time of sentencing, which does not
address their original problem of how to incapacitate those not identified as such whose
459 Gunn (1996)
460 Prins (1986) pp 87ff and Floud and Young (1981) Appendix C.
461Prins (1995), Bottoms (1977), Home Office and DHSS (1975).
174
term of imprisonment is approaching an end. It is quite probable that the prison medical
and other authorities, in close contact with the offender for a period of several years, will
reach a different assessment of many offenders' dangerousness than the judge passing
sentence some years earlier, even if he or she is given access to a great many expert
opinions462.
Both the psychiatric and juridical systems seek to regulate social behaviours. Both
systems operate on theoretical and technical levels. It is by distinguishing these different
levels that we understand the phenomena that psychiatry and the criminal justice system
seek to regulate. We cannot seek a definition of madness or criminality by looking for
these categories in isolation from the powerful institutions that control the management
of such behaviour. In any case categories such as 'madness' and 'crime' are only partial
elements of the behaviour that comes under the sphere of influence of these institutions,
both now claim to have a social vocation that ensure that their influence reaches more
broadly that their particular patient/ offender base would suggest. As well, psychiatric
and juridical structures must be understood in a context of competing and intersecting
social practices and agencies. To understand these social regulators we need to
understand the heterogeneity of their ideologies, origins, practices and methodologies.
We saw in chapter one that the solution to the problem of predicting, controlling and
treating those persons who constitute a danger to others has often been sought within a
scientific paradigm. For the first two thirds of the 20th century, both criminologists and
psychiatrists have assumed that the answer lay within a dominant positivist methodology.
Assumptions were and still are made concerning the success of the aggregation of
information and the generalisation of data from individuals to groups. Failures to
accurately predict 'dangerous' behaviour are attributed to the deficiency of the data
rather than any theoretical shortcomings. Despite the decline by policy makers in the
belief in positivist ideology to come up with workable solutions, criminologists till cling
to these old methods and approaches. The possibility that the data would necessarily
always be insufficient for this methodological weakness to be overcome is rarely
contemplated. If it were, the lives, careers and choices of honest individuals who are
462To quote Norris (1982)'The courts... allow much greater reliance to be placed on
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness than does the organised profession of
psychiatry', Duff and Garland (1995) p244
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aiming to improve the world would come under critical review. The potential for a
finding a conceptual space which allows for uncertainty, chance or randomness is largely
ignored as being metaphysical nonsense463.
Medicine is an example of one of the most 'sacred' sciences in modem society,
principally as a result of the great success manifest in the improvement in people's
longevity and well-being. Although medical knowledge can be obtained by a lay person,
and there are substitutes for it in the form of herbal, homeopathic and folk treatments for
disease and ailments, it remains the case that traditional medical practitioners are
privileged to hold a high status that is very seldom challenged. When medical care is
subject to criticism that critique is usually in the form of accusing the individual medical
practitioner of failure to meet the highest standards of the discipline rather than a critique
of the discipline and its authority. Criminology cannot be said to enjoy the same high
status as a knowledge. However, it does obtain much of its authority through a parasitic
affiliation with the discourses of science, medicine and psychiatry. The two discourses of
criminology and psychiatry are intimately related through a common foundation in
modernity, a shared methodological framework and a similarity of goals. The theoretical
basis upon which the two knowledges operate are similar and they can be seen to be
cross fertilising in their empirical and theoretical developments throughout the twentieth
century.
The concept of 'dangerousness' is flexible enough to capture people who commit
prohibited violent and sexual acts whether they are considered to be rational or non-
rational. The representation of the criminal as being responsible for his actions is clearly
influenced by the concept of rationality. Responsibility presupposes rationality but in the
criminal justice system rationality is considered in a particular and technical way464. An
assessment of the rationality of an act consists in examining the reason a particular
criminal activity might provide some benefit to the offender that is greater than the risk
of punishment. This cost/benefit analysis, strongly economic in its style, is simple
enough when it come to accounting for crimes ofmaterial gain such as robbery, burglary
and trading in stolen goods or illegal drugs and to the cathartic release provided by some




forms of violence. However, the model of costs and benefits is less useful when it comes
to 'anomic' activities such as vandalism, or when the benefits of crime are not material
but psychological, e.g. the emotional arousal and feeling of dominance gained through
some violent or sexual crimes.
Duster465 argues that the imputation of rationality is itself a social construction. He gives
hypothetical examples of a poor woman who steals, where the motive is apparent - she
needs money to feed her children. In this case there is obviously a rational 'explanation'
for the theft therefore the intent is assumed, she is found guilty and sentenced
accordingly. Duster contrasts this case with a rich woman in possession ofmany material
goods who also steals. Because there is no need for the woman to steal in order to satisfy
her needs, her actions are deemed to indicate an aberrant state of mind i.e. illness rather
than criminal intent, and the woman is referred for psychiatric treatment. The absence of
a rational explanation in the latter case (and a determined rejection of the simple
explanation that rich people may be also be covetous), leads to the conclusion that the
action is the result of illness rather than choice and the offender is relieved of
responsibility for her actions.
A similar functional process can be seen in the defining of certain forms of dangerous
behaviour as either criminal or pathological. Behaviour such as violent rape is, as far as
is known, relatively uncommon466. It is certainly abnormal, disconnected from the
physical and emotional engagement that arises in (even casual) consensual sexual
behaviour and often there seems to be no rational explanation relating to its commission.
Yet psychiatrists are reluctant to diagnose sex offenders as being mentally ill unless the
behaviour becomes extremely deviant and socially repugnant e.g. necrophilic or
gerontophilic behaviour. However, given the comments of Douglas, Bloor and others
concerning the social construction of science and the importance of maintaining the
mystique of science, this should not be surprising. As a profession psychiatrists have
little to gain by the adoption of this group of offenders into their patient base. The
treatment methods available are of uncertain benefit and the risk of professional criticism
in the event of inaccurate prediction (both false positives but especially false negatives)
465 Duster (1970)
466 j exclude consideration of the use of mass rape as a technique of warfare from this
discussion.
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is high. The reluctance to take responsibility for serious violent and troubled offenders
has elicited little sympathy from some commentators. Greenland remarks;
until more efficient and humane methods are developed and sanctioned by
society, clinical psychiatrists should stop being apologetic and defensive and
accept these difficult, and often thankless tasks as part of their professional and
legal mandate.467
When a person posing a threat is not capable of rational argument or when it is assumed
that a rational argument from the person's point of view will still result in criminal
action, then the likelihood of harm from dangerous behaviour is felt to be especially
acute. Thus the two most characteristic types of dangerous offender are those not capable
of rational argument (mentally dispordered) and those who believe the benefits of crime
outweigh the risks (recidivist or career criminal). In both these stereotypes of dangerous
offender, there is an underlying perception that the usual social constraints that deter
most people from committing crime are absent or ineffective. There is also the feeling
that the results of individual deterrence (i.e. punishment) are likely to be less effectual
for these offenders. As a result of these scarcely articulated beliefs concerning the
difference between 'normal' and 'dangerous' persons, the state justifies treating
'dangerous' offenders differently from 'normal' offenders.
We saw in chapter two that current Western penal systems are recognisably a cocktail of
classical deterrence and retribution theories together with a positivist theory of scientific
prediction and correction all attempting to deliver a (utilitarian) reduction in, or total
prevention of, dangerous behaviour. Confusion arises where there is conflict between the
primacy of legal safeguards and due process considerations of classical theory, as against
the pragmatic, predictive and behaviourist foundations of positivism. Bottoms468 draws
attention to the competing assumptions of classical and positivist penal theories with
respect to their definitions of dangerous offenders. As well as an inherent contradiction
in what is considered legitimate for the penal system to act upon, past or future conduct,
these differing schools of thought promote divergent accounts of who or what constitutes
a dangerous offender or dangerous act.
467 Greenland, quoted in Prins (1986) p88
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The introduction of mitigation into the classical theory required positivist methodology
to be used in the legal exercise of determining liability, culpability and in the disposal of
those deemed guilty. In particular, positivist methodology in the form of expert evidence
becomes important in assessing the mental states of those before their court, in order to
ascertain their legal status as defendants, their responsibility for their actions and
crucially, their dangerousness. As Peters notes:
the criteria for decision making in the administration of criminal justice assumed
an increasingly non-legal, 'scientific', character. Thus traditional legal concepts
made way for the scientific, or pseudo-scientific, categories of psychiatry and
criminology.469
4.5 Rationality and Dangerousness
We saw in chapter one that the English criminal justice system has long struggled with
the goal of averting certain types of harm. Various strategies have been adopted in the
interest of reducing harm by preventing crime, most obviously through the existence of
deterrent penalties and the use of rehabilitation and incapacitation as part of the process
of punishment. The mere presence of penalties assumes that citizens are rational: i.e. that
citizens who do not commit crime do so, at least in part, because they might suffer
unpleasant consequences if they are caught, convicted and punished. Nevertheless, there
exist people who frustrate the law's assumption of rationality. There are those persons
who do not refrain from crime despite the severity of potential punishment, or who,
having committed crime, are not hindered from committing further crime as a result of
the unpleasant and/or therapeutic things done to them in the name of retribution and
rehabilitation.
Those offenders who are subject to rehabilitation and incapacitation are often assumed
not to be rational e.g. mentally disordered offenders, offenders who act while
automatons, children. The desires of such offenders are either: not amenable to rational
468 Bottoms (1977)
179
deterrence (non rational); or, the desire for the perceived rewards of crime is so intense
that the threshold for being deterred by punishment is high enough for the person to be
prepared to take a risk that others would not (objectively irrational). In extreme cases of
non rationality where the desires cannot be controlled, the criminal law may respond by
acquitting the offender of responsibility for the crime, as occurs with the defense of
insanity. For those who are deemed rational but nevertheless do not make the 'right'
decision the criminal justice system's response (i.e. the punishment) is designed either to
change the individual - to make them in some sense more (objectively) rational, more
normally deferrable (which may happen merely through the passing of time or result
from the pain of punishment), or to incapacitate the offender so that they are unable to
offend.
Of course, the law does not deem all offenders to be non-rational or irrational. It
recognizes that there are many rational reasons for offending although it does not
normally approve of them. But it is certainly not the case that all offenders without an
objectively good reason for offending are deemed irrational. Indeed if this were the case
this could provide problems for finding of guilt since some forms of mens rea and actus
reus clearly require rationality. It may be possible to decide to do something on the basis
of a non-rational process such as flipping a coin, but once the intention is formed, a
rational process is required to carry it out (or to decide that it is not worth carrying out).
The rational process of committing a crime is an indication of the person's desire and
motivation and this in turn reveals the intention, i.e. the mens rea of the person at the
time of the offence. In a similar way, an argument can be made that recklessness and
negligence are rational strategies, since to ignore an undesirable possible outcome of
one's behaviour is just the prioritizing of present pleasure over potential future pain, and
this is rational if the future pain is considered to be sufficiently improbable. On the other
hand, a person may desire to commit an offence and intend to commit it in a certain place
and time but decide on rational grounds that the act should be deferred or abandoned, in
which case there is no actus reus and no crime. So the law does not require that the
decision to do something illegal is rational for there to be a finding of guilt, but the
rational process adopted in carrying out an illegal act is an indication of the required
mental state for the finding of guilt.
469 Peters (1988) p28 see also Garland (1994b)
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The criminal law has a conception of rationality which is of the following kind:
(R) If any agent x, wants d, and x believes that the illegal act a is the best way to
attain d under the circumstances, then x does a rationally.
For an offender to be accepted as non-rational the following must hold:
(N) If any agent x, wants d, and x commits the illegal act a in order to attain d
under any circumstances, then x does a non-rationally.
For the most part, the law assumes that offenders are rational in the sense that (R)
describes. The majority of the non-offending citizens who also desire d, may act equally
rationally but do not find the illegal act a to be the best way of attaining d (e.g. they
purchase the goods rather than steal them) or prefer to go without d rather than commit
the illegal act a and risk the possibility of being punished. As part of the rational
calculation the possibility of punishment as well as the likelihood of other unpleasant
consequences (loss of status etc.) are relevant to a determination of whether the illegal
act is the best way of achieving d.
The decision as to the best way of achieving d is always subjective to the person making
the calculation and will be based on imperfect information and of estimates of expected
utility. Hence it follows that (R) is also a description of irrationality, where the 'best'
way to attain d under the circumstances is subjectively rational for the offender but does
not appear rational to others. The vagueness of the concept of rationality entails that it is
not necessary for an offender to be totally non rational to be considered mentally
disordered. At the point where the objective rationality of the offender's actions seems so
far removed from the rationality of 'normal' persons, the law will take the view that the
offender is mentally disordered.
Notwithstanding those cases of objective irrationality that are considered to indicate
mental disorder, the law considers most offenders to be rational. But there are some
offenders whose behaviour makes the attribution of rationality difficult from the
standpoint of the expectations of the criminal justice system. As we have seen, the
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system need not concern itself overly with rationality except insofar as it helps determine
guilt, but the rationality of offenders is relevant to the question of punishment. Those
who are most frustrating because they do not conform with the assumptions of penal
psychology are repeat petty offenders and those offenders who are deemed dangerous.
Repeat offenders seem to be undeterred by the law's penalties (both possible and actual)
as a result in some jurisdictions they are punished disproportionately to ensure they are
incapacitated (e.g. 'three strikes' - type sentencing strategies) 470.
The way the criminal justice system responds to 'dangerous' offenders is informed by the
system's assumptions of their rationality or irrationality. These decisions influence the
extent to which the state can justify infringing the rights and freedoms of those deemed
dangerous. So-called 'dangerous' offenders are frustrating to a modern criminal justice
system because the assumption is that the offender's very dangerousness makes him or
her resistant to 'normal' calculating processes. These processes should result in him or
her being deterred from future offending by the threat of sanctions or the memory of past
sanctions (or treatment). As with other offenders it may well be that the dangerous
behaviour is sufficiently pleasurable or rewarding to outweigh the potential risks and
costs. The court cannot conclude the offender is non-rational and not susceptible to
rational calculations of the type assumed in penal theory and the criminal law without
acquitting that person of responsibility. In fact, since those offenders who are subject to
longer than normal punishment are found guilty there is a presumption of subjective
rationality even if the behaviour appears irrational to objective onlookers such as the
court.
The case of the repeat petty offender who is acting rationally, and the dangerous offender
who is acting (objectively) irrationally, contrast with the case of the disease carrying
person. Imagine the worst case of a disease that can be transmitted very quickly from
person to person without physical contact and with serious consequences for the newly
infected person. In such cases, whether the carrier of the disease acts rationally or not in
trying to prevent transmission, there is little that he or she can do. Nothing short of
470 An appeal to rationality makes it clear why such strategies are likely to fail to deter
offenders. Although the costs of repeated convictions under such a sentencing system are
high, the low risk of any particular offence triggering a conviction makes rational each
instance of offending.
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isolation (quarantine) can prevent the transmission of the disease. Assuming the
unfortunate carrier of the disease is not wanting to pass on the disease, the rationality of
the carrier is irrelevant. All his or her actions (rational or not) pose a threat until and
unless he or she is placed in quarantine. Nothing he or she chooses to do (apart from
entering quarantine) reduces the harm that he or she poses. We cannot for example point
out that it would be in his or her best interests to refrain from spreading the disease since
the disease carrier has no control over its spread. Unless he or she resists going into
quarantine, he or she is not culpable for any subsequent transmission of the disease as it
is beyond the diseased person's power to do anything to stop it.
Drawing on an argument from the previous chapter, it is important to see where the
distribution of benefits lies in the demand that a person or offender be placed in
quarantine. In the medical case it is difficult to see what first order benefit can be
obtained by the imposition of quarantine on a diseased person. The unfortunate carrier of
a disease is already infected, and there is little or no advantage in treatment for the
person to be placed in quarantine, the benefit of the state's enforcement of quarantine is
entirely second order. The most that can be hoped is that the disease carrier receives the
first order benefit of relief at not infecting others. The rationality of the disease carrier is
irrelevant to the imposition of quarantine as his or her behaviour and its motivation
cannot effect the transmission of disease, except to the extent that the individual submits
to the quarantine.
The situation is different for the 'dangerous' person who is subject to measures of
'quarantine'. For the situation to be equivalent, the 'dangerous' behaviour of the
individual must be unavoidable. Such behaviour must be beyond the control of the
'dangerous' offender and beyond the scope of deterrent or rehabilitative measures. In
contrast to the medical case, in order to qualify for quarantine, the incapacitated person
must be non rational, as any rational person would be able to control their dangerous
tendencies (and would be liable to proportionate punishment if and when a dangerous act
is committed). As in the medical case, detention can be justified only when nothing short
of containment can prevent the commission of a dangerous act. But in this case the
individual placed in 'quarantine' receives the first order benefit of not being punished as
the 'dangerous' act is prevented by the restrictions of quarantine. Although this is a
somewhat artificial example, taking as it does an extreme view of the evidential
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certainties with respect to dangerous behaviour, it does show the theoretical possibility
that some form of 'quarantine' may bring about first order benefits for a 'dangerous'
person. Thus, for the non rational dangerous person, who is unable to control his or her
own future serious violent or sexual offending, 'quarantine' in the form of civil detention
can be legitimate and justified providing as it does first and second order benefits. Note
however that, in practice, the evidential requirements rule out the use of civil detention.
The Floud report takes a slightly different perspective on the issue of quarantine which
they consider is a useful counterpart of preventive sentencing. If quarantine can be
justified, they argue, then preventive sentencing can also be justified. The Committee
argued that the state cannot interfere with a citizen's right to be presumed harmless
unless that person has committed a dangerous act of the kind that the state is seeking to
prevent.471 The evidential difficulties are therefore not so acute as with longer than
normal sentencing under the 1991 Criminal Justice Act as they require past behaviour of
the same type and degree of seriousness to provide evidence for future behaviour.
However the report privileges procedural mechanisms over accuracy in individual cases
since they note that:
The correctness of a predictive judgement cannot depend on our being justifiably
certain that an offender will actually reoffend... it depends primarily on the
soundness and reliability of an assessment of his disposition to inflict harm.
Whether, if he is let at large, he will actually do harm is very much a matter of
chance472.
The report does not consider the case of a person who has been found guilty of a
qualifying though not serious violent or sexual offence whom it is thought will go on to
commit a serious violent and sexual offence. However, they do consider the use of civil
preventive detention of the innocent (unconvicted) 'dangerous' person. The committee
was keen to find an argument that approves the use of quarantine and protective
sentencing but rules out preventive civil containment. In order to do this they rely on the
concept of 'intention' and arrive at the somewhat strange view that the state can
incapacitate citizens who are liable to cause unintentional harm (this enables quarantine)
471 Floud and Young (1981) p44
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but cannot incapacitate citizens who intend harm but have not committed a dangerous act
(this rules out civil preventive detention)473.
4.6 Rights, Rationality and Dangerousness
Discussions of the role of rationality or reason in the law go back at least to Aristotle
whose account in the Physics describes biological creatures, and hence humans, as being
changeable. According to Aristotle, human beings are able to order their behaviour
according to rational understanding, indeed this rational behaviour is seen as human
kind's most defining characteristic. This concept of alteration, the idea that through
reason humans are able to make choices to determine a course of action, to modify,
moderate and decide their own actions, is constitutive of the concept of a person which is
the foundation of the politics and law of liberal societies.
Rationality is not equivalent to free will although they are related concepts. A person
needs free will in order to be rational but not vice versa. One can have free will but
exercise it non-rationally, as in the example given above of forming an intention through
the toss of a coin. The liberal political society is premised on the idea of rationality rather
than free will since it appeals to ideas of social contract and the interdependence of
individuals living in communities. It is this rational appeal to self interest via the interest
of the group that underpins the idea of the modern liberal society and which generates the
need for the protections of individual rights from the demands of majorities and the
powerful.
Aristotle's conception of human beings as rational and teleological is also the foundation
of the concept of rights as promulgated by the United Nation's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights issued in 1948, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed by member states in 1950 and the UK's
Human Rights Act of 1998. These documents put forward a theory of rights arising from
the concepts of freedom of choice and freedom of action which is grounded in rational
decision making. Because human beings are creatures able to make free and rational
472 Floud and Young (1981) p 57
473 The 'quarantine' argument in Floud and Young (1981) has been criticised in Bottoms
and Brownsword (1982)
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choices, they have certain fundamental rights, primarily the (limited) right to act upon the
choices they make however irrational those choices seem to others. On this view, to take
away the opportunity to exercise rational choice is to take away the most fundamental of
human rights, indeed to take away the right to act on choices takes away the feature that
defines what it is to be human.
The model which protects the rights of the individual arises from the concept of a person
as maximally exercising rational choice but which recognizes the need for some of the
choices of the individual to be curtailed in order to permit social cohesion. The
conception of rights put forward in the documents listed above is predominantly
negative, preferring to afford protection against interference in the exercise of rational,
freely chosen behaviour rather than to specify the positive benefits a person can demand
from his or her community. This is a consequence of the tacit limitation of certain
freedoms by individuals in the construction of the liberal state and society. The state has
a role in protecting the (negative) rights of individuals, since individuals have already
given up substantial freedoms in order to maintain the smooth operation of social life.
This protection is necessary to act as a curb on the unrestrained desires of the majority to
act in their own best interest, and to enable people to choose what is in their own best
interests without having such choices imposed on them by the state. Thus the state is
constructed through a (rational) derogation of individual freedoms but in exchange must
act to preserve essential individual rights against the excessive demands of the majority.
The European Convention on Human Rights sets out a diet ofminimum rights and states
such as the UK which accept these rights have an obligation to protect the rights of
individual citizens under the convention. However, the state also has a right to protect the
interests of community values against the preferences of individuals. Communitarian
values may hinder the protection of individual rights in a variety of ways. Ashworth
reminds us:
In political terms communitarian theories may be found on a spectrum from the
Left to the Right. What they share is an insistence on placing community values
above individual preferences. For left-of-center communitarians the argument is
that liberal theories have tended to focus excessively on the rights of the
individual, failing to recognize that rights are ineffective without the practical
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power to exercise them, and ignoring the need for co-operation in many matters
if individuals are to realize their goals. Right-of-center communitarians, on the
other hand, tend to argue that concepts such as human rights are inimical to
public safety and handicap the legal system in its endeavor to protect innocent
citizens from malefactors474.
Ashworth's depiction of the position of right-of-center communitarians clearly chimes
with the aims of an incapacitative penal policy such as that used in s.2(2)(b) of the 1991
Criminal Justice Act and is a version of the crime control model of criminal justice. The
left communitarian difficulty with individual rights is a paternalistic variant of social
contract theory. It holds that citizens are prone to lose some rights (e.g. the right to
safety) unless the state intervenes to prevent the exercise of some other rights (e.g. the
right to act on choices which harm others). The communitarian argument surely is correct
to assert that, in the context of the UK's version of liberalism, the state does have an
obligation to endeavor to protect innocent citizens from malefactors. The state has an
obligation to do so since individuals give up their freedom to arm and defend themselves
against certain types of harm, and since citizens fund the criminal justice system through
taxes.
It seems the state has conflicting obligations, both to protect the liberty of individuals and
to protect the community against those same individual's harmful acts. How does the law
resolve the issue of competing obligations? Can there be distinctions between different
types of obligations or is one of these obligations not an obligation at all. To consider
this question, it is useful to consider John Searle's discussion of prima facie
obligations475.
Consider the following forms of relations:
(a) Ahas an obligation to do A
(b) A" has a duty to do A
(c) It would be a good thing ifXdid A
(d) Xought, other things being equal, to do A
474 Ashworth (1996)
475 Searle (1978) (examples slightly modified).
187
(e) X ought to do A
(f) All things considered, Xought to do A
As Searle remarks, in classic conflict situations, (a) entails (d) , but not (e) or (f). In fact,
as he goes on to say, the assertion of (a) is consistent with the denial of (f) and the
assertion of (g):
(g) All things considered, Xought not to do A
To give an example, if I am X and A is giving a lecture. Then it follows from (a) that I
have an obligation to give my lecture. This entails (d) that I ought, other things being
equal, to give the lecture. However, it does not entail (e) that I should give the lecture
simpliciter, nor does it entail (f) that all things considered I ought to give the lecture. I
may encounter a road accident on my way to the university and be able to offer life
saving assistance to the injured which would entail (g) that, all things considered, I
should not give my lecture. That is to say, my encountering the accident does not mean
that I do not still have an obligation to give my lecture, I do. But I also have an obligation
to help the injured accident victims, and, all things considered this is a stronger
obligation than the obligation I have to give my lecture476.
If we use Searle's distinction between obligations simpliciter and obligations all things
considered, where does this leave us in resolving the state's dual obligations to protect
the liberty of citizens but to also protect the safety of citizens? In the present case there is
a sense that there is a genuine obligation in both cases. So it is not convenient to say, as
Ross477 does, that if you have inconsistent obligations, then at least one of them is not
really an obligation, but is only a prima facie obligation. In the dangerousness case, the
state has conflicting obligations to both the person deemed dangerous and to the public.
This can be formalised as follows:
1. Op & Oq & - 0 (p&q)
476 Note that I cannot morally eschew my obligation to give all my lectures by seeking out
people who urgently require assistance - Nor do I have an absolute obligation to help all
people in need as e.g. a medical doctor does under the Hippocratic Oath.
477 Ross (1930)
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There is an obligation to do p and an obligation to do q but it is not possible to
both p and q.
But if one of the obligations is an obligation all things considered (O*) it follows that:
2. (0*p & Oq & - 0 (p&q)) =3 (0*p & -0*q)
An obligation all things considered over-rules any obligation with which it is in
conflict.
But importantly, it is not valid to say that:
3. -0*q id -Oq
Just because there is not an obligation to do q (all things considered) this doesn't
mean that there is not an obligation to do q (at all).
Searle's formulation is useful because it allows that there can be inconsistent obligations
without denying that both obligations exist. Nevertheless, we still have an empirical
problem: in the dangerousness case, since the obligations are prima facie incompatible,
one (and at most one) of the obligations must be an O*, i.e. an obligation all things
considered rather than an obligation simpliciter. It is a constitutional and political
judgement that determines which obligation is the O*, and this question brings us back to
rationality and rights, quarantine and incarceration.
So, under the 1991 Criminal Justice Act once a person has been found guilty it is not
necessary to take account of his or her rationality before considering punishment. The
rationality is assumed for all offenders not explicitly dealt with under provisions set aside
for the mentally disordered. Those offenders who have been convicted of a violent or
sexual offence and are assumed rational may be subject to a judgement of dangerousness
if it is thought that there is some risk that they will commit a serious violent or sexual
offence in future. The offender is receiving a extra dose of punishment (i.e. a longer term
of imprisonment) on the basis of something that he or she might do but has not yet done.
Whether or not the offender is morally liable to this sentence is a question that relates to
his or her rationality.
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There is obviously a questions of rights here, which brings us back to the question of the
state's conflicting obligations. In this specific case, the conflict is between the right to
liberty of individuals who have committed a violent or sexual offence, and the right of
each member of the public not to be the victim of a serious violent or sexual offence.
Given that both of the state's obligations are genuine and cannot be abrogated, one of
them must be an 'obligation all things considered' rather than an obligation simpliciter.
Let us take the obligation of the state to protect the rights of citizens from serious violent
or sexual offences. The first point to be noted is that the state can never guarantee to
protect its citizens from harm, in particular it cannot guarantee to protect its citizens from
harm caused by other citizens. If the state were to do this, the protective elements that
would be involved would probably be more than most of us are prepared to tolerate. Such
measures might include CCTV in the home, curfews for all, a ban on alcohol
consumption. This would clearly be an incursion into a broader set of liberties that do
indeed offer the potential for harm, and occasionally the risk of serious harm. But to
guarantee every citizen's freedom not to be a victim of crime entails taking away
freedom in just about all other areas of life and replacing them with a 'big brother' state.
The government does have an obligation to protect the public from victimisation, but
only up to a point, it is not an obligation all things considered. Practical as well as
principled argument makes that clear. It would obviously be unimaginably expensive to
attempt to prevent all serious violent and sexual crime and impossible to achieve in
practice. Treating this obligation as a prioritising obligation all things considered would
inhibit human freedoms in many ways. It would curtail the freedom to engage in all acts
that the state sees as being (objectively) irrational and harmful. The paradigm example of
such behaviour is consensual sado-masochism. Indeed the protection of individuals
against harms defined as being against their best interests could also be taken to mean
protection against all threats to the political structures and the status quo thus inhibiting
political challenge and social change.
The state has an obligation simpliciter to protect citizens from victimisation, but that
obligation does not persist in the face of other considerations such as the right to privacy
and freedom to act in consensual if objectively harmful ways. In short, citizens have a
right to protection from victimisation but do not have a right to be protected from all and
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every harm. We would not want it that way and it would be an infringement of our
liberty for the state to force this 'freedom' upon its citizens.
But perhaps the government's obligation to protect the liberty of the 'dangerous'
offender is also an obligation simpliciter. Are there conditions under which the
government does not have an obligation to ensure this right? Under the political structure
within which rights are constituted, the right to liberty is a consequence of human beings
exercising rational choice. This includes a right to choose to commit (or not) a serious
violent or sexual offence. Since these offenders have been deemed rational (or at least
not been diagnosed as non-rational or grossly irrational), to take away the individual's
right to act (or not) on a rational choice is to take away what Aristotle and others
consider the foundation of humanity. Imprisoning a person because they might commit a
serious violent or sexual offence (even though they have not yet done so) is to seriously
undermine their status as a rational human being.
The state cannot argue that being dangerous is similar to having an infectious disease
which requires quarantine. In the quarantine case, which is reserved for only the most
serious and contagious of diseases, the diagnosis is relatively easy (although it is always
possible to have false positives). The probability of the transmission of the disease is
easier to determine, and there is no way to prevent the infection from being transmitted
other than quarantine. These practical features contrast markedly with the offender who
is held to be dangerous and is subjected to a longer than normal term of imprisonment as
a result. The person has not (yet) committed a dangerous act so it is very hard to make
the 'diagnosis'; estimates of the likelihood of a particular individual committing a serious
offence are generally accepted to be very unreliable (or make a prediction that there is a
very low probability of such future offending). There are also other less intrusive ways to
protect the community from potentially dangerous offenders (enhanced support on
release from prison, tagging etc.).
For those deemed 'dangerous' to be imprisoned for longer than they deserve is a breach
of the obligations of the state to protect the liberty of its citizens all things considered.
The state's obligation to protect citizens from harm is an important obligation but it is an
obligation simpliciter and can be revoked by other obligations that hold when all things
are considered. Rational offenders inflicted with extra punishment are deprived of the
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opportunity to exercise rationality and hence are being denied their right to act as human
beings. If an offender goes on to commit dangerous acts, the state has an obligation to
protect the public from him or her, but until the act is committed, the offender has the
same right to liberty as other rational members of the community.
4.7 Science, mental health and rationality
Zimring and Hawkins note the late 20th century disillusionment with the rehabilitative
ethic, and the longstanding doubt concerning the efficacy of rehabilitation in prisons.
They point to the growth of a consensus of opinion, particularly in the USA but also in
Britain that justifies the use of prisons to incapacitate large numbers of offenders478.
However, they have rightly pointed out that 'incapacitation' means different things to
different groups. There are widely different conceptions of how many and for what
reasons offenders should be incapacitated. Zimring and Hawkins suggest that the
argument in favour of imprisoning only a few seriously dangerous offenders to ensure
public protection, known as selective incapacitation, is subject to considerable problems.
These problems chiefly concern the difficulty in discrimination of the dangerous, and the
differential disposal of offenders who commit similar offences: the latter being a
complaint that was also levelled at the discredited rehabilitative ethic.
Zimring and Hawkins argue that, as a result of problems in predicting and discriminating
the dangerous, the momentum of incapacitation has turned away from selective
incapacitation and towards incapacitating generally. This is justified on the grounds of
both control of less serious and property crime and the protection of the public from
serious violent crime. Although the use of incapacitation does not rule out the attempt to
employ a rehabilitative regime in the course of imprisonment or other containing
punishment, incapacitation becomes the dominant justification for a certain type of
punishment. What is striking is the similarity of the aims that have persisted during the
shift from a rehabilitative justification for imprisonment to an incapacitative justification
of imprisonment. In both systems the aim is straightforward crime control and although
the supporters of these different regimes may argue that there are benefits for the
478 Zimring and Hawkins (1995)
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offender in their preferred penal regime such benefits are welcome additional but not
necessary consequences of the regimes.
At the level of individuals, incapacitation is a less ambitious project than rehabilitation
and hence more easily achieved. Obviously, it is possible to guarantee the incapacitation
of an offender so long as that person is held securely in custody, but it is impossible to
guarantee his or her rehabilitation. Someone locked in a prison is prevented from
committing crimes in the public domain although he or she is not, of course, prevented
from committing crimes against fellow prisoners or prison staff. Advocates of a policy of
general incapacitation argue that it provides for a maximum level of safety for society -
avoidance of what Thomas calls 'manifest disaster criteria' which would demonstrate the
failure of the penal system to perform its task, that task being the 'removal of recalcitrant
members of society'479.
Psychiatric intervention also operates by removing the mentally ill members of society,
sometimes through physical means such as compulsory hospitalisation but also through
drug therapies and intensive supervision. Incapacitation has a long history in both
psychiatry and penality. Traditionally it has been justified in both domains as being the
therapeutic removal of an individual from an environment likely to make him or her
deviant through illness or illegality. In this form incapacitation (at least in its rhetoric)
was directed to benefiting the offender-patient and was pursued as a treatment. But as we
saw in chapters one and two, a change occurred in the late 20th century with respect to the
incapacitation of both criminals and the mentally ill. The justification was no longer that
the incapacitation was imposed and structured in the best interest of the patient. Rather,
incapacitation was justified as providing protection for the public from the deviant and
criminal behaviour of the offender or patient. As was noted in chapter three,
incapacitation is still seen as a treatment and a therapeutic intervention but the regimen is
aimed at caring for the general public. It provides a solely second order benefit. The
medical model is one of quarantine and prophylactic intervention rather than remedial or
palliative care.
479 Thomas (1972) Cited in Zimring and Hawkins (1995) p 25-26
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We saw in chapter three that there are constraints on the power of the Liberal state to
revoke the freedom of citizens. In the case of longer than normal imprisonment, it is clear
enough that the justification for this action is the protection of the public from the
harmful activities of the offenders who are incapacitated. The state that uses such
measures is acting in a paternalistic and utilitarian way - both familiar though not
necessarily liberal features of the modern state. The aim of this measure is to protect the
majority of the citizens, from the activities of those who are felt to pose some serious risk
to them. The willingness of the state to take upon itself this duty is interesting given
changes in the role of the state in 'late' or 'advanced' modern societies480. The state no
longer guarantees to provide security and protection for its citizens. Yet in introducing
longer than normal sentences for those felt to pose a risk, the state is returning to a
paternalistic and utilitarian role that is neither liberal nor consistent with other
characteristics of governance in late modern societies.
The policy of incapacitation, i.e. the practice of making it physically impossible for a
person to commit harm, takes different, though related, forms for the mentally ill and for
those found guilty of crime. The justifications for the incapacitation of both categories of
dangerous person are also different, as a result of consideration of the criteria of
rationality and the conceptual role which rationality plays in both legal and medical
discourse. As a result different policy and legislation has been implemented to deal with
both groups, in an attempt to reflect differences in rationality and hence culpability.
However, as we saw in chapter one, the distinction between incarcerating the mentally ill
'offender' in prison481 and the criminally insane 'patient' in a special hospital seems to be
blurring. This blurs the distinction between categories of 'rational and 'non-rational'
offenders. As we saw in chapter two, support for the development and implementation of
policies of social defence arise out of a pragmatic concern to prevent crime, and
incapacitation in whatever form is an important element of this. In this climate of
opinion, politicians, the media and the public care little about the justification under
which incapacitated people are held, concern is directed only at maintaining the security
of the public. Social defence policy uses incapacitation as a default mechanism for those
whom the state wishes to proactively incapacitate. As Rose notes:
480 See Rose (1999) and chapter 5 below.
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...despite their apparent complexity and heterogeneity, contemporary control
strategies do show a certain strategic coherence. They can be broadly divided
into two families: those that seek to regulate conduct by enmeshing individuals
within circuits of inclusion and those that seek to act upon pathologies through
managing a different set of circuits, circuits of exclusion.482
We saw in chapter one that there have been many attempts to place the dangerous in
'circuits of exclusion' in the past 100 years. In the following section an attempt will be
made to set out the organising assumptions of the social framework for criminal justice
and mental health practices and to interpret the political, cultural, and psychiatric
conditions which transformed these assumptions into the ruling ones of their particular
time. The analysis focuses upon the changing practices and arguments concerning the
incapacitation of dangerous offenders, since various patterns of incapacitation including
imprisonment, execution and involuntary hospitalisation have provided the most
sensitive measure of which offenders fit the prevailing definition of dangerousness.
4.8 Morale hazard and social defence
Despite the lack of overt interest in rehabilitation, the penal and psychiatric
establishments cannot give up on 'treatment' ideology because to do so would be to
undermine and devalue the dominant scientific discourse. In fact, by adopting a social
defence system which applies a purely incapacitative methodology to the management of
the dangerous, science is at risk of diminishing its role in crime reduction and control.
However, as we saw in chapter two this is avoided by the scientific enterprise shifting
away from diagnosing the best form of treatment for individual offenders and towards
diagnosing the best form of protection (quarantine) for the public though the use of
actuarial and probabilistic methods.
Incapacitation through imprisonment is justified as providing protection of the public
from those offenders sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and also as a crime-
reducing measure for those undergoing short periods of imprisonment. But where
incapacitation is used without a commensurate programme of rehabilitation or deterrence
481 Although prison may be situated in 'the community', see chapter one.
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we are in danger of promoting a situation that insurance analysts term 'morale hazard'483.
Morale hazard occurs when the incentives of a policy holder shift in a particular way
following the purchase of insurance such that the policy holder is at more risk of
suffering loss following the taking out of insurance than he or she was prior to
purchasing the insurance policy. Morale hazard is not be confused with moral hazard
which is the tendency of a person to commit fraud having secured insurance cover.
Morale hazard involves no deliberate intention to claim the insurance but describes an
increased relaxation of the safeguards that prevent losses and subsequent claims.
In the case of dangerous offenders, the state is at risk of morale hazard if it relies
exclusively on incapacitation for crime control. The rhetoric calls for the incapacitation
of the 'core offenders' who commit most crime and offers the simple claim that if these
people are prevented from re-offending crime rates will fall. The motivation of the state
to use other methods to reduce crime is diminished because the theory claims that it can
both reduce crime and protect the public through incapacitation (and incidentally that
nothing else works). Political and fiscal responsibilities such as the improvement of
inadequate housing and poor educational opportunities can be ignored and their
crimogenic influences discounted. Those who desire to obtain additional 'insurance' and
have the means to do so will also rely upon privately managed situational crime control
measures to supplement the publicly sponsored (although in part privately operated)
incapacitation of known offenders.
If morale hazard occurs in the penal system as a result of an over reliance on
incapacitation to reduce crime, advocates of incapacitation are forced to ignore
uncontroversial data of offending behaviour484 which suggest that incapacitation
following conviction will never be sufficient to reduce crime to acceptable levels,
particularly in environments where there is no situational crime control. The rhetoric of
incapacitation satisfies many of the political and organisational demands of the criminal
justice system, especially the calls for public protection by advocates of the victims of
crime. Incapacitation may even, as Durkheim's theory of punishment suggests, lead to an
482 Rose (2000) p 187
483 See Heimer (1985)
484 E.g. Data which suggest that many offenders are not caught and will never be subject
to an incapacitative disposal.
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increase in social cohesion through the act of punishment. As crime control however, the
evidence provided by comparative rates of imprisonment shows that incapacitation at
levels much higher than are currently used in the UK will not have substantial effects on
the rates of criminal activity and the harms caused by dangerous offenders. The dilemma
of incapacitation may be that as a result of morale hazard, it leads to more crime rather
than less.
4.9 Conclusion
This argument of this chapter has been that, despite a failure of criminological science to
provide a 'solution' to the problem of the offending in general and the 'dangerous'
offender in particular, scientific discourse is a fundamental element of the decision
process with respect to violent and sexual offenders and the imposition of longer than
normal punishment. Scientific language and methodology provide an important source of
authority for decision making which would otherwise appear to be based on non-rational
and emotional responses. A society which takes social defence as its implicit approach to
crime control may appear to be vulnerable to the demands of its citizens for a response to
particular incidents and fears. The use of high status medical and actuarial calculations
avoids the problem of the state appearing to impose punishment on non rational grounds.
As Rose notes, these scientific techniques need only to be gestured at for their force to be
felt:
The languages of description and techniques of calculation that are pervading the
work of control professions may be probabilistic, but they are seldom actuarial,
and are often only weakly numericised. For the control professionals, it is
probably better to understand what is happening in terms of the emergence and
routinisation of a particular style of thought: risk thinking. This is concerned
with bringing possible future undesired events into calculations in the present,
making their avoidance the central object of decision-making processes, and
administering individuals, institutions, expertise and resources in the service of
that ambition485.
485 Rose (2000) p 197-8
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Science provides authority for the use of predictive judgements even when these are
being formulated not by scientists but by sentencers. The apparent confusion that exists
over the distribution of the care and punishment that of mentally disordered offenders
and patients causes little concern in an environment of social defence which will tolerate
rehabilitation and/or incapacitation, delivered in the community, hospitals or prisons, as
long as such measures work effectively to protect the public.
Although it is recognised that no human is perfectly rational, the ability to connect
desires and action is an important constituent of humanity. Thus, for the most part it is
assumed that people act in particular ways because they have made a rational decision to
do so. The criminal justice system reflects this outlook as it is a requirement of criminal
liability that an offender is responsible for the prohibited act that he or she has
committed. If a rational criminal is convicted of a crime and receives a proportionate
punishment, there is no threat to the status of the offender as a rational actor. The state
has an obligation to protect its citizens from dangers, but it cannot act on the basis of a
prediction as to what a rational offender will do as this removes from the offender the
opportunity to choose to confound the prediction. This argument demonstrates that it is
potentially a threat to the human status of a rational individual if that person receives a
longer than normal sentence of imprisonment on the basis that he or she may commit a
more serious act in the future.
This position is different for a non rational offender. In this situation, medicine provides
a model for the incapacitation of the 'dangerous' offender through the concept of
coercive quarantine. The medical use of quarantine is only used in extreme situations, not
when there is merely a high probability of the transmission of disease to others but when
the harm to others is unavoidable. Quarantine is invoked when the transmission of
disease would occur regardless of the actions or choices of the individuals who has been
placed under quarantine. Such a situation is uncommon in the criminal justice
framework. If a person was unable to prevent him or herself from committing a
prohibited violent or sexual act, then it is difficult to see how this person could be seen as
responsible for his or her actions. If the harm posed by an offender is truly unavoidable
then that person is not amenable to the deterrent or rehabilitative measures applied by the
criminal justice system. No argument would persuade this offender that ceasing
offending is in his or her best interests as whether or not the person agreed, the harm
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which he or she is going to cause will occur. In such cases it is difficult to describe this
offender as rational. If the offender is unable to exercise choices, or to act on the choice
he or she makes, then that person should not be considered rational and should not be
liable to a criminal justice disposal. In this case, then, a form of civil quarantine, such as
a hospital order under mental health legislation may be appropriate and will be justified.
For the non-rational 'offender', this disposal does not interfere with their essential
humanity, because they are being responded to in a way which recognizes some
difference or pathology.
The non rational potentially violent person shares some of the characteristics with the
disease carrying person. Both are unable to take measures to prevent the harm that they
may pose to others. In both cases, only quarantine is sufficient to prevent the commission
of future harm to others. Yet the theoretical justification for incapacitating the
'dangerous' person is more compelling as the 'quarantine' measure of incapacitation
provides a first order benefit to the individual whose harmful behaviour is thwarted. The
first order benefit is the absence of future liberty reducing punishment which may have
occurred if the act had been committed. For the disease carrying patient, quarantine poses
only the flimsiest of first order benefits, and quarantine primarily results in second order
benefits.
However, despite the fact that the political justification favours the use of 'quarantine'
for the 'dangerous' person, the evidential difficulties rule this out. It is impossible to
know which offender poses a threat such that only incapacitation will suffice to prevent
future serious violent acts. There is no equivalent of the 'disease' for which no other
measure short of quarantine is suitable. In the case of 'dangerous' rational persons, the
criminal justice system includes within its remit a range of inchoate offences, including
criminal attempts where it is not necessary for a harmful act to have been committed486.
As well, serious violent or sexual offences will attract long determinate sentences of
imprisonment which will effectively incapacitate the perpetrators of such offences. So,
not only is there a huge evidential problem in the identification of the 'dangerous' person
but there are alternative ways in which the 'dangerous' offender can be incapacitated.
486 Padfield (2002) chapter seven
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There is therefore no justification for the use of 'quarantine' or 'civil detention' type
measures for rational offenders who have not yet committed a dangerous act.
The use of incapacitation, whether it is general or selective and wherever it occurs is
aimed at crime reduction. Keeping a large number of citizens in prison or hospital is
expensive and diverts resources from other state funded amenities. A policy of using
secure accommodation to incapacitate 'dangerous' offenders can only be contemplated if
it has some positive benefits for the society in which it is employed. However, such a
policy runs the risk of creating a society that suffers from 'morale hazard'. Government
and citizens place their faith in the use of the prison to solve the problem of crime and
relax their guard feeling that no other measures are as successful or necessary. If rates of
imprisonment fail to reduce crime then more and more prisons are required to be built.
This may result in less effort and money is used to combat crime in other ways, e.g. by
looking at the social and economic conditions which the proponents of the (largely
untried) sociological positivist theories claimed gives rise to high crime rate
communities. Therefore, prioritizing the use of incapacitation to the detriment of other
crime reductive measures runs the risk that levels of crime will rise as a result.
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CHAPTER FIVE
JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INCAPACITATIVE SENTENCES
The longer than normal sentence of imprisonment as permitted by s.(2)(2)(b) of the 1991
Criminal Justice Act is an extraordinarily powerful instrument. The Act gives sentencers
the power to incapacitate an offender by the use of disproportionate punishment imposed
for crimes which he or she has not yet committed. This thesis gives an account of the
way in which one legal jurisdiction in a modern liberal state developed legislation which
permits the punishment of an individual citizen more severely than is deserved, on the
basis of a prediction about future behaviour, even though there may be no evidence that
the citizen has acted in the predicted way before. The thesis argues that the apparent
justifications for the use of such a measure are inadequate and puts forward arguments to
show that the measure is illiberal and incompatible with the moral and political
foundations of the state.
No liberal state ought to contemplate a measure such as s.2(2)(b), as it severely impinges
on the liberty of citizens, citizens who have not committed the act for which the
punishment is imposed. Punishing someone for something they have not yet done will
inevitably mean that some offenders are punished for crimes which they would not have
committed had they remained at large. Yet this law, which is still in force in England and
Wales, received very little media interest at the time it was introduced and continues to
fail to attract attention outside of the academic literature. Part of the explanation for this
is that, although it is prima facie illiberal, such sentencing is also prima facie utilitarian.
Incapacitation via imprisonment, like the incapacitation of quarantine, is invoked for
public policy reasons, the understandable desire to prevent the public from being
subjected to the activities of those who may cause them harm. But it is not enough to
assert that such a measure is utilitarian, a policy of undeserved incapacitative punishment
must be supported by a considered moral and political justification if it is to be
acceptable in a modern liberal society.
The thesis considered the historical, political and sociological foundations of the
imposition of incapacitative undeserved punishment and some elements of similar
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controversies in mental health. The 1991 Act can only be understood in the context of
changes in the British society throughout the 20th century, but particularly in the post war
period. This time span has seen remarkable changes, not the least of which has been a
phenomenal rise in the level of recorded crime. The rise in crime was accompanied by:
• the introduction of a variety of new punishment styles;
• an increase in the level of imprisonment;
• the rise and decline of the rehabilitative justification for imprisonment;
• a related loss of faith in medicine's ability to treat certain types of mental
illness;
• changes in the economic and structural constitution of government
organisations including privatisation in the prison sector and the development
of agencies removed from their central government funding departments;
• a change in the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and the
legislature;
• the development of academic research in criminology and its gradual,
intermittent influence on criminal justice and penal policy.
All of these changes in economic, cultural, intellectual and political attitudes meant that
the discourse surrounding the crime and punishment changed considerably over the
century. Particularly in the last two decades of the 20th century, new modes of thought
and analysis were invoked to try and control crime and manage offenders. In the febrile
environment of punitive political rhetoric and media interest in crime at this time, it was
perhaps not surprising that an illiberal measure which was novel and qualitatively
different, yet which could offer a guarantee that it would protect the public to some
extent, could be introduced without controversy and criticism.
We saw in chapter one that the state must articulate and justify the imposition of
punishment if punishment is to be imposed legitimately. Longstanding jurisprudential
principles state that punishment must be deserved and result from the commission of a
proscribed act. These principles derive from sources as ancient as the magna carta and
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are an important safeguard against the improper use of power by the state. Without the
existence of constraining principles the state would have unlimited power to exercise
coercive control over citizens. Despite the presence of the ancient principles of criminal
law, there are common and unremarkable exceptions to these principles and to the
principles of sentencing. The use of longer than normal imprisonment on 'innocent'
offenders provides an exception to the general criteria for the imposition of punishment.
S.2(2)(b) provides a specific variation from the principle of proportionality that is the
foundation of the 1991 Act, and the principle of parsimony in the use of imprisonment,
which has long been a recurrent goal of English penal law. The 1991 Act brings into
English law the opportunity for sentencers to pass penal measures on the assumption that
the offender will, in future, commit crimes more serious than the one that is currently
before the court and more serious than he or she has committed, to date. This unique
power highlights the significance of the new penal paradigm brought in by the 1991
Criminal Justice Act which includes pre-emptive incapacitation as a general aim of
punishment.
The 20th century saw many attempts to control those whom it was felt were particularly
threatening to individuals or to the stability of British society. Starting with the 1908
Prevention ofCrime Act, English legislation has attempted to use the prison as a site of
incapacitation of the 'dangerous'. The 1908 Act enabled a sentencer to add a period of
between 5 and 10 years to the sentence of penal servitude if an offender was found to be
a 'habitual offender'. The incapacitation of habitual offenders attracted criticism that it
was falling on inappropriate offenders who did not require such stringent measures. Thus
preventive detention provisions in the 1948 Criminal Justice Act were aimed at serious
offenders rather than habitual offenders who appeared to be impervious to reform.
Although these measures were designed to prevent offending by incapacitating the
offender, the sentences were imposed as a consequence of the offender's dangerousness
as judged by the current offence and criminal record. None of these incapacitative
provisions was ever heavily used and they were criticised for promoting extreme
disparities in sentences.
Incapacitation is not only used in the standard criminal justice context. It has been
considered as particularly advantageous in the prevention of the harm that may be posed
by 'dangerous' mentally disordered people under mental health legislation. But there is a
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tension between the criminal justice and medical provisions for the mentally disordered,
convicted and unconvicted offenders. Recent policy papers suggest that the government
may be considering the reintroduction of indeterminate sentences which could be served
either in prisons or in medical establishments. As the prison has traditionally not been
considered an appropriate location for the delivery of mental health treatment, this policy
development will require that the concept of care delivered in 'the community' be
extended to include the prison. The concept of a prison sentence partially served 'in the
community' also suggests that there is a deliberate blurring of the distinction between the
prison, other penal measures and health care. The blurring of the distinction between the
prison and the community and between imprisonment and other penalties distracts
attention from the fundamentally different nature of imprisonment and the qualitatively
different experience of being punished in this way. As a result, the sentence of
imprisonment is not seen as being particularly special; it is just the endpoint of a
spectrum of penal measures all of which remove liberty. But this ignores the social,
psychological and cultural significance of the sentence of imprisonment.
In chapter two it was observed that the preventive detention elements of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991 reflect a frustration with crime reduction policies and a retreat to the
most secure crime reduction technique - incapacitation. Governments have tacitly
admitted that they cannot completely control crime. Yet they are faced with a legitimacy
crisis as crime is one of the few visible domains of public welfare over which they still
claim total and exclusive responsibility487. In the absence ofwar, government obligations
to the people such as defence, diplomacy and development seem distant to most people.
Economic sovereignty has been reduced, as has the state's influence over agricultural,
environmental and trade policy through participation in the European Union and through
the machinations of the world economy. Even health care has become less of a state
monopoly with the growth of private hospitals and insurance provision. Just as social
contract theorists see the maintenance of order and stability as the overriding goal of the
state, the criminal justice system remains a central area of concern for government and an
area in which they must demonstrate their authority and influence.
487
Although forms of private policing exist, the state has exclusive responsibility for
punishment. If it did not, then vigilantism would be more prevalent and possibly bring
about a spiral of retaliation.
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A decline in the belief in positivist criminological 'knowledge' to reduce crime rates
generally and to provide a method for preventing the occurrence of serious crimes led to
the perspective known as 'new penology'. New penology takes a hyper-rational view of
crime prevention and adopts a prudential approach to the allocation of resources.
However, when it was introduced into public policy, the new penology lacked media and
judicial support. This fact, together with the co-incidence of that highest profile crime of
the past 30 years occurred, brought about a revised form of the new penology with an
added element of punitiveness and a reduction in concerns about the efficient use of
resources. The model of social defence best describes English criminal justice in the late
20th century and there is evidence of social defence thinking in the 1991 Criminal Justice
Act.
Social defence is a pragmatic position that uses rehabilitation, reintegration, deterrence
and incapacitation in the penal and medical sector in order to prevent crime. Social
defence policy reserves imprisonment for those who either commit serious offences or
cannot be deterred or rehabilitated and thus supports the bifurcated approach to
punishment that is provided by the sentencing provisions of the 1991 Act. As well, the
longer than normal sentencing provision of s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act satisfies advocates
of punitive new penology. However, any policy of social defence welcomes pre-emptive
incapacitation to ensure that if all other measures fail, the state can prevent those whom it
fears will harm others from doing so. For all the frameworks discussed, incapacitation is
the default position, when all else seems unlikely to prevent the commission of serious
offences.
The 1991 Act takes incapacitation to a different level than the Acts which preceded it by
introducing powers that enable sentencers to use the prison for the incapacitation of those
offenders who are considered 'dangerous' even though they have not yet committed
dangerous act. By taking action against potential rather than actual threats, the state is, in
a sense, only doing that which it is requiring its citizens to do. O'Malley488 and
Garland489 have noted that as the state limits the promises it makes to its citizens,
particularly with respect to crime control, citizens are required to take on themselves the




state's version of this responsibilisation strategy. It is prudent to take action against a risk
once that risk is identified, particularly if the expertise is available to enable any risk to
be noted and calculated. Not to take action against a known risk is careless, even
negligent, and gives rise to blame. Although the state in most cases is not the direct
victim, the politics of criminal justice are tautly strung and any failure of the system is
resonates loudly in the media and in party political rhetoric. The combination of the
state's responsibilisation strategy applied to itself and the availability and confidence in
technologies of risk assessment and actuarial calculation mean that the state is compelled
to act to incapacitate those it identifies as posing a threat.
With the backdrop of a seemingly limitless increase in serious and violent crime, the
state will still respond to the commission of crime, i.e. record, investigate, detect and
apprehend the offender, arrange the trial and administer punishment, but the citizen is
primarily responsible for his or her personal security and the organisation of and payment
for private crime prevention measures. This self-reliance which is expected of citizens in
the sphere of crime prevention is noted by O'Malley490 and Ewald491 as being part of a
growing culture of prudence brought about by reduction in the promises made by the
state with respect to provision of welfare, health care, pensions etc. and an increasing
expectation that those who can afford to will make provision for themselves. Indeed for
both practical reasons, i.e. dissatisfaction with the level of provision, and political
reasons i.e. an expectation that taxation resources should be targeted at the needy rather
than the rich, a culture of prudence ensured that those who could were told that they
should ensure their own well-being in the face of the diminishing role of the state492. The
increased expectation that citizens are responsible for their own safety and security gives
rise to a heightened sense of the risk of crimes as routines of crime prevention become
familiar. This expense and behavioural changes this brings about increases public
antipathy to offending behaviour and increases levels ofpopular punitiveness.
The history of similar disproportionate detention provisions reminds us that, although s.





that preceded it, in practice the provision is doing very little that is new. As a result it
could be expected that, like its predecessors, it will fail to satisfy public and political
demands for enhanced protection from serious offenders. However, the 1991 Act came
into being a time when levels of crime and levels of punitiveness were high. Media
attention makes crime seem prevalent and very personal. So unlike the Acts that
preceded it, the 1991 Act is not likely to fall out of use because it is punishing petty
offenders too harshly. The penal climate of the 1980-90s was such that since this time
there is no such thing as a petty offence or a nuisance offender. In such a climate,
increased punitiveness combines with a call for increased protection from offenders, and
a policy of longer than normal imprisonment receives public and political support.
The 1991 Act invoked a bifurcated sentencing policy endorsing financial and community
punishments for the majority of offenders and reserving sentences of imprisonment for
cases where it was justified by the seriousness of the offence or the dangerousness of the
offender. The 1991 Act placed enormous significance on the concept of proportionality,
which had the potential to reduce sentencers' use of imprisonment, as indeed it did
temporarily following the introduction of the Act. However as the penal policy
underlying the 1991 Act could be perceived as promoting less severe sentences, the
policies had to be augmented by an increase in punitive rhetoric. Windlesham noted 'If
the belief, that had obtained such a hold on the British mind, that imprisonment was the
only real punishment for criminal offences and anything else was a soft option was to be
loosened, arguments with the power of dynamite were called for.'493 The government had
to provide evidence and reassurance that it was fulfilling its duty of protecting the public
and enabling longer than normal sentences for 'dangerous' offenders was a way of
providing such evidence.
In chapter three it was argued that the liberal state must justify any curtailment of
citizens' liberty on the basis that the state's action will either increase the overall liberty
of the individual involved or increase the liberty of other individuals. Liberalism requires
that utilitarian judgements be constrained, to protect those citizens whose interests and
desires are different from those of the majority. Nevertheless, the modern state takes as
492 This is apparent through state support for private crime prevention organisations such
as Neighbourhood Watch
493 Windlesham (1993a) p253
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its legitimate responsibility the protection of citizens and justifies its formal monopoly
over crime control and punishment as being constitutive of this responsibility. The state's
responsibilities to its citizens are to help citizens attain their own version of the good life
in so far as this does not interfere with others' efforts to achieve their own, different
version of the good life. But liberal states can do this in a number of ways, by
withdrawing from citizens' lives as far as possible, or by intervening to facilitate, through
the provision of a level of minimum services, to provide citizens with the ability to
determine their version of the good life. Following Isaiah Berlin, the former is called
'negative' liberty, the latter 'positive' liberty.
The UK is an example of a state that provides positive liberty in the form of welfare,
healthcare and education for citizens. However, the provision of benefits necessarily
involves the state intervening in the lives of citizens. Where this intervention acts upon
an individual and provides a benefit for that individual, a first-order benefit results.
Where the state intervention acts upon an individual but the benefits are produced for one
or more other people, a solely second order benefit is the result. State intervention which
aims to prevent offending produces first and second order benefits, intervention which
aims to prevent re-offending tend to produce second order benefits. The main argument
of this section is that longer than normal punishment of the 'innocent' exemplified by
s.2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act gives rise to a solely second order benefit. As
s.2(2)(b) is a unique provision based on predictive judgements which are difficult to
measure or verify, and is applied to offenders on a discretionary basis, the use of
s.2(2)(b) redistributes the benefits of state intervention in an unequal way. The offender
who is subject to a longer than normal sentence is not treated in the same way as other
citizens or even other offenders. The provision is therefore illiberal and its use cannot be
justified in a liberal state.
Chapter four looked at the role of science in criminological and criminal justice
discourse and practice. As was noted in chapter two, positivist criminological theory was
the predominant explanatory paradigm for most of the 20th century. From the mid 1970s
however, this paradigm became discredited although both criminologists and policy
makers continue to rely on scientific methodology in the pursuit of harm prevention
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strategies. Scientific concepts, like their legal counterparts, are social constructions and
can be exploited for political or cultural reasons. The use of the notion of 'risk' in the
criminal justice context offers a spurious scientific credibility to the determination of
'dangerousness', a term so vague as to be meaningless. It is also, for the most part an
unnecessary term, as, under the 1991 Act serious violent or sexual offending will
naturally attract a proportionate, long (and hence incapacitative) sentence of
imprisonment.
Norbert Elias' theory of the civilising process explains why there is an element of
emotional, non-rational response to criminality. But the modern state cannot punish or
incapacitate offenders on the basis of the emotional response that their offending arouses.
Sacred scientific concepts are thus utilised in the determination of 'the dangerous'
notwithstanding the demise of belief in positivist criminological theories. However,
although social changes explain the development of policy of social defence, this policy
does not justify the use of disproportionate, predictive, incapacitative sentences of
imprisonment, for 'dangerous' offenders. This measure gives rise to solely second order
benefits and, as was argued in chapter three, is thereby ruled out as being inappropriate
for a liberal state.
It has been argued494 that the 1991 Act contains within it a vision of the individual
offender as not 'morally' guilty. Rather the Act conceives of offenders as more or less
'dangerous' as a result of the use of aggregate notions of risk and insurance. This may be
partially true, however in a period of heightened concern over levels of crime,
distinctions between more and less dangerous offenders become redundant. All offenders
are considered to be straightforwardly dangerous and liable to severe sentences. There
have been several approaches taken to try and identify those offenders who are felt to
pose a threat to the public. These attempts fit within a policy of social defence which
seeks to protect the public from the harm of criminal activity in any way that is believed
to be effective, regardless of ideology. The characteristics of those whom it is thought
necessary or beneficial to identify as 'the dangerous' vary, as we have seen, but the
requirement to identify and symbolically separate the group of people to be controlled
494 Robinson (1996) pi25
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from the general community, endures. And the discourses of risk, danger and insurance
do not replace the older emotional and non rational response to offending and to
offenders, as is shown by the tone of crime reporting in many English newspapers.
Yet this division of people into those who are and who are not worthy of inclusion within
a society which offers respect, rights and the status of citizens is, in modern liberal
political theory, problematic. Liberal political systems start from the fundamental
premise that all humans are equal. In other words all people share equal rights and status.
This premise underpins the freedoms that all citizens of the liberal state are held to enjoy
- at least in principle. It has been argued that when the individual cannot participate in the
liberal political processes as a result of a lack of rationality, some civil incapacitative
disposals may be justified and appropriate. However, the development of longer than
normal sentences and other forms of pre-emptive incapacitation withdraws the rights of
rational citizens to presumptions of innocence which apply to all other citizens and all
other offenders. Those subjected to such provisions find their status as rational human
beings revoked despite not having done anything that would normally require the repeal
of rights and citizenship.
Scientific conceptions of the 'dangerous' exist in the medical context as well as the
criminal justice sphere where the equivalent concept to incapacitation is quarantine.
Quarantine is imposed upon a disease sufferer when nothing that that person could do
short of submitting to quarantine will prevent the transmission of the harmful disease.
The equivalent case in the criminal justice sphere is a 'dangerous' offender whose
actions are so uncontrollable, that nothing the offender (or anyone else) can do, short of
submitting to an incapacitative disposal, will nullify the threat that this offender poses.
The offender who fits this profile is non-rational as his or her behaviour is not amenable
to any influence, and the offender is not responsible for his or her harmful actions. As a
result of the offender's lack of responsibility, culpability, and liability for an offence, a
criminal justice sentence is not appropriate. However, if evidential factors point to an
imminent act with a high probability of serious harm, then such a person may be liable to
an incapacitative civil measure in order to prevent the commission of harm to others.
Unfortunately for advocates of pre-emptive incapacitation such as s.2(2)(b) of the 1991
Criminal Justice Act, the evidential difficulties are too great to justify such a measure
and are sufficient to exclude the use of longer than normal imprisonment.
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For the rational offender, pre-emptive incapacitation does not correspond with the
medical concept of quarantine and any coercive act which relies on a prediction or
judgement of a person's future behaviour, assumes that the person subjected to such
measures will not use his or her rational capacity to make choices whether or not to
commit prohibited acts. Predicting the behaviour of rational citizens and co-ercively
intervening in their lives is a non-liberal act which threatens citizens' essential humanity
by depriving them of the opportunity to exercise rational choices. On this basis s.2(2)(b)
of the 1991 Act is ruled out as invasive and illiberal.
This thesis has shown that whilst the use of longer than normal sentences of
imprisonment imposed on offenders predicted to be dangerous can be explained by the
social, political and epistemological developments that occurred in England and Wales at
the end of the 20th century, such measures cannot be justified under liberal political
principles. That this measure was introduced and has been adopted without public
disapprobation is explicable only in the context of a society experiencing a heightened
awareness of and fear of crime. That this measure has remained largely unchallenged for
over a decade suggests that it is unlikely to be abolished in the near future. Indeed, pre¬
emptive incapacitative disposals are likely to become more common in both the medical
and criminal justice contexts. It is therefore essential that the threat that such measures
pose to liberal political structures is made apparent. It is not sufficient to say that in a
democracy, the acquiescence of citizens to illiberal measures validates these illiberal
measures. S. 2(2)(b) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act provides an example of the extent
to which the state is prepared to depart from important legal and political principles. To
the extent that such departures go largely unchallenged in the public domain, then the
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